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This thesis answers the following question: “Does the practice and theory of 
modern Transnational Juridical Institutions impact upon the development and 
maintenance of International Security within the complex of the Civil Military relation’s 
paradigm, and if so, how?” Therefore it examines the effects of International Juridical 
Institutions upon the relations between civil authorities and the military structure within 
modern states. Since 1945 the international community has constituted four ad hoc 
tribunals, namely the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Their mandate was to bring to 
justice those who have committed grave breaches of international law by the waging of 
aggressive war, crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against 
peace; crimes committed with the use of the military. Their jurisprudence significantly 
challenged the relations between the military the state and the society not only in the state 
they had or have jurisdiction but worldwide. They have affected constitutions, attitudes, 
education, training, roles and missions of the military and posed limitations to the state by 
influencing domestic or international social and legal order. These changes within the 
civil-military relations and international security promoted by these international criminal 
courts highlights that international justice could be used as a useful political instrument. 
Hence, they were a success. However, the current political debate under the new 
permanent International Criminal Court reveals that systemic international justice has not 
matured yet to meet the needs of a world equipped with a plethora of weapons and highly 
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This thesis examines the practice and theory of the four ad hoc criminal tribunals, 
namely the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia at 
The Hague, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at Arusha. This was 
done through the prism of civil-military relations and their dynamics.  
The abovementioned tribunals have shown that international unwillingness to 
accept serious violations of international crimes is no longer a theoretical concept, and 
that is what is expected from them: to send the signal that impunity is no longer tolerable. 
In doing so, they significantly challenged the relations between the military, the state, and 
the society not just in the state that had or have jurisdiction but worldwide.  
The International Military Tribunals produced principles that were codified as 
international law and influenced societies by serving as symbols; states and state behavior 
through their constitution, legislation, and appealing to the public; armed forces through 
education, changing traditions, training in new missions, and forging a cult of obedience 
in international law. Although Germany and Japan had been for many years under 
occupation, credit has to be given to the IMTs for the establishment of democratic civil-
military relations in them. Furthermore, even though the IMTs had taken place more than 
fifty years ago they still influence policies and affect the armed forces in terms of 
training, education, designing missions and being deployed. New missions in terms of 
stability operations require knowledge of terms like “aggression,” “proportional force,” 
“war crimes,” “genocide,’” and “crimes against humanity,” a terminology that was first 
established in those criminal tribunals after the Second World War.  
Moreover, a new doctrine in the post Cold War era has been introduced, that 
includes among others respect for human rights. In countries such as the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda during the last decade even human dignity has been trampled on 
a large scale. By punishing those responsible for the horrific crimes in those states a 
powerful message to the political, military authorities, and warlords is delivered 
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worldwide: one day sooner or later they will be brought to justice. This is exactly what 
the ICTY and the ICTR are trying to do. 
Their mandate is not to develop international law; those standards already exist. 
By continuing the momentum of the IMTs, they have caused significant legal 
developments; even diffusion effects in national legislations and in the United Nations as 
the cases of Pinocet and the internationalized tribunals are showing. However, their 
mandate should be considered also in a narrower terms, i.e. in being a part of the tool kit 
for building confidence and reconciliation in their post-conflict societies and prevent 
destabilization of their regions. Both tribunals showed as long as they are supported in 
their efforts they are successful in fulfilling their mandate. Likewise, the ad hoc tribunals’ 
contribution within the civil-military relations should be examined under that prism. So 
far even being supported by the West changes started emerging only recently, and is the 
future that prove them real or just cosmetic; a hypocrisy by the elites holding office to 
provide themselves with aid, to eliminate their rivals, and to consolidated power.  
The time and effort required to establish, make them functional, and to provide 
the necessary logistics for the above tribunals brought the Security Council to a point of 
“tribunal fatigue” that led to the establishment of the ICC. The debate over the latter, and 
the United States refusal to ratify it, has resulted in two major outcomes. The first is that 
efforts for prosecuting war criminals and promoting international justice lost their major 
contributor both in personnel and logistics, the United States of America and, second that 
the possible U.S. military withdrawal from current peacekeeping operations like the ones 
in East Timor and Bosnia, would affect roles and missions of the U.S. military, by 
limiting their participation in U.N. peacekeeping.  
The abovementioned research highlighted that international justice can be used as 
a useful policy instrument to promote democratic civil-military relations. It effects 
Constitutions, attitudes, education, training, roles and missions of the armed forces and 
poses limitations to the state and the military through the established legal order in terms 





Historically, the areas of common international concern, on the global or 
international level, were the guides for enforcing international law. It was the interests of 
the Western powers, after the experiences they had had with totalitarian regimes in the 
World Wars, that prompted them to set up international machinery to ensure among 
others the protection of certain values, and to prescribe rules of conduct for the armed 
forces, the use of these forces by the states and the relation of both state and military 
authorities with the society. This machinery includes widely different bodies with rather 
few commonalities; from third party adjudicative mechanisms and dispute settlements 
regimes, to criminal tribunals.  
In that effort not all attempts were successful. Five Central American nations on 
December 20, 1907 tried to establish a regional and transnational court. This Central 
American Court of Justice failed mainly due to the lack of independence of judges, 
overly broad jurisdiction, and the absence of satisfactory procedure. 1 
It was the First World War that marked a new phase in the historical development 
of international juridical bodies, and in the criminal responsibility for war crimes due to 
the flagrancy and cruelty of the laws of war violations. After the end of the First World 
War, under the pressure of the public opinion in the victors’ countries and during the 
Versailles peace negotiations, 901 accused war criminals were to be indicted.2 These 
criminals were both civilian and military authorities thus international law was brought 
into the dynamic of the relations between the state, the military, and the society, or the 
civil-military relations framework. 
Nevertheless, the attempts to bring German military officers to justice proved 
ineffective. The different positions taken by each of the Allied Powers allowed the 
                                                 
1 World courts, The Central American Court of Justice-Introduction. 
Available [online] at: http://www.worldcourts.com/cacj/eng/intro.htm,  10/10/2002. 
 2 J.Holmes Armstead Jr, The International Criminal Court: History, Development and Status, Santa 
Clara Law Review, Vol. 38, No 3, 1998, p. 746. 
2 
Germans to achieve a compromise, so that accused German war criminals could be tried 
from the German Supreme Court in Leipzig. The trials began in May 1921, and lasted 
until June 1922 in an atmosphere of “patriotic indignation”3 resulted in only thirteen 
convictions.4   
During the interwar period there was an effort to restrict the freedom of states in 
their choice of means of warfare, and in outlawing war as an act. In such an attempt in 
1919 the Permanent Court of International Justice (1922-1946) or PCIJ, was established. 
Likewise in 1926, a permanent International Criminal Court was proposed, during the 
thirty-fourth Conference of the International Law Association held in Vienna. However, 
the idea of suppressing acts committed either by states or individuals endangering peace 
was still regarded as a manifestation of a dangerous revolutionary sentiment. As a result, 
the attempts by the victors of the First World War did not result in the control of the 
military in the defeated countries or in increased international security. Empirical 
evidence of similar attempts after the end of the Second World War however, appear to 
be totally different, with the establishment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and- 
mainly-with the International Military Tribunals (IMT) in Nuremberg and Tokyo.  
The ICJ or World Court, which sits at The Hague, in The Netherlands was created 
in 1945 to decide, in accordance with international law, on disputes submitted to it by 
states. A case can only be submitted to the ICJ with the consent of the states concerned. It 
is this agreement that determines the jurisdiction of the court.5 Furthermore, on August 8, 
1945 the allied powers acting in the interests of all the United Nations (U.N.) members 
set up the first International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg for the war criminals 
of the European Axis that resulted to real punishments and significant jurisprudence. 
Along with the next IMT at Tokyo were the turning point in the history of international 
                                                 
 3 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Vet Nanda et al, A treatise in International Criminal Law, Vol. 1, Thomas, 
1973, p.568. 
 4 J.Holmes Armstead Jr., The International Criminal Court: History, Development and Status,  p. 746. 
 5 ICJ has jurisdiction over a dispute only if either the parties bilaterally agree to submit an already 
existing dispute to it, if treaties or conventions in force confer jurisdiction to it, or if the state has declared 
the acceptance of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction. Between 1946 and July 1, 1996, the court was called 
upon to deal with 74 cases in which it delivered 61 judgments, made 295 orders, dealt with 22 advisory 
cases, delivered 23 advisory opinions, and made 32 orders. See Case Summaries, United Nations. Available 
[online] at: 
 www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibbbook/Bbookchapter8index.htm, 1/15/2002. 
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criminal law, which however influenced the rest of the post Second World War national 
military tribunals and trials and still influence national and international actors today. 
These successful attempts have significant political reasoning behind them; the 
perceived evil of Nazism was far deeper and more pervasive than that of Imperial 
Germany in the First World War. The crimes of the German and the Japanese authorities 
during the Second World War had reached dimensions unparalleled in human history.  
The pressure from world opinion and the need not to condemn the entire Axis population 
as the Cold War was imminent and both East and West needed support to consolidate 
their respective positions caused official attitudes to change. Hence, the international 
community focused on enforcing more effective sanctions, a policy that found support 
from the interwar development of the laws of war. Therefore, for the first time those 
responsible for waging a war of aggression or responsible for atrocities or other crimes 
under international law, were subjected to real penalties. The previous tactic used in the 
First World War to have individuals prosecuted and punished by their own countries 
tribunals was now abandoned as futile. In that spirit, the first IMT, the Nuremberg 
Tribunal lasted eleven months, and out of the twenty-one defendants in custody (one 
indicted Nazi, Martin Bormann, was indicted in absentia, though never found), a total of 
eleven were sentenced to death, three were acquitted and the rest received extended 
prison terms. Likewise, the second IMT, the International Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMFTE) was set by the Allied Supreme Commander in the Far East, General Douglas 
MacArthur, on January 19, 1946. The trials began on May 3, 1946, and lasted two and a 
half years. On November 4, 1948 the tribunal’s president Sir William Webb from 
Australia announced that all of the defendants had been found guilty. Seven were 
sentenced to death, sixteen to life terms, two to lesser terms, two had died during the 
trials, and one had been found insane. 
Although the above trials have been criticized as “victor’s justice” it was the first 
time that international criminal law had been rigorously and effectively enforced. The 
coerciveness of the tribunals, the new focus on the principle of individual responsibility 
among the military and the government officials through a trial process has set a 
precedent. Through focusing on individuals from the military and the government the 
stigma of collective guilt was lessened to the German and Japanese people, and bolstered 
4 
the institutionalization of their countries towards democratic regimes. Constitutions were 
created with provisions for the democratic control of the military, and the citizenry did 
not have the notion of humiliation as much as after the end of the First World War. 
Furthermore, they created an evolution of political, military and legal accountability. 
With the effective enforcement of international law a powerful message has been sent to 
the individuals in power that they cannot commit genocides and crimes against humanity 
with a sense of impunity. Indeed, the democratic control of the military both in Germany 
and in Japan is not questioned today, and much credit has to be given to those tribunals. 
The ideas and principles set by the IMTs have developed gradually. The principal 
impetus has been the United Nations and in particular the United Nations General 
Assembly, first in the Charter itself, further in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948, then in the 1948 Genocide Convention, and afterwards in a series of 
treaties adopted over the past several decades. Likewise, the legal institution building 
continued with the establishment, among others, of the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal on November 24, 1949 by General Assembly Resolution 351A (IV) in an 
attempt to pass judgments upon applications alleging non-observance of contracts of 
employment of staff members or of their terms of appointment, and the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) located in Hamburg, Germany, by the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982, which entered into 
force on November 16, 1994. ITLOS works as “one of the means for the settlements of 
disputes concerning the interpretation of the Convention.”6 The Europeans had moved in 
a similar direction with the establishment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1952 
as the judicial institution of the Community, and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) in 1959 which evolved in 1998 in a new ECHR as the means for enforcing the 
obligations arising from the European Convention of Human Rights and its Protocols, for 
the contracting states. Although these courts are transnational and more regional than 
international, they influence not only the members of the European Union (E.U.) but are 
respected worldwide. Furthermore, their role is vital, constructive, and innovative for the 
                                                 
 6  International Law, United Nations.  
Available [online] at: www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/specil.htm, 1/13/2002. 
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states that applied or are going to apply for membership in the E.U. and set a new 
standard of acceptance for regional transnational juridical bodies. 
However, during the Cold War the bipolar split in world politics and its 
aggravation of tensions between the developed and developing worlds hobbled 
international institutions. International law developed quickly but its international 
monitoring and enforcing mechanisms remained highly politicized or quasi-judicial in the 
best of the cases. Human values and international law were seen as the ideological bent of 
the West. Under that perspective, the ECHR and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACHR) had strong monitoring powers but limited enforcement capabilities. 
After the end of the Cold War the United Nations provided an answer to the 
demand for peace and security. The Security Council now personified the central norms 
and values of the international community and became the major instrument for 
promoting and establishing stability. The states now were not conceived as a source of 
protection but also as a source of harm causing instability and security crises. The post-
communist countries received major international influence in achieving their transition 
to democracy and establishing democratic civil-military relations. Democracy was 
accepted now as the cornerstone of international stability. Moreover, places that would 
have been considered of relatively little significance in the previous Cold War setting 
have now became important, e.g. the case of Somalia. Therefore, the Security Council 
has set up ad hoc tribunals in order to solve immediate problems in cases where the civil 
society was too weak to bring to justice the accused individuals.  
Hence, the horrific events in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia led the United 
Nations (U.N.) to establish ad hoc tribunals to prosecute persons responsible for genocide 
and violations of international humanitarian law. On May 25, 1993, Security Council 
Resolution 827 announced the creation of an international tribunal, located in The Hague 
(Netherlands), to prosecute those who had violated international humanitarian law in the 
former Yugoslavia, and on November 8, 1994 the U.N. set another tribunal located in 
Arusha (United Republic of Tanzania) to prosecute the persons responsible for genocide 
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda and its 
6 
neighboring states between January 1 and December 31, 1994.7 The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has eighty indictees, forty-nine of them 
are currently in proceedings before the tribunal, and thirty-one remain at large.8 The 
International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its first indictment against eight 
accused persons in November 8, 1995, and since then over seventy suspects have been 
indicted, of whom more than fifty have been taken into custody. Of those so far 
apprehended, the trials of nine have been completed which resulted in eight convictions 
and one acquittal. Seven trials, and two appeals are currently in progress. As a result, “the 
total of completed cases and trials in progress involve over half of the total persons 
arrested.”9  
These tribunals, through their jurisprudence, have shown that international 
criminal justice is a reality, and that the establishment of an internationally recognized 
system of justice provides a new avenue of recourse in the rule of law as an alternative to 
the use of force by individuals or states. Furthermore, the success of such institutions by 
influencing other social and political institutions and appealing to the hearts and minds of 
the people, encourages the domestic courts and other extra-judicial mechanisms to take 
up their work at a national level, and promotes national reconciliation, as well as regional 
and international security.10 The international tribunals’ jurisprudence developed into 
standards of acceptable behavior. Moreover, the legitimization of the tribunals to the 
local societies (since they represent a worldwide effort), along with the help of the 
international community enforcing practical demands (by means of sanctions and 
financial assistance), seem to be creating relative forms of stability and obedience. This 
implies obedience of the military to the elected civilian authorities and compliance of the 
latter to the Constitution. These legal and constitutional compliances are central elements 
in the dynamics of the civil-military relations since they influence military and political 
                                                 
 7United Nations Documentation: Research Guide, United Nations. 
Available[online]at: www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/specil.htm, 1/13/2002. 
 8 ICTY, ICTY at a glance, United Nations.Available [online] at: www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm, 
1/14/2002. 
 9Achievements of the ICTR, United Nations. Available [online] at: www.ictr.org, 1/14/2002. 
10 Such national behavior from the national courts can be observed in notorious human rights abuse cases 
like Pinocet in the United Kingdom and Hissene Habre in Senegal. 
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behavior ands impose limitations and restrictions from servicemen conduct to armament 
and funding policies. 
However, the “ethnic cleansing” in the former Yugoslavia had another effect 
besides the ad hoc tribunal: it speeded the structural development of a permanent court. 
Although scholars have argued for the need of an international criminal court since the 
1920s, and the U.N. recognized the need for such a court with Resolution 260 on 
December 9, 1948. Since then, the question of the establishment of an international 
criminal court has been considered periodically until 1998 when the international 
community met in Rome, Italy, from June 15 to July, 17 to finalize a draft statute which, 
when ratified, would establish such a court. Although the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) has been called the missing link in the international legal system, its creation is 
very closely bound with issues of state sovereignty. Indeed, the creation of the ICC even 
for prosecution of particularly grave international crimes finds it difficult to overcome the 
traditional notion of state. Moreover, states are still unlikely to allow international bodies 
or courts vigorously enforcing international law on their own without their consensus, 
regarding themselves as the source of law and order within their own boundaries. Until 
November 1, 2002 out of one hundred and thirty nine signatories at the Rome’s Statute of 
the ICC eighty-one are currently parties out of the sixty needed, and the ICC came in 
force on July 1, 2002.11 Nevertheless, the U.S. has refused so far to accept the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over American citizens thus reinforcing the traditional notion of state.12 
 
B. PURPOSE AND MAJOR ARGUMENT 
“Who is concerned now with the extermination of Armenians?” 
Adolf Hitler, addressing his military commanders on August 22, 1939.13 
 
                                                 
 11Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations. 
Available[online]at: 
www.untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp, 1/15/2002. 
12 Americans will be tried by U.S. courts if accused of abuses. See Ian Black, EU Caves In To 
Washington Over International Criminal Court, the Guardian/UK, 9/30/2002. Available [online] at: 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0930-01.htm, 11/1/2002. 
 13 Nuremberg, Trial Documents, Doc. L-3. 
8 
Within the framework of modern civil-military relations the civilian control of the 
armed forces is paramount. The basis of the civilian control is the lawful authority under 
the Constitution of the state, which in the modern liberal democracies accepts 
international law. Therefore, the armed forces are bound to obey international law. This 
came as a necessary means of compliance since most of the times the armed forces were 
used by their states to commit horrific crimes with the most inhumane methods, 
eliminating even their own citizens, the ones that they were supposed to protect. Hence, 
law-and international law in particular-serves as a tool to restrict the military in lawful 
actions and to provide means of accountability for the statesmen when they use their 
military in unlawful actions. 
Unfortunately, until today an international legal norm that is meant to be applied 
to all states, and especially the world powers, is a contradiction in terms because it 
presupposes the consensus for a breach in state sovereignty and a superior transnational 
authority that do not exist. Further problems arise when international law is enforced by 
international bodies, e.g., Transnational Juridical Bodies, without the consent of involved 
states, where matters concern their citizens-military or civilian-that are ordered by their 
lawfully constituted authorities to commit breaches of international law.  
Such international criminal bodies had been the four ad hoc tribunals of the 
twentieth century and the new ICC. Because no case is brought to the ICC so far the four 
ad hoc criminal tribunals are the ones that give the international community’s tone to the 
efforts of eliminating impunity and for that this thesis will concentrate heavily on them.  
Hence, this thesis answers the following question: “Does the practice and theory 
of modern Transnational Juridical Institutions impact upon the development and 
maintenance of International Security within the complex of the Civil Military relation’s 
dynamics, and if so, how?” 
The major argument is that if justice is served through institutionally mature, 
resourceful, widely representative, financially viable, and autonomous Transnational 
Juridical Institutions, then states and individuals will commit themselves further to the 
rule of law, even the most powerful states. Therefore, the executive authority of a nation-
state will have even more reason to adequately express the will of the people, the armed 
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forces will be deterred from usurping the state apparatus, and the use of the military will 
be restricted to lawful actions. Thus, justice through international law applied by 
international bodies, will be used as a catalyst in transiting and consolidating democratic 
civil-military relations. 
However, the wide variety of international bodies requires more than a master’s 
thesis to address the question in full. Hence, this thesis could not possibly examine all the 
existing Transnational Juridical Institutions. This is beyond its scope. Instead, it has a 
modest aim. It will focus the research question on the ad hoc criminal tribunals, i.e. the 
two International Military Tribunals, and the two ad hoc tribunals within the United 
Nations system, i.e. the ICTY and the ICTR. As these are the most important institutions 
presently active I will endeavor to examine their effects upon the international system 
generally and the modern civil-military relations specifically. 
Hence, if the answer to the research question is positive, these Transnational 
Juridical Institutions have served well as policy instruments, in terms that they have 
changed the modus operandi of the civilian authorities and their armed forces, and 
provided obedience of the latter to the former. Likewise, the coherent jurisprudence of 
these bodies may serve as a guiding light under the present conditions, within the United 
States and most of the Western military involved in a new war of an unprecedented 
nature, the war against terrorism, and the stability support operations in Afghanistan.  
 
C. METHODOLOGY  
The methodology used in this thesis is a historical review of international law 
concepts and civil-military relations while focusing on the jurisprudence of the four ad 
hoc Transnational Juridical Bodies of the twentieth century, namely the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda. I will examine the cases tried, interpret the judicial decisions and attempt to 
postulate the effects had upon the development of the civil-military relationship and 
concomitant state behavior. 
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Civil-military relations in this thesis are examined, in terms of the military, under 
the prism of how the military are used by their states, and how accountable they are, 
especially the officer corps. Likewise, in terms of the state, how accountable the 
statesmen are in giving unlawful orders, and what is the reaction within their societies. 
The understanding of the present thesis is not only that the military should be brought 
under civilian control, but also this control must be exercised from a democratic sate 
apparatus where the rule of law is paramount. 
Hence, the research attempts to identify variables within the framework of 
international security and civil-military relations (the answer to “how”) affected by the 
rulings and the jurisprudence of the tribunals (the presentation of “the practice and 
theory”), and by them to illustrate if civil-military relations are challenged and brought 
under democratic control by applying judicial methods. Such variables were 
constitutional and legal provisions, training, education, attitudes and traditions, roles and 
missions. All these were used in guiding the military in the normal democratic political 
process, i.e. eliminating impunity, establishing accountability, and limitating or 
refocusing roles and missions. 
Major problems contributing to the difficulty of answering the research question 
have been the paucity of data available in English on the subject. There is very little, if 
anything at all, written on the topic, and in same cases it is considered to be a “non-issue” 
(which, on the other hand, makes it an issue). However, there is good material available 
on the history and policy dynamics of the ad hoc tribunals. Therefore, the effort was to 
link generally normative concepts applied from the courts with political analysis. 
The latter however brought another major difficulty in consideration. The IMTs 
are long gone whereas the U.N. tribunals are still active; in fact they are entering now 
into a phase of maturity. Even more, lessons learned are not always relevant to all 
countries due to differences in history, security environment, and domestic structures. 
Germany and Japan were occupied for many years but are consolidated democracies 
now, whereas Yugoslavia and Rwanda are currently transiting to democracy but face 
security concerns. However, with the support of the international community, changes to 
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the latter are emerging; fragile or not these changes may be, they are indicators of 
influence of the external normative pressure through the international courts. 
 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
Today some two hundred and ten international judges sit on more than twenty 
international judicial bodies and act as final arbiters on everything from the death penalty 
and responsibility for genocide, to the rights of gays in the armed forces. Nevertheless, 
there is very little awareness about these bodies and their achievements in civil-military 
relations and security issues. Hence, it is important to examine what such institutions 
have accomplished with their rulings thus far, and to evaluate future potential. Hence, 
from the numerous international courts and dispute settlement bodies, the 
abovementioned four international criminal courts, and their impact in civil-military 
relations in particular, has been the motive behind the present thesis. 
Law was selected, because in general it is neglected in the civil-military literature, 
and international law even more. However, any research into law, and more particularly 
into the administration of justice, is a study of civilization. Between law and culture there 
is a close relationship. The legal system of any given society, international or domestic, 
can be considered as a reflection of its values. In every legal system, juridical institutions, 
domestic or international, mainly achieve promoting and enforcing the rule of law, 
including international law. The latter was born from the ashes of human beings 
exterminated in horrific ways by military and militia in an attempt for elites to seize or 
hold on power. Hence, it is very important to examine the relation between external 
structures such as the international criminal courts of the twentieth century and the 
transition to a civil-military modus operandi, which accepts civilian supremacy, in a 
democratic state that reflects the will of the majority but also protects the interests and the 
well being of the minority. 
Civilian democratic control of the armed forces as already mentioned, is 
considered to be axiomatic in that democratic elected civilians are in control of the 
military. This kind of control serves as the solution to a simple paradox: The military, an 
institution of violence, is created to protect the polity from its external enemies, thus 
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relaxing our fears of others, but then we fear the same institution created for protection, 
unless it remains under legitimate control. The same paradox viewed from the military 
point of view is logically related to that: It is created to protect the polity but in 
overreaching its designated role it can destroy the same polity it is intended to serve.14 
The modern nation state is at its roots a legal entity: The democratic state must exercise 
legal control over all the states’ institutions if in fact real democratic governance is to 
exist. 
It is exactly this need for civilian democratic control that led civilian authorities to 
use law and legal institutions as part of the machinery for controlling the armed forces.15 
Because states regard themselves as the source of law and order within their boundaries, 
they are not willing to accept external systemic actors influencing domestic policies. 
However, today the continued existence of any government, particularly a democratic 
one, depends not only upon respect for the domestic law, but also relies upon respect by 
all other governments for at least several minimal provisions of international law, e.g., 
their boundaries, and their existence. Many international rules impose domestic 
limitations on the government’s power, for the sake of their own legal order, i.e. their 
Constitution. Therefore the military being subject to the constitution of a state is 
intrinsically bound by international law. This does not imply that all legal techniques that 
are effective domestically would be equally successful when introduced within the 
international community with regards to the armed forces. It is nevertheless a useful tool, 
which has to be used. It should be best understood as a tool for international security, not 
as an alternative to force or to politics, but as a way of structuring political, and social 
order. It can serve the notion of balance of power both in the international and in the 
domestic arenas by bringing limitations upon the military, i.e., by changing doctrines, 
attitudes, and traditions. 
Indeed, the establishment of formal international committees, procedures, and 
courts has as their primary purpose to hold governments and the state apparatus-including 
                                                 
 14 Peter D. Feaver, Civil-Military Relations, Annual Reviews Political Science, 1999, 2:211-241. 
15 This does not imply that other methods have not been used. The need for civilian democratic control 
also required political and economic institutions and transformations along with educational changes. Law 
and legal institutions are just one part of the various tools in the state’s machinery. 
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the armed forces, militia, and the police-accountable for their activities. They do so in a 
way that necessarily invades domestic sovereignty. In particular, the adoption of 
international tribunals and transnational juridical bodies in general is growing. During the 
Cold War both the bipolar split in world politics and its aggravation of tensions between 
the developed and developing worlds hobbled international institutions. Today, the end of 
the Cold War has loosened many of the blockades to international lawmaking and 
implementation. In that perspective, the recent adoption of the International Criminal 
Court on April 11, 2002 by the United Nations looks most promising; no country and no 
individual is out of its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the success of such an institution will 
further encourage the domestic courts and other extra judicial mechanisms at a national 
level, helping to provide regional and international security. Nevertheless, it is the future 
practice that will reveal the real potential of this new court as an achievement of mankind 
or as another failure due to international power politics. 
 
 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter I is the introductory chapter of the present thesis. It briefly provides a 
background, the methodology followed, the purpose of this study, the significance of the 
thesis, and finally its organization. 
Chapter II presents a conceptual approach of the term civil-military relations and 
a definition based on the trinity “state, military, and society,” and examines the role of 
law, and in particular international law, as a tool of political control within the civil-
military relations framework.  
Chapter III presents the relevant developments in international law, and shows its 
contemporary developments towards the gradual recognition that not only states but also 
individuals can be accountable under international law. It also briefly addresses the 
development of international criminal law, international humanitarian law, and 
international human rights law. When addressing the enforcement mechanisms, a 
definition in the terms of “Transnational Juridical Bodies” is proposed to include all the 
different international courts and dispute settlement bodies. 
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Chapter IV discusses the history, the jurisprudence and addresses the impact of 
the two post-Second World War ad hoc International Military Tribunals on international 
security and civil-military relations. 
Chapter V discusses the history, the jurisprudence and addresses the impact of the 
two United Nations ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals on international security and 
civil-military relations. 
Chapter VI covers the recent developments in the twenty first century with the 
permanent International Criminal Court being the major development. It further provides 
an overall assessment on applying judicial methods from international criminal bodies to 
challenge non-democratic structures, and develop democratic civil-military relations, and 

















II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
            Central to the discourse on state, society and military relations is that the modern 
state in large measure has drawn its power from its monopoly of the legitimate use of 
violence. Civil-military relations address the relationship of the military monopoly to the 
state and the society.  
Within the modern Western democratic civil-military framework, the state is 
more than the government. It is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic, and 
coercive systems that attempt not only to manage the state apparatus, but to structure 
relations between civil and public power and relationships both with and within the 
society. Likewise, society is the arena where manifold interest groups and social 
movements (such as neighborhood associations, women’s groups, religious groups, 
intellectual currents, civil organizations and NGOs) from all classes (such as trade 
unions, journalists, lawyers, and entrepreneurs) attempt to assemble to express their ideas 
and advance their interests. It also includes the environment where the polity (polity in 
the classic Aristotelian concern, with how people organize themselves for collective life 
in the polis) specifically arranges itself for political concentration to gain control over 
public power and the state apparatus.16 
            On the other side of the spectrum, the military holds a legal monopoly of armed 
force. It also includes a multiplicity of organizations and services consisting mainly of the 
forces assigned to national defense, namely: the army, the navy, and the air force. It is 
vital in terms of adopting and implementing the state’s national security policy; in how to 
enhance the state’s social, political, and economic institutions against threats from other 
states. However, the military is shaped both by the different security threats and by the 
social forces, values, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society.  
It is important to note that within civil-military relations literature the focus is 
predominately on the officer corps. This is due to the rigid hierarchical structure of the 
                                                 
 16 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, Princeton University 
Press, 1988, p. 3-4. 
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armed forces. The most influential and important decisions are made and orders issued at 
the superior echelons. Hence, it is the officer corps that is primarily responsible for the 
military security of the society. Therefore, the political relations between the state and the 
officer corps reflect a balancing between civilians and the armed forces. This balancing is 
absolutely necessary for maximizing the state’s security at the least sacrifice of other 
social values and needs. 
              Modern democratic regimes require civilian supremacy over the armed forces. If 
democratic conditions apply to any state bureaucracy, the military is clearly the one in 
which these conditions take on crucial importance due to the recognized monopoly over 
society’s coercive power. In a democracy, citizens formulate and articulate their 
preferences, and have those preferences represented in the conduct of government. This 
dynamic is provided with corresponding institutional and legal guarantees. Hence, 
modern civil-military relations explicitly include the military as subject to the policies 
formulated by elected individuals holding the highest state offices. Civilian supremacy is 
regarded as sine qua non. The assertion of this civilian supremacy restricts the armed 
forces only to assistance in the formulation and implementation of national defense 
policy as the legitimate government adopts it. 
            Although Plato addressed the political control of armed forces about 2,500 years 
ago in The Republic, the conception of civilian supremacy as the cornerstone of civil-
military relations only emerged modernly in the 1950s. Samuel Huntington succinctly 
describes the important connection between the civil government and the military 
establishment within the confines of the modern nation state. Indeed, he addressed the 
problem of minimizing military power with two methods of civilian control namely, the 
methods of subjective and objective civilian control. Subjective civilian control 
presupposes some degree of military involvement “in institutional class, and 
constitutional politics.” The military become “the mirror of the state” and they do not 
possess an independent military sphere. In fact “…the essence of subjective civilian 
control is the denial of an independent military sphere.”17 However, according to 
Huntington, the rise of the military profession made this method obsolete, and gave rise 
                                                 
17 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 14th printing, 2000, p.83. 
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to objective civilian control. Objective civilian control achieves its end by “militarizing 
the military, making them the tool of the state,”18 and used as such by the civilian 
authorities. This method of control is based on the maximization of professionalism, 
which has the consequence of rendering the armed forces “political sterile and neutral.”19 
Nevertheless, this minimization of the military’s political power is balanced with “the 
recognition of autonomous military professionalism” and allowing an independent 
military sphere.20 
Civilian supremacy gives democratically elected government unquestioned 
authority over all policy arenas. Civilian control is needed essentially to prevent the 
armed forces from challenging the state’s duly constituted political authority and 
prevailing values. It ensures that the military will not endanger the basic liberties, 
including the popular sovereignty that they are meant to protect. The essential guarantee, 
which is built (or has to be built) into the system, is the constitutional subordination of 
the armed forces to the legitimate government and to the national policy, as these are 
defined by the will of the people and their legislature. In such a system, the military role 
is generally constrained to matters of national defense and international security, it is 
removed from all responsibility for internal security, and a civilian ministry of defense, or 
an equivalent governmental structure, exists to enable civilians to exercise effective 
oversight and control of the armed forces. The military is an institution created by the 
state and is subordinate thereto; it serves as an instrument of policy, and is subordinated 
to the civil government in this role. Therefore, in a modern democracy, the degree of 
military participation can vary only within well-defined limits, which are in turn 
institutionalized with domestic legal manifestations. The validity and acceptance of a 
political and social order is reflected in these legal manifestations, along with measures of 
coercion, in a way that guarantee the provisions that they encompass.21 
                                                 
18  Ibid., p.83. 
19 Ibid., p.84. 
20 Ibid., p.83. 
21 A legal manifestation without encompassing provisions of coercion is considered to be lex 
imperfecta (imperfect law). A legal manifestation that reflects the political and social order in a democracy 
is usually the constitution. However, the guarantees provided by the constitution are adopted with usual 
legislation e.g., Military Codes of Justice, Military Penal Codes, etc.. 
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In order to protect the state and the military from two types of potential dangers, 
certain constitutional formulas are adopted. These dangers are mainly twofold. First, 
military participation in politics, especially in making policy (including defense and 
security policy), and second the use or misuse of the military by politicians in order to 
attain political goals. Civilian control as a form of political control in many non-
democratic regimes has involved the military in numerous atrocities and horrific crimes. 
As it is obvious in such cases, the country is either unable or simply unwilling to 
prosecute the criminals. Dictators and their puppets within the armed forces would not be 
held accountable for their actions, thus making the relations between the society and the 
military even worse. 
B. LAW IN THE MODERN STATE AND IN CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
The highest development of the modern nation state, at least aspired to by the 
Western World, appears to be the development of political control under democratic 
principles. The highest moral principle in justifying political power is undoubtedly 
democracy. Furthermore, democracy is often equated with the rule of law in such a way 
that most regimes, democratic or not, rest exacting emphasis on the state’s relationship to 
law and its legal institutions. Legal norms are used by regimes to establish predictability 
over who can decide what. The central attribute of the modern impersonal state is the rule 
of law, the so-called Rechtsstaat.  
The Rechtsstaat is the kind of state, which has been established in Western 
Europe and North America since the eighteenth century. The Europeans, and the United 
States of America have been the leaders in corresponding to the demands for civil 
freedom and containing definite guarantees of this freedom. The guiding principle of the 
Rechtsstaat is to protect the freedom of the individual against state power.22 Indeed, 
within that kind of state the freedom of the individual is in principle unlimited, whereas 
the authority that the state has to intervene in this sphere is by definition limited. All state 
interventions are to be regarded as exceptions that must be carefully justified. Provision is 
made for mutual control and binding of the state apparatus: The power of the state-which 
                                                 
 22 Rune Slagstad et all, Constitutionalism and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 104. 
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is in principle limited-is customarily divided into executive, legislative, and judicial 
functions, combined in a normative system designating spheres of competence. 
Therefore, the Rechtsstaat is a legal state because all administrative authorities, 
especially that of the military and the security forces is subject to the conditions and the 
procedure of law, and state intervention is permissible solely on the basis of a law. Rulers 
act auf Grund eines Gesetzes (“on the basis of a law”) or im Namen des Gesetzes (“in the 
name of the law”). The state authorities perform their duties only by following the 
existing positive norms in a competent way. The legitimacy of the state rests on the 
legality of all its exercise of power.23 
However, this legality has its own set of problems. In its positivist version, 
legality does not require democracy; it is not concerned with the issue of how rules 
should be enacted or who has the right to hold office and thus provide the regime with 
legitimacy. Legality has been used as an excuse by many totalitarian regimes in justifying 
the use of arbitrary power, despite little pretension to legitimacy, and helped them to 
ensure a legal coherence. It was legal experts, law professors that provided the Nazis with 
a philosophical cloak for their crimes, and introduced the teleological method of judicial 
interpretation with which the Third Reich applauded all its evils as “supremely just.” 
Since then, there have been many cases of despotic regimes hidden behind the legal 
“rituals” adding surplus value to legality alone; such were the cases, among others, in the 
military dictatorships in Latin America, and the repressive regime in the former 
Yugoslavia. Therefore, it is essential for legality to be linked with legitimacy, which is 
only obtained by political procedures such as free elections. 
The problems arising in the striving for good government and the rule of law are 
especially germane within the framework of civil-military relations. The military are not 
just an autocratic institution demanding complete loyalty and commitment, but most 
importantly, they are designed to bring force to bear in the most efficient way possible, 
whenever the state requires it. Hence, law is a valuable political instrument that can 
enforce its practical demands by means of sanctions, and set standards for desired 
behavior. The positivisation of normative expectations into law enables the stabilization 
                                                 
 23 Ibid., p. 106. 
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of the preferable norms and simultaneously the coordination and obedience of the armed 
forces in our complex modern societies. Therefore, the function of institutionalized 
normative expectations, which have been perceived as legitimate, is vital for the 
evolution of civilian supremacy: In civil-military relations law is used to create relative 
forms of stability and obedience to the elected civilian authorities.  
Additionally, legal regulations have much to offer as a tool in the social context of 
the civil-military relations. Certainly, the forms and the more specific relations of legal 
and social problem solving constitute vital parts of the structuring and the characteristics 
of modern societies. Therefore, certain problems may be temporarily solved by legal 
regulations while at the same time the apparatus may be erected to continue search for a 
more socially based solution mechanism. Law is only one of society’s institutions 
designed to solve problems, but it is the one with the power. 
 
C. WHY INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
It is exactly this need for civilian democratic control that led civilian authorities to 
use law and legal institutions as part of the machinery for controlling the armed forces. 
Because states regard themselves as the source of law and order within their boundaries, 
the question still remaining to be answered is why should international law be used and 
what particular legal institutions are necessary to maintain and affirm the civil-military 
relations balance. 
In trying to provide a reasonable and logical answer to the above question, one 
has to consider that today the continued existence of any government, particularly a 
democratic one, depends not only upon respect for the domestic law, but also relies upon 
respect by all other governments for at least several minimal provisions of international 
law, e.g., their boundaries, and their existence. Many international rules impose domestic 
limitations on the government’s power, by the shake of their own legal order, i.e. their 
Constitution. Therefore the military being subject to the Constitution of its state is 
intrinsically bound by international law. This does not imply that all legal techniques that 
are effective domestically would be equally successful when introduced within the 
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international community with regards to the armed forces. It is nevertheless a useful tool, 
which has to be used. It should be best understood as a tool for international security, not 
as an alternative to force or to politics, but as a way of structuring political, and social 
forces. It can serve the notion of balance of power both in the international and in the 
domestic arenas by bringing limitations upon the military, i.e., by changing doctrines, 
attitudes, and traditions. 
Indeed, the establishment of formal international institutions, e.g., committees, 
procedures, and courts has as its primary purpose to hold governments and the state 
apparatus-including the armed forces, militia, and the police-accountable for their 
activities. This process is done in a way that necessarily invades domestic sovereignty. It 
influences the crafting of constitutions and legislatures in a way that immediately limits 
or re-orients the conduct, the roles and the missions of the military. Likewise it becomes 
necessary to educate servicemembers in these norms because sometimes international law 
is important in their new missions, e.g., Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) 
or, under the new terminology, Stability Operations. Finally, national and international 
legal and political institutions have as their by-products aspiring norms thus changing 
values and traditions.  
In a higher level of analysis several more explanations may be suggested. The 
realist school of thought asserts that the most powerful democracies seek to externalize 
their values, coercing weaker or less democratic governments to accept their notion of 
international regimes, and their subsequent obligations. The liberal, idealist school argues 
that the most established democracies seek to externalize their own values by setting a 
transnational process of diffusion and persuasion that socializes less democratic 
governments to accept their regimes. Another argument suggests that it is not the most 
powerful or persuasive democracies that favor enforceable-and not just rhetorical-
international obligations, but also the weakly established democracies. Their 
governments purse that kind of commitments for reasons of self-interest: they help 
establish democratic governance against non-democratic domestic opposition.  
Whatever the preferable approach, the adoption of international tribunals and 
transnational juridical bodies in general is growing. During the Cold War both the bipolar 
split in world politics and its aggravation of tensions between the developed and 
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developing worlds hobbled international institutions. Today, the end of the Cold War has 
loosened many of the blockades to international lawmaking and implementation. In that 
perspective, the recent adoption of the International Criminal Court on April 11, 2002 by 
the United Nations looks most promising; no country and no individual is out of its 
jurisdiction.24 Furthermore, the success of such an institution will further encourage the 
domestic courts and other extra judicial mechanisms at a national level, helping to 
provide regional and international security.  
Nevertheless, it is the future practice that will reveal the real potential of this new 
court as an achievement of mankind or as another failure due to power politics. Hence, 
for understanding the danger of failure because of the dynamic and continuous 
relationship between international law and politics, a brief review of relevant concepts 
and developments in international law seems necessary, especially with regards to the 
transition from state to individual accountability. 
 
                                                 
24 Although the predominant one, the U.S. opposes this view. As discussed in Chapter V of the present 
thesis during October 2002 separate arrangements were made between the E.U. and the U.S. that will 
provide a degree of immunity for U.S. citizens from prosecution by the ICC. 
23 
III. REVIEW OF RELEVANT DEVELOPMENTS 
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW (IL) AND STATE PRIMACY 
1. The State is the Primary Subject  
The paramount purpose of international law was and is the regulation of the 
relations between states, under the scope of providing stability in international relations 
and an expectation that certain acts or omissions will affect predictable consequences. It 
consists of rules that states consider binding in their relations with each other might that 
be customary international law25 or international agreements.26  
In brief, the sources of international law as appear in Article 38 of the Statute of 
the ICJ, are: the international conventions establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states, the international customs as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law, the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and finally the judicial 
decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations. 
A subject of international law is an entity that is capable of possessing 
international rights and duties and furthermore, having the capacity to maintain its rights 
by bringing international claims.27 Furthermore, an entity recognized by customary law 
as capable of possessing rights and duties, and bringing international claims, and having 
these capacities conferred upon it is a legal person.  
Within classical international law, states are considered to be the primary subject. 
Explicitly, the state’s territory, its appurtenances (i.e., its airspace and territorial sea), its 
government and population within its borders, compose the physical and social 
manifestations of the state as the primary international legal person. Apart from states, 
organizations may have legal personality in the international plane, if certain conditions 
are satisfied. Because of the complexity of international relations and the absence of a 
                                                 
25 Customary IL is the general and consistent practice among nations with respect to a particular subject, 
which over time is accepted by them as a legal obligation. It has to be distinguished by usage, which is a 
general practice that does not reflect a legal obligation contrary to custom. 
26 An international agreement, e.g., bilateral treaties, executive agreements, multilateral conventions, is a 
commitment entered into by two or more nations that reflects their intention to be bound by its terms in 
their relations with one another. 
27 Reparation for Injuries case, ICJ Reports (1949), 179 as it appears in Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law, fifth edition, Oxford University Press, 1998,p 57. 
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centralized law of corporations, the legal situation is quite complex (e.g., the individual is 
regarded in certain cases as a legal person, and yet it is more than obvious that the 
individual alone cannot sign treaties). Therefore, the listing of entities with legal 
personality in the international level for particular purposes is considerable.28  
In accordance with the international law’s framework, the rule is that it is the state 
is responsible for international wrongs or for conduct in breach of international 
obligations, hereafter author state, because they have consented so. In fact in 1927, the 
PCIJ in the Lotus Case (France v. Turkey) stated that: 
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules 
of law binding upon states therefore emanate from their own free will as 
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing 
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between 
these co-existing communities or with a view to the achievement of 
common aims.29  
The ICJ has also affirmed this classic pronouncement in the Lotus Case, that states are 
bound only by rules of international law which they have consented to, as late as 1986 
and 1996 in the cases of Nicaragua and in its Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons respectively.30 
This emphasis on the state is consistent with the environment in which 
international law originated, i.e., a world of independent, equal and sovereign states, the 
only major actors in the international arena. In this international arena, unlike in domestic 
societies, individuals had for many years no standing to assert any legal right. They 
obtained rights only derivatively, by virtue of the protection afforded to the individual by 
                                                 
 28 The established legal persons in a simplified approach are the state, the political entities legally 
proximate to the state, the condominia, the internationalized territories, the international organizations, the 
state’s agencies, and the agencies of the different organizations.  Special types of personalities include non-
self governing peoples, states in statu nascendi, legal constructions, belligerent and insurgent communities, 
entities sui generis, and individuals. Controversial issues include entities that are given internationals status 
by the virtue of international treaties, i.e. intergovernmental corporations of private law and other entities 
that operate transnational, have resources greater than those of a state and they may have diplomatic 
support from governments. 
 29 (1927) PCIJ Rep., Series A, No. 10, at 18-19. This is quoted in Kriangsak Kittischaisaree, 
International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 5. 
 30 Kriangsak Kittischaisaree, International Criminal Law, p. 10. 
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nationality. Hence, international responsibility and liability was connected with state 
being the subject of international law. 
2. International Responsibility and Liability of the State and the 
Expanding Reach of International Law 
In international law the invasion of the legal interest of one subject of the law by 
another legal person creates international responsibility. In fact, today responsibility is 
regarded as a general principle of international law, “a concomitant of substantive rules 
and of the supposition that acts and omissions may be categorized as illegal by reference 
to the rules establishing rights and duties.”31 If one state violates the law, it may expect 
that other states will reciprocate. Likewise, failure to comply with international law 
usually involves political and economic risks of such magnitude that states are thereby 
reluctant to breach international law. The nature of this state responsibility relates both to 
breaches of a treaty and to breaches of a legal duty, and is not based upon delict in the 
municipal sense. As it was stated in the case of the Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims “all 
rights of an international character involve international responsibility. If the obligation in 
question is not met, responsibility entails the duty to make reparation.”32 Likewise, in the 
Chorz`ow Factory the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) stated in its 
judgment not only that the obligation to make reparation is a principle of international 
law but there is also “no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.”33 Later 
on, in 1949, the ICJ in the case of the Corfu Channel held Albania responsible under 
International Law for the damage and the losses of human live which resulted due to the 
absence of a warning about mines in her territorial waters, and that there was a duty for 
Albania to pay compensation to the injured state, the United Kingdom. Therefore, the 
legal liability attaches to the transgressor state to provide reparations, including cessation, 
which constitutes the means to discharge the responsibility incumbent upon it as a result 
of its international delict or crime, and should always be adequate to remedy that 
internationally wrongful act. Furthermore, since reparation has a normative character, the 
                                                 
 31 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 436. 
 32(1927) PCIJ, Ser. A , No 9, p.21. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 437. 
 33 (1928) PCIJ, Ser. A, No 17, p.29. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, p. 438. 
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consequences of an international delict have to be less severe than of an international 
crime. 
Moreover, the injured state is entitled to invoke the responsibility of the author 
state and demand reparation in the form of cessation, restitution in kind, compensation, 
satisfaction, and in guarantees and assurances against repetition, either singly or in 
combination. Enforcing reparation involves the issues of countermeasures34 (e.g. trade 
embargos), and the use of force. Resort to such measures intends to coerce the author 
state in fulfilling its obligations with regards to the injured state either by non-military 
means or with the use of military force. In particular, states are under the obligation to 
refrain from the use of force generally. However, the use of the military under the UN 
Charter is justifiable under the Articles 42, where the Security Council can authorize the 
use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security, and 51, for matters of 
self-defense. The reasonable disputes and questions regarding reparation and the use of 
force, real or imagined, may call for adjudication by the ICJ, although in case of 
international crimes it is very unlikely that the author state will agree on the ICJ’s 
adjudication.  
However, with respect to international crimes and the obligation of guarantees 
against repetition, certain measures can be legally taken that can provide deterrence and 
assurance against repetition. In most cases such measures are not just verbal declarations, 
or forwarding through administrative channels instructions or directions to the author 
state’s officials. Instead, 
The scope of guarantees against repletion to be provided or implemented by the author 
State ought to be expected in case of international crimes, and this must be seen to 
constitute special or supplementary consequences of the regime of crimes. The two main 
categories of guarantees are those related to the police, paramilitary and armed forces, 
and those related to the State organization. Appropriate guarantees within the first 
category may include obligations regarding disarmament, dismantling of war industries, 
destruction of weapons, re-organization of the police, paramilitary or armed forces, and 
the admission of observation teams. Appropriate guarantees related to the State 
organization may include obligations for the prosecution and punishment of those 
responsible for the commission of the crime, the prohibition of specific political groups 
or parties, a change of government, constitutional changes, the holding of free elections, 
and respect for human rights. Guarantees against repetition, which are either demanded or 
imposed should not amount generally, to an imposed settlement of disputes or to the loss 
of territory or political independence. An exception regarding this latter position would                                                  
 34 Measures adopted by way of reciprocity and reprisal consisting of non-military actions admitted by 
international law, with a view to the maintenance of international peace and security. 
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be constituted by a situation in which the author State of an international crime targeted a 
specific ethnic people. In such a case the people concerned should be allowed, as a 
guarantee against repetition, to exercise its right of self determination.35 
 
Furthermore, the problem of states having obligations towards the international 
community adds to the complexity of the issue. The ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, 
proclaimed the distinction in the legal interest that every state has in the observance of 
obligations erga omnes, or obligations towards the international community as a whole, 
between obligations vis-à-vis states. As examples of acts that can be characterized as 
being subject to obligations erga omnes, all of which could be classified as peremptory 
norms of international law, it named the rules concerning the basic rights of the human 
person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination, and the prohibition 
against aggression and genocide.  
Explicitly, the ICJ distinguished between obligations within the state and 
obligations towards the international community as follows: 
An essential distinction should be draw between the obligations of a State towards the 
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State….By their 
very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the 
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are 
obligation erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary 
international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from 
the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of human persons, including 
protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of 
protection have entered into the body of general international law….; others are conferred 
by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.36 
But its existence, an actio popularis in the above sense, depends on the further 
institutionalization of the international community, as a personified international 
community, willing to approve and enforce it. Unfortunately, “the international 
community still faces an impediment to its assertion of actio popularis.”37  Hence, a few 
years after that ruling, the ICJ in the case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) 
ruled that even if one state has a legal standing because of the erga omnes nature of the 
                                                 
 35 André de Hoogh, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: A Theoretical inquiry into the 
Implementation and Enforcement of the International Responsibility of States, Kluer Law International, 
1996, p.195-196. 
 36 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Second Phase), ICJ 
Rep. 1970, 3 at 32. This is quoted in Kriangsak Kittischaisaree, International Criminal Law,  p 11. 
 37 This is quoted in Kriangsak Kittischaisaree, International Criminal Law, p 13. 
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rights involved, the author state must have consented to the jurisdiction of the court. The 
ICJ while fully shared the erga omnes character of the claim (the self-determination of 
the people of East Timor), cannot rule on the lawfulness of the conduct of the author state 
(Indonesia) if the latter is not a party to the case. Hence, the notion of state consent 
prevented the use of international legal standing against an international crime. 
Nonetheless, one of the contemporary developments in international law is a 
gradual recognition that individuals may, under certain circumstances, be “subjects” of 
international law. The latter implies that now the individuals may have rights and 
obligations following directly from international law and not merely derivate from their 
state nationality. This concept received a major thrust forward at the end of the Second 
World War, with the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and with 
the adoption of the United Nations Charter and its emphasis on human rights. Likewise,  
The acceptance of the so-called Nuremberg principles recognized that individual Nazi 
leaders, not just the Nazi state, were criminally responsible for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and crimes against peace, and should be tried by an international tribunal 
convened by the allied states. The crimes for which they were tried, including atrocities 
against nationals of their own states, were considered to be international crimes.38 
 
However simple or complicated the above may seem, experience has shown that 
they present an extremely dense issue. The magnitude and the character of matters like 
the prosecution of former political and military leaders (even after negotiated 
arrangements), nation building, and peacekeeping operations remains problematical.  
Nevertheless, in the light of the evolvement of international criminal law and the 
enforcement of the International Criminal Court many states worldwide share the hope 
that a substantially forced regime of responsibility applicable to international crimes may 
fruitfully be elaborated. Hence, a more insightful look at the development of international 
criminal law, human rights and humanitarian law will be helpful in order to realize the 
difficulties and the shortcomings of the transition from the responsibility of the state to 
the individual. For reasons that will become obvious throughout this thesis the 
subjectivity of the individual in contemporary international law is still controversial; an 
interesting observation since international law aims at regulating human relations and has 
been originated in the necessity of intercourse between human beings. 
                                                 
 38 Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Contemporary International law: Relevant to today’s world?, Naval War 
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B. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (ICL) AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNITY 
International criminal law is the discipline of law that governs international 
crimes, the convergence of the protection of the victims of armed conflict, and the 
international aspects of domestic, national criminal law. It basically embraces two 
essentially different groups of legal rules: The legal rules originated by domestic or 
municipal sources of law trying to regulate facts that have international character, and the 
substantive, procedural rules derived from public international law.39  
The determination of the category of crimes that can be characterized as 
international is set by the international community, and therefore can be prosecuted 
before an international tribunal, whether permanent or ad hoc. In accordance to the U.S. 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, an international crime is “such act universally 
recognized as criminal, which is considered a grave mater of international concern and 
for some valid reason cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State that 
would have control over it under ordinary circumstances.”40 
Compared to the other branches of law, international criminal law has been 
relatively slow in crystallization as a clearly viable system mainly due to issues regarding 
the state sovereignty and the international power play. Until today states have still not 
been willing to consent to the general prosecution of their citizens before an international 
tribunal. Therefore, the right residing to any member of the international community to 
take legal action in the terms of a public interest as actio popularis, has been hollow in 
practice. Any sovereign act performed in the territory of a foreign state, such as measures 
in terms of criminal proceedings, constitutes a violation of its sovereignty; this can be 
performed only if the latter agrees either in general (e.g. by statue or treaty) or in terms of 
a specific declaration for a specific case. However, there is precedence of significant 
exceptions, such as the two International Military Tribunals after the end of the Second 
                                                 
College Review, Vol. 45, 89:103, Summer 1992, p. 95. 
 39M. Cherif Bassiouni, Vet Nanda, et al, A treatise in International Criminal Law, Vol. 2,Thomas, 
1973,  p. 135. 
 40 Hostages Trial, US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 19 Feb. 1948 (1953) 15 Ann. Dig. 632 at 636. 
This is quoted in Kriangsak Kittischaisaree, International Criminal Law, p. 3. 
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World War, and the two United Nations Tribunals after the end of the Cold War. 
Furthermore, in July 1998 the international community succeeded in adopting the Statute 
of the ICC after a fifty years ongoing debate, giving hope to the idea of an international 
criminal justice that could serve in the new era of globalization.  
Within the aforesaid precedents, the practical necessity of exercising international 
criminal jurisdiction, and enforcement mechanisms has risen. Hence, within international 
criminal law the question of offences became and is currently closely connected with the 
question of the machinery in which international criminal jurisdiction is exercised. In 
addressing this issue, four ad hoc tribunals have been established in the course of the 
twentieth century: The International Military Tribunal (IMT) sitting at Nuremberg, the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) sitting at Tokyo, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sitting at The Hague, 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) sitting at Arusha. Likewise, 
within the last eighty-three years, as the world’s major political powers saw fit, five 
investigatory commissions were established, namely: The 1919 Commission on the 
Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties, investigating 
crimes occurring during the First World War, the 1943 U.N. War Crime Commission, 
which investigated crimes during the Second World War, the 1946 Far Eastern 
Commission, which investigated Japanese war crimes during the Second World War, the 
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, to 
investigate violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, and 
finally the Independent Commission of Experts Established in accordance with Security 
Council Resolution 935, the Rwanda Commission, to investigate violations committed 
during the Rwandan civil war. Although the above international prosecutions started with 
the establishment of international commissions, their work was not always particularly 
relevant to the subsequent prosecutions.41 Yet, with the creation of these tribunals, it is 
indeed true that a considerable advancement has been made in the development of 
international criminal law; they have clearly sidelined the notion of sovereignty of states. 
                                                 
 41 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A documentary history, 
Transnational Publishers, 1998, p 6-7. 
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 The unconditional military surrender of Germany and Japan, at the end of the 
Second World War, resulted in the creation of ITM and IMFTE. On August 8, 1945, an 
agreement was signed by the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the 
provisional Government of France, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-later 
adhered to by nineteen other states- to prosecute and punish the major war criminals 
within the European Axis Powers, “acting in the interests of all the United Nations,” 
establishing the Charter of International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg as an annex to 
the agreement. On December 11, 1946, by Resolution 95(1) the General Assembly of the 
United Nations affirmed “the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.”42 Moreover, following the 
European precedent, on January 19, 1946, the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East was established for the apprehension, trial, and punishment of war criminals in the 
Far East. From their judgments, which will be discussed more extensively in the 
following chapters, these IMTs clearly demonstrated that the individual himself could be 
held responsible for crimes against international law. This ad hoc tribunal machinery 
continued later in the twentieth century with the implementation of ICTY and ICTR as 
the enforcement by the U.N. Security Council (U.N.S.C.) of Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, respectively.  
After the experience of the ad hoc tribunal machinery, the idea of a permanent 
international court, free from political manipulations, seems to be maintaining the 
momentum of the international criminal law’s toolkit. Although the International 
Criminal Court is established under a multinational treaty and not as an ad hoc body 
under U.N. Security Council control,43 its adoption on July 17, 1998 and its entrance into 





                                                 
 42 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Vet Nanda, et al, A treatise in International Criminal Law, Vol. 1, p. 114. 































C. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (IHRL) AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (IHL) 
International human rights law and international humanitarian law are 
complementary. Humanitarian law applies in armed conflicts whereas human rights 
protect the individual at all times; human rights are concerned with the organization of the 
state vis-à-vis the individual. Both seek to protect the individual but they do so under 
different circumstances. They both contain proscriptions against torture, genocide, slavery, 
and extra judicial killings. Furthermore, international human rights law today applies to 
both individuals vis-à-vis the government and to non-state actors who commit human 
rights abuses e.g., terrorists, and armed opposition groups etc…. 
International human rights law and international humanitarian law overlap and, 
when seen together, they share the same objective at all times, namely the protection of 
human life and dignity. Hence, the major codifications of the international humanitarian 
law although they scarcely provide for human rights per se, they protect exactly what 
human rights stand for: the 1949 Geneva Conventions with their two additional protocols, 
and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide indeed 
guarantee the protection of human rights during an armed conflict.44  The existent 
codification has been further enriched with the jurisprudence of the two United Nations ad 
hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  
Contrary to the international humanitarian law, which dates back to antiquity,45 
the development of human rights law started after the Second World War. However, 
human rights law evolved very fast; in fact within the human rights field, widespread 
acceptance of treaties, declarations, resolutions, and other instruments arguably has 
become more significant than actual practice in creating binding law.46 The founding of 
                                                 
44 The U.N. bodies decided to exclude all discussion of the law of war from their work (the law of 
war was not included in the U.N. International Law Commission) mainly because there was the fear that by 
considering that branch of law may undermine the force of jus contra bellum. The latter would undermine 
the confidence in the U.N.’s ability to maintain peace. See Robert Kolb, The relationship between 
international humanitarian law and human rights law: A brief history of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, International Review of the Red Cross, No 324, 30 
September 1998, p. 409-419. Available [online] at: 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList168/85C81A4753C25BA9C1256B66005B30B3, 
6/28/2002. 
 45 Ibid. 
 46Frank Newman & David Weissbrodt, International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process, 2nd 
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the United Nations in 1946 and the subsequent Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
clearly comprise the major efforts assuming a very important role in enforcing and 
implementing human rights. Moreover, an important institution building with regional 
mechanisms outside the United Nations evolved over these years. 
The primary sources of international human rights law are treaties, with the U.N. 
Charter and the International Bill of Human Rights the most prominent of them and also 
containing seminal human rights provision. Likewise, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights forms part of the International Bill of Rights, together with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. The Declaration sets out the human rights as principles, lays 
out their objectives and carries moral weight.47  
Unlike the Declaration, the Covenants have the force of law. Those who sign 
these documents have not only a moral, but also a legal obligation to respect the contained 
therein terms. Once a Covenant is signed, it must be accepted and ratified by a country’s 
own parliament or equivalent legislative body to become law (pacta sund servanda).  
In addition to the U.N. mechanisms for implementing human rights, regional 
structures now operate in Europe, the Americas, and Africa with the European system 
being the most fully developed of those structures. The Convention on Human Rights 
was opened for signature in Rome on 4 November 1950 by the European Council, and 
was enacted on 3 September 1953. The purpose of the Convention was, as stated in the 
Preamble, to achieve greater European unity through a common understanding and 
observance of human rights, and to take the first steps towards collective enforcement of 
certain of the rights, as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948.48 
                                                 
ed., Anderson Publishing Co, 1996, p. 18. 
 47 It must be noted that although the Declaration may itself fall short of being enforceable upon states, 
many of its provisions are at the very least binding against them because of customary international law. 
Also, a very large number of laws and legal documents are based on the principles of the Declaration. 
Many countries have cited it or included its provisions in their basic laws or constitutions and many human 
rights covenants, conventions and treaties concluded since 1948 have been built upon its principles. 
 48 By virtue of the Convention, the Contracting States undertook to secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction, a number of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. The rights guaranteed include the 
right to life, prohibition of torture, right to liberty and security, right to a fair trial, right to respect for 
private and family life, and freedom of expression. 
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In addition, the Convention set up a control mechanism for enforcing the 
undertakings of the contracting states. It allows not only states but also individuals to take 
proceedings against a contracting state responsible for alleged breaches of the 
Convention. The right of individual petition is of crucial importance and lies at the very 
heart of the Convention’s system of protection.  
Since the Convention was enacted, eleven protocols have been adopted. Protocols 
1,4,6, and 7 add further rights and liberties to those guaranteed and Protocol 2 confers on 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) the ability to give advisory opinions. 
Protocol 11 restructures the enforcement machinery. The remaining protocols concern the 
organization of, and procedure before, the Convention institutions. 
ECHR in particular, is an independent judicial institution in the normal sense of 
the term, with one judge from each member state of the Council of Europe and a public 
procedure. A case may be brought before the Court by the Commission or by a state 
concerned in the case. Its judgments are final, binding, and declaratory in nature.  
The Court is called on to review actions of legislative, executive and judicial 
authorities in the western democratic member states. If the Court finds a violation of the 
Convention, it has no power to quash the decisions of the national authorities or to order 
remedial or consequential measures. It may, however, award “just satisfaction” in the 
form of financial compensation. The judgments are transmitted to the Committee of 
Ministers, which supervises their execution.49  
                                                 
49 The states becoming parties to the Convention are already committed to upholding human 
rights. According to Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, human rights protection is crucial for 
membership. As could be expected, the Court does not in practice have to deal with allegations of wide 
scale violations of human rights. The Court has had to consider cases concerning the arrest and detention 
guarantees (art. 5), the right to a fair administration of justice in civil and criminal proceedings (art. 6) in 
member countries. In addition to the “judicial procedure” cases, a wide range of other issues have come up 
for decision, such as the absence of access to the courts to challenge the legality of decisions by 
administrative authorities and professional bodies, the legal status of children born out of wedlock, the 
taking of children to public care, immigration, expulsion, extradition, homosexuality laws, the language 
provisions governing elections to regional legislative assemblies, compensation for nationalization of ship-
building and aircraft industries, rent control laws, telephone tapping, allegations of prejudice as a result of 
not belonging to particular trade unions, trans-frontier broadcasting, the freedom of speech, etc. The 
Convention strikes a subtle balance between the sovereignty of the contracting states and power of review 
of the Convention institutions. The latter have developed a number of principles of interpretation. The most 
important of those principles are the “autonomous” nature of the concepts in the Convention as compared 
with similar concepts in the domestic legal systems, the evolutive interpretation of the text to keep the 
Convention’s guarantees adapted to the changing needs of the society and the “margin of appreciation,” or 
area of discretion left to the member states in the implementation of the guaranteed rights. 
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Many of the cases dealt with by the Court have led to changes in the law and 
practices of the state concerned. The operation of the Convention system as described, 
has given rise to a corpus of Convention law, which radiates an influence beyond the 
individual case so that other states will look to the judgment for guidance on the 
compatibility of their own law and practice. On many occasions this has prompted a state, 
which was not a party to the case, to amend its legislation or adapt its case law. That is 
the real impact and importance of the ECHR’s judgments.      
The European Convention on Human Rights does not institute a system intended 
to replace national human rights protection. On the contrary, as the Court has said on 
several occasions, it is of a subsidiary nature. The primary responsibility lies with the 
contracting states, in particular with their judiciary. This is reflected in the rule that no 
state has to answer before the Convention bodies before it has had an opportunity to 
redress the alleged wrong within the context of its own procedural order. The success of 
the system described depends upon the co-operation between domestic courts and the 
ECHR. The trend today is, in the case law of the Supreme Courts in member states, to 
follow the interpretation adopted by the ECHR. 
 
D. THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
TRANSNATIONAL JURIDICAL BODIES: A PROPOSED DEFINITION  
One of the principal criticisms of international law is that the means of enforcing 
sanctions against the breaching nation is highly problematic. For the most part national 
courts regulate rules that have international character, and states are bound by their 
consent. Moreover, international law is obeyed by states under the traditional methods of 
diplomatic negotiation, good offices, conciliation and mediation. Nevertheless, 
international machinery exists to ensure the protection of certain important interests and 
values both for states and individuals.  
                                                 
In most of the contracting states the Convention has been incorporated into national law. While the 
contracting states are not obliged to incorporate the Convention, incorporation enables the national judge to 
consider a case under the provisions that may be at issue before the Convention. Thus, the need to lodge 
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fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual under national law is required. 
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This machinery includes widely different bodies with rather few commonalities; 
from third party adjudicative mechanisms and dispute settlements to criminal tribunals 
and a new criminal court. Furthermore, private parties are increasingly playing a role in 
international dispute mechanisms. In fact, the second half of the twentieth century and the 
beginning of the twenty first will most probably be remembered by mankind’s efforts to 
establish an international order that includes justice, particularly after the Cold War 
ended. All these existing international dispute settlement entities are so diverse and 
different that, as Cessare Romano argues, it has been difficult for international legal 
scholars to  
[F]ind a single name suitable to identify all of the international bodies….International 
legal scholars use the broad designation of ‘dispute settlement bodies.” Since 1994, 
however, this term has become increasingly inadequate to describe the efforts to promote 
the international rule of law. In particular the international criminal courts for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the future permanent criminal court cannot be regarded as 
‘dispute settlement bodies.’ They do not ‘settle a dispute’ on a point of law or fact 
between two subjects (States, international organizations or individuals); rather, they 
apply international humanitarian law, or international criminal law (provided that such a 
body can identified), to individuals. They do not exercise, therefore, a contentious or an 
advisory jurisdiction but rather an implementation function. They do not provide an 
alternative to the use of force, like all dispute settlement bodies, but rather are the tragic 
consequence of its use.50 
 
Hence, a new broad definition is proposed, in order to cover not only the dispute 
mechanisms of the international community, but also the two post second World War ad 
hoc International Military Tribunals. Thus, the term “Transnational Juridical Institutions” 
seems to be adequate in describing courts, administrative hearing bodies, and other 
juridical institutions that make rulings and apply international law as last resort tribunal-
solving disputes between nations, international organizations, or individuals. These courts 
speak with finality, and their rulings serve as a source for international law. They can be 
widely representative, truly international or regional in composition, and they can be 
either military or civilian institutions. They can be with or without any supervision or 
oversight, and they can modernly claim jurisdiction over states as well as individuals. In 
particular their jurisdiction can be either limited or expanded worldwide; even to 
countries that have not agreed to membership.  
Examples of such Transnational Juridical Institutions are the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) - or else the World 
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Court, the International Military Tribunals (ITM) in Nuremberg and Tokyo, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Central American 
Court of Justice, the Inter American Court Of Human Rights (IACHR), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), the International Criminal Court (ICC), etc…. 
From all these bodies, the ones that tried to end the impunity of atrocities and 
human rights violators, namely the two IMTs, the ICTY, and the ICTR hold a distinct 
position. Millions of innocent lives have been lost in war and at the hands of oppressive 
governments with the military as executioners of their plans, sharing the spoils of power 
holding. Non-fulfillment of obligations accepted by the majority of states to punish the 
architects of such policies ended with the establishment of and the punishment received 
from these tribunals. The latter do not only provide a major improvement for 
international law, but also a catalyst for bringing states that participated in gross 




IV. THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: FROM THE LATE EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY TO THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
It was very common historically for mankind to view war and actions of the 
armed forces mainly in terms of causes and effects. Little attention was given to moral 
and legal ramifications. It was all about winners and losers; the ultimate good was victory 
at all costs. The International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo changed the 
way the world viewed wars, and crimes associated with them. Their historical 
background is very important in order to appreciate the settings and the circumstances 
accompanying the tribunals. Both of these International Military Tribunals were 
established in the aftermath of the Second World War to prosecute individuals for crimes 
against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. As Telford Taylor states, “Ask 
the passerby what the words ‘war crimes’ bring to his mind, and the chances are the reply 
will be ‘Nuremberg.’”51 
 The conditions that gave rise to the laws of war, as we know them today are 
products of the changes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the consequent 
changes in the customs and practices of war. Especially after the Thirty Years War 
(1618-1648) that had left much of Europe a shambles, significant change emerged. 
From these disastrous years, military lessons were learned. Soldiers who were regularly 
fed and paid, and who did not have to forage for food and shelter, could be disciplined 
and trained to a pitch of efficiency that greatly raised the tactical level of operations. 
Troops were organized under a regular chain of command, in battalions, regiments, and 
other standard units. Administrative staffs handled supplies, pay, and other logistical 
necessities. Military police helped enforce discipline, and procedures something like 
courts-martial were established to punish offenders. 
Thus soldiering became a profession, and the distinction between soldier and civilian was 
stabilized. And so were born the customs and rules governing the conduct of occupying 
troops, requiring respect for their lives and livelihoods of the civilian inhabitants, as long 
as they remained non-combatants.52 
 
However, the elements of the laws of war remained largely unwritten in any 
official sense. These uncodified laws were known as customary international law. It was 
                                                 
 51 Taylor Telford, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, Back Bay Books, 1992, p. 6. 
 52 Ibid, p.6. 
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not until 1899, when the international breakthrough occurred with the signing of The 
Hague Conventions, and the follow-on Convention in 1907, on the laws of land warfare. 
Before that, committing crimes during war was rarely recognized as unlawful; the 
constraints on the conduct of war, jus in bello, were largely ignored. Therefore, two 
world wars had to occur before any significant changes happened and measures were 
adopted. Explicitly the question of punishing war criminals was answered only under the 
shadows of the failure war crimes trials of the First World War. For it was the First 
World War that showed the extend to which international justice could be compromised 
for the sake of political expedience.53  
The latter has a lot to do with the way the First World War was fought, and the 
ineffective punishment the war criminals received after it. It was from the very beginning 
of the First World War Kaiser Wilhelm II and his general staff conducted German war 
operations in such a way that fear, hate, and chaos was raised in a way comparable to that 
achieved later in time by the Third Reich. After the First World War ended, the pressure 
for punitive action against Germany was overwhelming with the strongest pressure 
coming from the British Empire, which was bearing the brunt of the U-boat and Zeppelin 
operations. Likewise, due to his election campaign, the British Prime Minister at the time 
David Lloyd George, wanted to put the German Kaiser Wilhelm II on trial as responsible 
for a war of aggression.  
Moreover, the pressure of public opinion in the Allied countries made them to 
establish a Commission to inquire and report the violations of international law alleged 
against the Central Powers, on January 25, 1919. Hence, during March 1919 the 
Commission adopted a report in which, among others, advised the establishment of a 
“High Tribunal” Leipzig (1921) to conduct trials of war criminals falling within 
international criminal jurisdiction. All persons belonging to the enemy countries who had 
violated the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, including heads of states, 
would be held liable to criminal prosecution. The Commission listed specified offences in 
violation of the laws and customs of war. It took note of the atrocities committed on the 
territory of the Central Powers against their own nationals such as the genocide of the 
                                                 
 53 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ICC Ratification and National Implementing Legislation, International 
Association of Penal Law (AIDP), 13 Quarter, (1:44), 1999, p. 10. 
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Armenians by the Turks and the crimes of the Austrian troops against its Italian minority, 
as violations of the laws of humanity.  
However, the United States of America had a different policy. The belief of the 
U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was that any judicial prosecution of the German Kaiser 
would create the undesirable precedent of victor’s justice, would do irreparable harm to 
the proposed League of Nations, and would boost the resentment among the Germans in 
such a way that could easily drive them towards communism. Consequently, the U.S. 
representatives objected to the phrase “laws and principles of humanity” arguing that 
those principles as included in the report were not a sufficiently reliable standard of 
conduct, and at the end no mention was made of the Kaiser’s responsibility for initiating 
an aggressive war. Therefore, the Treaty of Versailles indicted the German Sovereign not 
for war crimes but for “a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity 
of treaties.”54 Besides having no roots in international legal doctrine at the time, while the 
charge against the Kaiser was vague and did not mention his responsibility for initiating 
an aggressive war. The Allies failed to put Wilhelm II on the stand as he had found 
asylum in Holland, and the Dutch refused to extradite him on the grounds that his crimes 
were of a political character, since it was within the prerogatives of the head of the state 
to declare war.  
To make things even worse, in effect no German citizen was punished for war 
crimes, although Articles 227-230 of the Treaty of Versailles provided for punishing war 
criminals. According to the provision of Article 228, the German government recognized 
the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons 
accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.55 When 
the European Allies56 requested the surrender of 854 persons accused for such crimes the 
received pressure from the German government and reduced the numbers drastically to 
45 individuals, and won approval to put them on a trial before the German Supreme 
Court in Leipzig in 1921. Not only was this decision against to the Treaty of Versailles, 
                                                 
 54 Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, article 227. 
 55 Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, article 228. 
 56 The U.S. because of an isolationist Congress had withdrawn from European politics after the war 
and therefore did not participate further in any war crimes procedure. 
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but the consequent trials proved to be a fiasco: The ones convicted were not made to 
serve their sentences, the British wishing to strengthen the German government let the 
matter fade away, and the French and the Belgians began trying hundreds of the accused 
Germans in absentia after they had withdrawn their observers from Leipzig. 
Similarly the Allies showed no interest in pursuing war criminals in Austria, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, or Turkey.57 The Armenian genocide and the mistreatment of British 
prisoners by the Turks resulted in the conviction of only Turkish officers by a Turkish 
military tribunal in 1919. The Allies failed to establish the criminality of the massacres,58 
and a political solution was given in 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne granting amnesty 
to the perpetrators. Likewise, efforts for a limitation of armaments at the five-power 
Washington Conference of 1922 failed. Following Locarno security pact in 1920, the 
1925 Geneva Protocol was established against the use of poison gas, the 1930 London 
Treaty for the limitation of naval armaments was signed, and the 1928 Treaty of Paris 
came into force and sought to outlaw war itself. Though inspiring in intent this 
multiplicity of international agreements proved to be hollow in practice in the years that 
followed.  
Contrary to the aftermath of the First World War, that of the Second World War 
saw an explosion of war crimes trials in both Europe and Far East. Interestingly enough, 
except for the provisions relating to poison gas and submarines, the declared and 
generally accepted laws of war were the same with the provisions embodied in the Hague 
and Geneva conventions. Nonetheless, in 1945, public and official attitudes towards the 
laws of war had undergone a tremendous change. The horrific atrocities committed by the 
Axis military under the state direction made this time the victors of the war to abandon 
their First World War practice. The Allies could not have accepted once more that war 
criminals would be prosecuted and punished by their own national courts. That attempt 
had been already proven futile. 
 
 
                                                 
 57 With the exception of Yugoslavia, which pressed for the punishment of war criminals from 
Bulgaria. 
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B. THE NUREMBERG AND TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was an occupation court set up 
by the Allies,59 to whom Nazi Germany had unconditionally surrendered thus giving 
them the right to exercise sovereign legislative power,60 after the end of the Second 
World War. It had four judges; one for each of the allied powers fighting in Europe; 
Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the U.S.. It further affirmed the right of the 
Allies to legislate for the occupied territories as recognized by the civilized world; it was 
a process driven by the U.S. since the Moscow Declaration.61 The choice was between 
having a fair trial to deter future generations, and between summary executions of those 
who committed unprecedented atrocities. Moreover, a big trial would concentrate 
worldwide attention whereas a scattering of small trials would have carried little or no 
weight at all in marshalling public opinion.  
It has to be distinguished from the rest of the tribunals implementing Control 
Council Law No. 10, which are usually referred to as “Military Tribunals” of various 
nations e.g., the “U.S. Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, as opposed to the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, or Nuremberg Tribunal. Although small in 
number of defendants, compared to the rest of the Military Tribunals of the various 
nations, “was and has remained the most striking and important trial of them all, and that 
is why it has become known as ‘Nuremberg’- a name which conjures up the moral and 
legal issues raised by applying judicial methods to challenged wartime acts.”62 
                                                 
 58 The term genocide had not yet been used but that what the Armenian massacres were. 
 59 Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the U.S. acting in the interests of all nations. 
 60 Trials of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting 
at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22 (H.M. Stationary Office, 1950), 411 at 433; International Military 
Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, (1947) 41 AJIL 172 at 216. 
 61 On October 30, 1943 President Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet 
Premier Joseph Stalin signed the Moscow Declaration, which stated that upon cessation of conflict, the 
Allies would prosecute the Nazi war criminals. However, there was not a common desire for their judgment 
and punishment. The British advocated the summary execution of the major war criminals, the Soviets 
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 62 Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, p.  626. 
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The legal basis for the Nuremberg Tribunal was afforded by the London Charter 
of August 8, 1945. The Charter formulated three categories of international law crimes, 
namely crimes against peace, war crimes, and finally crimes against humanity. The 
Tribunal itself accepted the criminal responsibilility of the defendants, reasoning that 
crimes against international law “are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only 
by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law 
be enforced.”63 The answer to the question of what kind of international law was to be 
enforced, and who was to interpret it, appears to be of a political nature. As the U.S. 
Representative to the International Conference on the Military trials stated in 1945, “we 
will declare what international law is….”64  
The Nuremberg Tribunal considered its task to be one of interpretation and 
product of the law introduced by its Charter as “decisive and binding upon the 
Tribunal.”65 Regarding the framework of the applicable law, and to the accusations of 
“victors justice” under retrospective legislation, or the defiance of the principle nullum 
crimen, nulla poena sinne lege,66 the International Military Tribunal stated that, 
In the first place, it is to be observed that the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a 
limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust 
to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighbouring 
States without warning is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must 
know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be 
unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished…67 
The lack of codification in international positive law required from the Tribunal 
sometimes to treat law in accordance with its perspective. Explicitly, for the offences of 
war crimes applied, inter allia, the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1929 Geneva 
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Conventions, and it was very careful for the Allies not to be accused of tu quoque68 
evidence. Crimes against humanity, such as the atrocities committed by Germans against 
nationals of occupied territories, or allied Axis territories, or even against German 
nationals were new. This category of crimes was formulated in view of German behavior 
toward German Jews.69 Persecution of the offenders was covered by the concepts of 
crimes against peace or war crimes. The concept of the crime against peace was novel 
too, developed from the Anglo American world. It was covered by combining charges for 
waging war and the methods of warfare used by the Axis. 
Twenty-four major Nazi war criminals were put on the stand in the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, leaving the prosecution of the minor ones to the states where they had 
committed their crimes. One of the defendants was declared unfit to stand trial and 
another committed suicide. The trials lasted eleven months, and a total of twelve 
defendants were sentenced to death (one of them was Martin Bormann, who was tried in 
absentia), three were acquitted and the rest received prison terms.  
The other military tribunal, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, or 
simply Tokyo Tribunal, was a natural and unavoidable consequence of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal.70 After the war, the Supreme Allied Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, 
who also appointed the eleven judges, created it.  
As a matter of fact only little inclination existed in high American circles to bring 
Japanese leaders before a Court charging them with the crime against peace. One wish 
did exist in American military and political circles, and that was to revenge the attack on 
Pearl Harbor…For the United States, Pearl Harbor was the symbol of Japanese guile, if 
not of Japanese criminality. For this attack without declaration of war the responsible 
leaders should be punished exemplarily. That was the opinion of General Douglas 
MacArthur, as he told me personally.71 
Although the Tokyo Tribunal was intrinsically based on Pearl Harbor, since the 
precedent of Nuremberg had already been set, it was impossible to ignore Nuremberg. 
Hence, it followed as analogous reasoning and was modeled from the Nuremberg 
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Tribunal, proclaiming its Charter in January 1946, and convened on May 3, 1946. 
Japanese war crimes suspects were classified as ‘A,’ ‘B,’ or ‘C.’ The ‘A’ suspects were 
charged with crimes against peace, and were the ones that were prosecuted by the Tokyo 
Tribunal, the ‘B’ with conventional war crimes, and the ‘C’ with crimes against 
humanity. The Tokyo Tribunal prosecuted twenty-five defendants, two of whom died 
during the trial, and one was declared mentally unfit to stand trial. The rest of the 
suspects (‘B’ and ‘C’ class) were tried before military courts in various states. It received 
the same criticism as the Nuremberg Tribunal namely, as “victor’s justice,” e.g., Japan 
was not permitted to accuse the U.S. for the use of the atomic weapons dropped in its 
soil, or the Soviets for the violation of the neutrality agreement of April 13, 1941. 
All of the crime categories used in both tribunals “were vulnerable in the light of 
strict legality principles as elaborated in conventional constitutional laws of the civilized 
world.”72 In accordance with the Civil Law countries tradition, international law at that 
time had to be derived from a body of codes or statutes.73 Furthermore, at the time of the 
London Charter, waging a war of aggression had no parallel in conventional criminal 
codes. Hence, if judged by conventional conceptions of criminal justice projected at the 
international level,74 the legal basis for some of the crimes at the tribunals was 
questionable. However, as both of the International Military Tribunals had proven, 
international law reflects the moral judgments of the international community, and it 
evolves like the Common Law of the Anglo-American tradition. It is not contractual, 
referable to a lex scripta of definite and certain content, as the Civil Law countries would 
presume. Additionally, the justice given by these tribunals is justified in the light of their 
exceptionality. The crimes committed, and the intentionally involvement of the states of 
Germany and Japan, were unparallel in contemporary history. Legislative action 
addressing this situation had not occurred before the events. 
 Another important concern is the jurisdictional issue, which must be carefully 
looked upon with respect to the historical experience after the First World War. Given the 
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fact that the trials after the First World War ended up to be a mockery, and to the fact that 
the German and Japanese penal codes were never amended to condone the atrocities of 
the war era, there was a significant danger to replicate the previous to the Second World 
War events. The political reasoning behind the tribunals that has been provided above 
clearly demonstrated that this could not have happened again. 
So the International Military Tribunal began and finished, with general approval and little 
criticism from the world public. There were no charges that the defendants were being 
railroaded, the disclosures of Nazi atrocities were appalling, and the judges appeared to 
be fair and humane men. Thus the Tribunal accomplished what it had been established 
for. The world public was satisfied...In short, the International Military Tribunal was a 
success.75 
The judgments in Nuremberg and Tokyo were a turning point in crystallizing and 
clarifying international law.  They were not flawless, but under the conditions of that 
time, they presented the best possible civilized solution. Their errors and mistakes were 
instructive for the future. But their greatness is hidden in the new, unique and 
revolutionary concepts adopted. With the new rules of responsibility set by the IMTs, the 
old arguments invoked in order to paralyze the effectiveness of punishment based on 
traditional legal concepts76 or on the internal criminal law of the Civil Law countries, 
have been overcome and the Nuremberg principles have been since part of the 
international law. It is a mistake to judge the revolutionary character of these 
Transnational Juridical Bodies by the laws that they overcame or even abolished. It 
would more prudent to judge them by their value for the future. 
 
C. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
AT NUREMBERG 
If the International Military Tribunals were necessary, the question of what were 
their results, and how well they were utilized, not only by the victors and the defeated 
actors, but for the whole of mankind has to be answered with the principles set by these 
Transnational Juridical Bodies in mind.  
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Indeed, it takes a long time to arrive at a system of legal provisions, especially at 
the international level. Therefore, the principles set by the International Military 
Tribunals having proved themselves resistant to time, are of paramount importance. They 
were unanimously adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 95(1) on December 
11, 1946, and further accepted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 12, 1959. 
These principles, although they do not represent a systemic means of applying 
international juridical power, they address armed conflict issues as criminal conduct.  The 
seven principles set, are as follows: 
“Principle I.  Any person who commits or is an accomplice in the commission of an act 
which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable for 
punishment. 
Principle II.  The fact that domestic law does not punish an act which is an international 
crime does not free the perpetrator of such crime from responsibility under international 
law. 
Principle III.  The fact that a person who committed an international crime acted as Head 
of State or public official does not free him from responsibility under international law or 
mitigate punishment. 
Principle IV. The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his government or of a 
superior does not free him from responsibility under international law. It may, however, 
be considered in mitigation of punishment, if justice so requires. 
Principle V. Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a 
fair trial on the facts and law. 
Principle VI. The crimes hereafter set out are punishable as crimes under international 
law: 
a.     Crimes against Peace: 
1. Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; 
2. Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the 
acts mentioned under (1). 
 b.    War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall 
include, but not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any 
other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of 
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private 
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by 
military necessity. 
c.    Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
and other inhumane acts done against a civilian population, or persecutions on political, 
racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried out 
in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime. 
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Principle VII. Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime or a 
crime against humanity, as set forth in Principle VI, is a crime under international 
law.”77 
The Nuremberg principles, with the passage of time, have had a profound impact, 
not only on international criminal jurisprudence, but also in establishing international 
security, and contributing to civil-military relations worldwide, as part of positive and 
contemporary international law.  
The jurisprudence from the above principles is now included in Article 16 of the 
International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind of 1996.  Aggression, in accordance to the Draft Code Article is 
described, as an act by “an individual who, as leader or organizer, actively participates in 
or orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression committed by a 
State, shall be responsible for a crime of aggression.”78 With regards to the elements of 
aggression as an international crime, 
“What is clear is that omission can amount to an actus reus of this crime. The US 
Military Tribunal in the High Command case held that, in certain circumstances, 
omission or inaction could incur criminal liability of the accused like ‘active 
participation’. This happens in the following situation: 
‘If…, after the policy to initiate and wage aggressive wars was formulated, a defendant 
came into possession of knowledge that the invasions and wars to be waged were 
aggressive and unlawful, then he will be criminally responsible if he, being on the policy 
level, could have influenced such policy and failed so.’ 
Mens Rea 
The requisite mental elements for the crimes of aggression are intent plus knowledge. In 
the High Command case, the US Military Tribunal stated that those guilty of this offence 
must have: 
‘actual knowledge that an aggressive war is being indented and that if launched it will be 
an aggressive war. It requires in addition that the possessor of such knowledge, after he 
acquires it shall be in a position to shape or influence the policy that brings about its 
initiation or its continuance after its initiation, either by furthering, or by hindering or 
preventing it. If then does the former, he becomes criminally responsible; if he does the 
latter to the extent of his ability, then his action shows the lack of criminal intent with 
respect to such policy…’”79 
Not just any individual can be subject to prosecution under this charge. It has to 
be one of the individuals specified in the Nuremberg or Tokyo Charters, because a 
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boundary line had to be drawn between the simple soldier and the supreme commander or 
the dictator. As it was ruled in the High Command case in Nuremberg, in the cases of 
Muto, and Tojo in Tokyo, it is not the rank that is of importance in this case, but the 
individual’s ability to shape or influence policy, and it has to be proved on a case-by-case 
base. In order for the individual on a policy level not to be accused under this charge, he 
has to withdraw once he becomes fully aware of the conspiracy to wage an aggressive 
war, or of the aggressive war that is already being waged.80 Nevertheless, the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Tribunals did not limit their consideration of liability in terms of conspiracy to 
the charge of crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
The term “crimes against humanity” was first used technically during the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo justice. Even more, in Principle VI the sub-category of “other 
inhumane acts” is included, so there will be no legal negligence in this particular crime 
that could be exploited by the imagination and creativity of criminals against humanity. 
This led to the examination and condemn of such crimes by the U.N. General Assembly 
on December 11, 1946, and by the ILC. They have reached the status of international 
crimes as part of international customary law and their perpetrators are given individual 
criminal responsibility. Moreover, the elements of crimes against humanity continued to 
be developed in the domestic courts of the world, and from the two U.N. ad hoc tribunals, 
ICTR and ICTY, until today. Now, it is a rule of customary international law that this 
kind of crimes needs not to be linked to international armed conflict as required during 
Nuremberg and Tokyo. 
Regarding war crimes the contribution of Nuremberg and Tokyo is of no less 
importance. Their Charters regarded as war crimes those committed during international 
armed conflicts, i.e. if it is between two or more states, and had to be committed in the 
occupied territories. Hence, they had to be crimes; they had to be linked to an armed 
conflict itself; they had to be committed in the occupied territories-if they were 
committed in state territory or annexed territories they were crimes against humanity. The 
class of perpetrators was this time expanded. Civilians and not only military were 
convicted for this category of crimes, such as Hirota, the former minister of Japan 
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convicted for war crimes during the “Rape of Nanking.” It is true that the elements of this 
crime have evolved with time. However, the judgments in the post Second World War 
tribunals, the developments in international human rights law, and regional Transnational 
Juridical Institutions, such as the ECHR, had found significant guidance in the rulings of 
Nuremberg and Tokyo.81 Hence, soldiers, members of the government, party officials 
and administrators, judges and prosecutors, doctors and nurses, concentration camp 
inmates, executioners were found guilty in the post-Second World War trials, under the 
Nuremberg reasoning. 
Today no doubt exists as to the liability of the military commander who explicitly 
or implicitly gives permission to commit war crimes. In the Tokyo Tribunal the question 
of liability included the establishment of responsibility for omission in such crimes. The 
acknowledgement of such responsibilities has invaluable significance stimulated in 
marked degree the concern of high military and civil authorities for the maintaining 
international law. This was even more elaborate with regards to the terms of 
participation; the Tokyo Tribunal held responsible individuals on the basis of their de 
facto position to the conduct of war by the Japanese, although they had no formal powers 
of command.82 
On the other hand, following superior orders was no longer a defense for the 
soldiers that they believe that by committing war crimes or atrocities are doing their duty. 
If that were the case the head of states issuing decrees and orders would be the only ones 
responsible. Only if the soldier, although aware of the illegality of the superior’s orders, 
had no choice, the element of moral choice is relevant and he could plead duress. 
Furthermore, the principles established by the International Military Tribunals 
have been incorporated in many legal systems, and they have influenced the U.N. 
Charter. In many countries laws or regulations related to war crimes have been enacted, 
while most of these countries are part of one or more of the relevant Conventions. In 
other countries the Nuremberg principles can be found in the provisions of general 
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criminal law. Moreover, in many instances war criminals were judged, although under 
domestic criminal law provisions, certainly in the light of the Nuremberg principles, e.g. 
the Eichmann case by the District Court of Jerusalem in 1961, and the case of Klaus 
Barbie in France. 
Until today the application of international rules of war remains generally 
determined by the nations concerned, except in the comparatively few occasions that the 
United Nations intervenes. This intervention is most of the times by acting as a referee 
therefore, it is most of the times arguable if the nature of a war is aggressive or not. 
Additionally, not all the times legal systems adhered to the principles set.  In the case of 
crimes committed or sponsored by a state like genocide or crimes against humanity, 
impunity at the national level is the usual outcome. Amnesty as a political means to 
promote national unity and reconciliation without justice being done first, is a reality in 
South Africa. 
These do not negate the importance of the International Military Tribunals. They 
were novelties in their time, they caused drastic developments and achievements within 
international law, they have contributed to worldwide peace and security by influencing 
inter governmental and non governmental organizations such as the U.N. and the Red 
Cross respectively, and appealing to the hearts and minds of the public opinion 
worldwide. Moreover, they contributed to civil-military relations by creating a 
momentum for obedience into international law to both sides military and civilian 
authorities, and by putting the armed forces under democratic civilian control by creating 
a powerful precedence. This momentum was kept alive with the ICTR and ICTY that 
prove that international justice still is needed because it works. It remains to be seen if the 
novelty of the new millennium, the International Criminal Court will reinforce their 
success. 
 
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. 
Certainly it was not, and it is not anticipated that the rulings of the International 
Military Tribunals would or will put an end to aggressive wars or war crimes. It is 
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doubtful whether an explicit definition of aggression satisfying the principle of legality 
could ever be agreed upon. However, their significance in shaping public opinion and 
motivating policy-makers worldwide in declaring an international ban on waging such 
acts was, and still is, of utmost importance. Their influence on the United Nations is 
obvious: The world consent as set in the Charter of the United Nations states as its first 
and foremost purpose in Article 1 (1) is to suppress the acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace in order to maintain international peace and security. Even if the 
definition of aggression is not provided, and it is left intentionally to the Security Council 
to define, the International Military Tribunals were the first bodies addressing 
aggressiveness. They did not define aggression per se, but they distinguished between 
aggressive actions and aggressive wars, declared or not, and the individuals for 
aggressive actions were charged with a conspiracy to commit a crime against peace. 
Thus, they could provide the reasoning that can lead to the definition. On December 14, 
1974 their spirit culminated in the definition of aggression by consensus from U.N. 
General Assembly’s Resolution 3314. 
In accordance to these principles, when North Korea attacked South Korea in 
1950 it was a clear case of aggression, and the United Nations became actively engaged. 
The U.N. Security Council was able to authorize military forces and assistance to a 
unified command under the U.S. in order to restore international peace and security. A 
war of aggression was stopped, the North Koreans and their Chinese allies were driven 
back to the original border, and a truce was declared. A few years later the United 
Nations were involved again in denouncing the British-Israel military incursion into the 
Suez Canal, when the Egyptians tried to obtain full control of the latter. Another case of 
stopping aggression was the 1990s crisis in the Persian Gulf when Iraq invaded Kuwait. 
The United Nations again adopted the view that international law forbids aggressive wars 
and thus cannot tolerate them. Within this reasoning the U.S. and the rest of the coalition 
forces interfered, liberated Kuwait, and provided stability in the region.83  There is no 
doubt that in all these cases other factors were also involved, but the International 
Military Tribunals ban on aggressive wars was so intended and the moral, legal, and 
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political validity of it so important that it has been repetitively brought up in the interests 
of international security and peace.  
Moreover, the years that followed after the International Military Tribunals were 
effected by confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union, but as time passed, 
both of the Cold War adversaries could fight a war with weapons of mass destruction. 
Starting an atomic war would definitely be a war of aggression. 
Nuremberg and Tokyo are indelible precedents: in a period when the technical 
development of weaponry (atomic weapons) is conductive to the banishment of war, such 
precedents clear the way, they have the power of the beaten path. It can be maintained 
that it is a criminal act to commence a war in the atomic age.84 
Likewise, during the postwar period the U.N. has passed special Resolutions and 
initiated several conventions the meaning and legal interpretation of which rely upon the 
Nuremberg principles, e.g. the 1948 Genocide Convention, and the 1948 U.N. 
Convention Against Torture. Nuremberg and Tokyo justice led in conjunction with the 
post-Nuremberg codification of war crimes law, to the U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
that established the two U.N. ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and provided 
the guideline for the Charter of the International Criminal Court. Their spirit runs in the 
human rights provisions contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
adopted on 10 December 1948, by the U.N. General Assembly.  
Although the above present the merits of the case, loopholes also exist. The 
Vietnam War is questioned worldwide as a war of aggression, and acts committed in that 
war fall within the prohibited classifications of warfare as laid down in Nuremberg and 
Tokyo. Furthermore, when the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan, the 
aggression was plain but the U.N. did not take up arms against the Soviets. The United 
States of America only marginally helped the Afghanis; the danger of a global thermo-
nuclear war was more important than the aggression of the Soviets.  
Outside the U.N., the principles of the International Military Tribunal contributed 
in the development of the laws of warfare in terms of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions 
(the four Red Cross Conventions), and the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II. They 
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created expectations from the world’s public opinion, and they still gather their attention. 
They provided guidance for the creation of other mechanisms for implementing human 
rights. In addition to the U.N., regional structures now operate in Europe, the Americas, 
and Africa with the European system being the most fully developed of those structures 
and its ECHR.  
The importance of the International Military Tribunals to the future of Germany 
and Japan with the West, and their significance in terms of international security can be 
displayed even further by an article of Otto Kranzbuehler, one of the defense lawyers, as 
narrated by Telford Taylor: 
If agreement from a quite different source is desired, consider an article on Nuremberg by 
Otto Kranzbuehler, who, on other subjects, has differed with me often and forcefully: 
It was clear that after the obvious crimes committed under Hitler’s leadership, 
particularly the annihilation process against the Jews, something had to happen to 
discharge the tension between victors and vanquished…It was the United States who 
insisted that expiation must be sought and found by way of a judicial trial. The 
International Military Tribunal proceedings did, in my opinion, perform this function. It 
was the painful starting point for building the relations that exist today [1965] between 
Germany and her Western Allies.85 
 
The importance of the Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments and principles within the 
framework of civil-military relations would be shortsighted to be considered only with 
regards to Japan and Germany. Their significance exceeds territorial limits; it belongs to 
the whole civilized world. Their principles were codified as international law and 
influenced societies by serving as symbols; states and state behavior through their 
constitution, legislation, and appealing to the public; armed forces through education, 
changing traditions, training in new missions, and forging a cult of obedience in 
international law. 
Conceptually, it is easier to examine the impact in Germany, Japan, and the 
United States of America for reasons of immediate application and convenience. It is not 
a coincidence in the literature that the conception of civilian supremacy as at the 
cornerstone of civil-military relations which only emerged in the early 1950s, with 
Samuel Huntington’s “The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations” studying exactly Germany, Japan and the United States of America.   
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German civil-military relations have been through three phases. Phase I was when 
the aristocratic army of Frederic the Great was destroyed by Napoleon, Phase II when the 
professional army created by Scchaarnhorst and Gneisenau was destroyed by the Nazis, 
and Phase III started after the end of the Second World War.86 The Nazi party before the 
Second World War infiltrated the professional officer corps. That altered its fundamental 
character as an autonomous institution.87 Hitler started to intervene in the preparation of 
the military plans as early as 1938. When the war started to go badly he started making 
decisions on the tactical level also. Although many of the German armed forces during 
the war had participated in atrocities and war crimes, there were also many that objected 
and resisted. The military were victims of Nazism; this is a reality but not an excuse in 
legal terms. Its destruction with the millions of deaths and casualties created strong anti-
war and anti-military sentiments in the post-war Germany. It is remarkable how bad civil-
military relations due to a horrible totalitarian regime made the military as an institution 
to fail: 
Born of enlightened reform, it [the military] had been motivated by the ideals of integrity, 
service, competence, duty, and loyalty. Whatever the uses to which it was put, in and of 
itself it was a force for reason, realism, and peace.88 
This “use” was absolutely horrific: Many of the enemies of National Socialism 
were killed in measured and methodical fashion by the German military and their killing 
squads, and the troops were required and permitted to vent their anger against non- 
combatants. These actions had definitely left a “stain” on the armed forces worldwide; 
Germany included. 
The pattern of civil-military relations emerged differently in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. If it were to be left to its own, the Federal Republic of Germany would 
surely not have acquired an army for many years. The rise of the Cold War created the 
need for rearmament, and Nuremberg justice provided the principles. The condemnation 
under Nuremberg justice of those who committed horrific crimes unparallel to mankind 
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by that time inspired lawmakers, politicians, and the public. Nuremberg served not only 
as an institutional tool but also as a myth, tradition, and symbol for the armed forces, the 
state, and the society. The historical memory that dominated the founding of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, its political culture, and its social attitude had all the marks of the 
Military Tribunal on them.  
Under these conditions, the Federal Republic joined into a system of collective 
security; while on the same time this ensured that German citizens could not be forced 
into military service against their wishes. This was mainly done with the concept of 
Innere Führung or Inner Order, which embodied the basic concept of the internal order of 
the military and the integration of the latter in the society and the state. Under this 
concept an emerging democratic Bundestag would achieve absolute control over the 
armed forces. At first, 
The Bundestag insisted upon sharing in the control of the military forces. …More 
significantly, the German government’s defense adviser indicated that the ‘inner order’ of 
the army and that all soldiers would go through a special ‘citizenship course.’ 
‘Democracy can be defended only by democrats,’ Herr Blank was quoted as saying, ‘and 
freedom only by those who experience it themselves.’89 
The founders of the West German armed forces, “promised that the future army 
would represent something fundamentally new in contrast to the era before 1945, and that 
it would avoid the political and social abuses of the past.”90  This new Innere Führung 
demanded and promoted moral leadership, how this leadership is practiced by the 
superiors, and particularly with regards to military conduct in stressful conditions.  
Under Innere Führung, the military become citizens in uniform. The citizen is to 
experience his military service not as a contradiction to or denial of his rights and 
freedoms, but as a fundamental condition to secure dignity, justice, freedom, democracy 
and peace. Hence, the soldier is trained to the highest standards while still remaining 
politically conscious and responsible, acknowledging democratic rights and protecting 
the values that were set forth with the IMTs.  The concept is not static, since society 
evolves through time however it has very strong foundations, essentially guarantying 
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respect for human rights and for democratic political authority. Although many aspects of 
it are taught since it has been codified in the constitution and in relevant laws, each 
member of the armed forces must be able to experience the application of its principles in 
his daily military service.91 This integration of the military to the society reflects to 
Huntington’s “subjective control;” the military are integrated into the state and the 
society becoming the mirror of the latter. 
In Germany the constitutional and legal order was a determining factor for the 
control of the military. “The image of the citizen in uniform combines the military with 
democracy and the system of the constitutional state.”92 From the very beginning of the 
new state its Constitution, the Basic Law, and the Laws of the Laenders included the 
spirit of the two-post war IMTs, and the public’s rejection and revulsion of the armed 
forces.93 The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany as promulgated by the 
Parliamentary Council on May 23, 1949 and amended by the Unification Treaty in 1990 
provides that the executive authority is bound by law and justice and particularly, by the 
basic rights of all citizens. Therefore, it includes provisions for the basic human rights 
(Articles 1-18), accepts international arbitration under article 24, bans the preparation of a 
war of aggression under Article 25, and provides for checks and balances between the 
executive, legislative and judiciary authorities. It is important to notice that the basic right 
of protection of human dignity, laid down in Article1 is not subject to any restrictions, 
and may not be infringed by any emergency legislation measures or regulations 
concerning the legal status of the soldiers, due to its fundamental importance within the 
human rights provisions.94 Armed forces are established and given powers under the 
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provisions of Article 87a. Even in a state of defiance, the Basic Law includes the 
provisions of international law under Article 115a. Moreover, in terms of controlling the 
armed forces, and in order to maintain that the constitutional and legal provisions are 
preserved and obeyed by the military, the Basic Law includes significant provisions. 
Military criminal courts are under the Federal Minister of Justice (Article 96), a 
parliamentary commission of defense monitors the military behavior and approves the 
budget (Article 45a), a defense commissioner is appointed to safeguard the basic rights of 
the citizen-soldier (Article 45b), and the command authority is given to civilians (Article 
65a as it was amended in 1968).  
The changes in non-constitutional legislation can be also observed in different 
articles of the German Penal Code. In accordance to Section 5, Section 80, and Section 
80a of the latter, the preparation of a war of aggression is considered a crime even if such 
an act has committed outside of Germany.95 Failure to report such crimes is also 
punishable under Section 138. Section 6 and 220a provide similarly against genocide.96 
Section 100 provides for peace-endangering relationships. Chapter Six under Section 113 
provides for resistance to an unlawful act even if the perpetrator mistakenly assumes that 
the official act, e.g. an order is unlawful.97 Finally, under Section 81(2) 2 it is high 
treason to change the constitutional order based on the Basic Law,98 and under Sections 
86a and 89 the armed forces are protected by anti constitutional influence, especially 
Nazi party propaganda.99 
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Likewise, the regulations concerning the legal status of a soldier contained in the 
Legal Status of Military Personnel Act in Section 6, guarantee the same citizen rights to 
the soldier as in every citizen. Hence, combined with the respective constitutional 
provisions the military personnel does not become a mere object of state action. “As a 
member of the armed forces and bound to the state in a special relationship of duty and 
loyalty, he enjoys the basic rights which he, at the same time, has a supreme duty to 
support and uphold.”100 Similarly, the legal Status of Military Personnel Act provide for 
the duty of the military to “…support the basic democratic order of the Federal Republic 
of Germany and…defend its laws…demand obedience if the armed forces are to remain 
effective and the primacy of political control is to be preserved.”101 
Furthermore, Nuremberg shaped public opinion for many years in terms of 
sensitivity to military misconduct, and this public behavior transformed into political 
action; the German military are founded on the principle of general defense duty. Hence, 
due to the frequent rotation of national service conscripts all tendencies and changes to 
the civil society are quickly transferred to the military; the military and the society are 
interlinked with the conscripts making the citizen-soldier an “inner” type of control, since 
the military actually mirror the society.  The latter can be observed in the sporadic cases 
where German soldiers were engaging into physical abuses of their own, and the resultant 
decree of 1964 that described and maintained the tradition in the German military.102 
Likewise, the Bundeeswehr did not accept individuals who identified themselves with the 
ideas of the Nazis or the Waffen-SS.103  
For Japan the pattern of sustained military involvement to politics ended in 1945. 
Similarly to the German case, for eight years the only civil-military relations were 
between the local domestic authorities and the occupation forces. Even when Japan was 
no more occupied, it had no armed forces. Foreign policies, and in particular the U.S. 
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foreign policy influenced in Japan’s transition to democracy, and initiated a “democratic 
transition by installation.”104 However, the Japanese civilian authorities were aware of 
the political character and the involvement the military had before the war, and the 
disastrous consequences this could have for the future if it was to be repeated.  
The most important step towards this direction influenced by the IMTs was the 
replacement of the former Great Japanese Imperial Constitution with the 1946 
Constitution, which is the “supreme law of the nation.”105 For analytical purposes is 
important to notice that the 1946 Constitution was enacted while the IMTs were going 
on; the spirit of the latter is obvious throughout the former: Among the fundamental 
principles of the Constitution lay pacifism and basic human rights. In particular human 
rights are protected under Chapter III. In accordance with them the peoples’ rights to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall “…be the supreme consideration in legislation 
and in other governmental affairs.”106 
Likewise, both its preamble and its Article 9 of Chapter II substantiate the idea of 
pacifism in a form of renunciation of war; prohibition of aggression; and non-retention of 
military arms. The preamble explicitly resolves that “never again shall we be visited with 
the horrors of war through the action of government,” affirms that the authority of the 
latter “is derived from the people,” and makes clear its fundamental presupposition that 
the consent of the governed is “a universal principle of mankind.”107 The Constitution’s 
Article 9, due to its uniqueness and its importance on roles and missions of the armed 
forces deserves to be quoted in full: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international disputes. 
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In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as 
well as other war potential, will never been maintained. The right of belligerency of the 
state will not be recognized.108 
Not ignoring that the fact the Japanese military potential had to be minimized had 
a lot to do with Japan being occupied, it is also important not to ignore that the 
Constitution was widely embraced by the Japanese society, which had suffered so much 
during the Second World War. Furthermore, the Japanese society felt that they were free 
from any war responsibility, since their wartime leaders paid the price in the wake of the 
Tokyo tribunal, and they still stand firm in support of the pacifist provisions of the 
Constitution.109  
However, the beginning of the Cold War, and the Korean War in particular, gave 
birth to the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) and the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) 
under the Self Defense Forces Law of 1954. They both comprise the same defense 
organization but JDA is used as an administrative organization controlling the JSDF and 
subordinate to the prime minister (Article 66 of the Constitution). Under the legal and 
constitutional restrictions they are relatively small, presenting the minimum force 
required for self-defense.110 The Self-Defense Law of 1954, upholding strictly the 
constitutional lines provides for a unique military system. “All SDF personnel are 
technically civilians: those in uniform are classified as special civil servants and are 
subordinate to ordinary civil servants who run the Defense Agency.”111 
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Moreover, under Japan's Constitution strict civilian control is maintained over 
every aspect of the Japanese military. High-ranking military officers are not allowed to be 
involved in the government policymaking process, might that be as a cabinet or National 
Defense Council member.  The Chairman of the Joint Staff Council (JSC) cannot report 
directly to the Prime Minister, nor can a military representative testify before the 
parliament or it’s committees. Likewise the JSDF’s structure precludes the concentration 
of power of the pre 1945 general staffs. 
To be sure, the prewar constitution contained a fault, that military authorities could 
conduct military operations outside political control; the government could not participate 
in the military command. Presently, in contrast, the JSDF is totally under civilian control. 
This is an entirely different arrangement than its predecessor had. Today, the prime 
minister, on behalf of the cabinet, holds the authority for supreme command and control 
of the JSDF. Therefore, there is virtually no possibility that militarism will revive in 
Japan…112 
Likewise, constitutional constraints prevent the SDF from possessing weapons 
systems that are considered purely offensive. In addition to the state’s policy of never 
acquiring, manufacturing, or using weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons, 
the JSDF are not allowed to acquire weaponry with force-projection capabilities, such as 
aircraft carries, and air-refueling planes.113  
Therefore, due to the constitutional restrictions in terms of a collective defense 
agreement, and to the limitations of the JDF, the United States of America in 1960, under 
the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, undertook the main burden of Japan’s 
security. The treaty was based on Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution: Article 5 of the treaty 
states that “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the 
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and 
security and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional provisions and processes.”114  
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After the end of the Cold War, Japan contributed towards peacekeeping 
operations (PKOs) under the Peace Keeping Law of 1992, and passed several 
amendments in its legislation, the so called Guidelines legislation, in order to support 
U.S. forces in situations in areas surrounding Japan that have an important influence on 
the latter’s peace and security. However, the restrictions imposed due to constitutional 
anti-war provisions made the JSDF subject to strict guidelines e.g., they cannot be 
deployed in missions that may entail the use of force; Japan cannot send peacekeepers in 
an area where a cease-fire has not yet been firmly established between conflicting 
parties.115 
Further issues make civil-military relations more interesting and complex. There 
is no military secrets law, and all offences from the SDF personnel are adjudicated under 
normal procedures by civil courts. Japan lacks emergency legislations, i.e,. wartime laws 
because they are under Article 9, a violation of the Constitution and therefore Japan 
cannot ratify and implement the Geneva Conventions. Since war is outlawed as a means 
to resolve disputes, supposition of wartime legislation would be a violation of the 
Constitution. As a result the JSDF became a peculiar armed force that disincorporates the 
idea of war crime. Hence, issues like unlawful conduct of JSDF servicemembers would 
hold the latter responsible for acts that are not stipulated in the national legislation. 
However, after the terrorist attack in the United States of America, on September 11, 
2001 the Japanese government is in the progress of submitting new legislation during 
2002 although such an attempt will be very difficult to be approved by the Diet due to the 
abovementioned Constitutional constraints.  
The importance of the two ITMs can also be seen in their impact on the West, and 
especially in the United States of America the major protagonist in both military 
tribunals. It must be noticed from the beginning that in the United States of America 
citizenship is an important parameter of both the society and the military. The armed 
forces, the people, and the government establish a special relationship.116 People’s 
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attitudes reflect upon the military and the policymakers. To the American public the 
IMTs serve as symbols against aggression, genocide, and horrific crimes. The 
punishment of those responsible for the Holocaust, for the “final solution” brings 
Nuremberg in mind. Many political decisions regarding the use of the military have either 
been strongly criticized, Vietnam to be the strongest case, or applauded, e.g., the Gulf 
War. Similarly the “body bag” syndrome, as the latter had been addressed by various 
polls, has been many times the decisive factor for the policymakers in order not to deploy 
the armed forces however; when it comes to crimes dealt at Nuremberg the American 
public has been overwhelmingly supportive.117 The moral conviction that crimes like 
genocide bring into public mind legitimized domestically, both towards the military and 
the policymakers, the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Moreover, when the Nuremberg principles were codified as international law they 
became easily accommodated under the U.S. Constitution118 and U.S. municipal law.119 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949, created in the spirit of the IMTs, passed as federal law 
on May 5, 1950 through the system of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The latter 
provides for prosecution of military personnel suspected of having committed violations 
of the law of war.120 Likewise, The Law of Land Warfare, paragraph 509 makes it 
explicit that obedience to an unlawful order is no defense against a charge of war crimes. 
Furthermore, credit has to be given to the tribunals for making with their 
jurisprudence military officers to appreciate the complexities of national policy, and the 
political thinking in which they would be engaged. Objective civilian control was 
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occasionally criticized in terms of unlawful conduct. As Samuel Huntington states when 
he addresses the issue of objective civilian control and non-military thinking in the post 
war U.S., 
American military officers themselves in the postwar decade did not miss the relevance 
of the Nuremberg ‘higher loyalty philosophy to their own behavior. General MacArthur 
echoed many of the American civilian critics of the German generals when he denounced 
the ‘new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed 
forces owe primary allegiance and loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority 
of the executive branch of government rather than to the country and its Constitution 
which they are sworn to defend.” More explicitly, another American officer defended 
what he agreed was the ‘insubordination’ of Captain Crommelin in the 1949 B-36 
controversy on the grounds that: 
The decisions of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal were in large 
based on the tenet that the professional military defendants should have followed their 
consciences and not the orders of Hitler. There are, then occasions when the refusal of a 
military man to comply is not insubordinate, but is positively his duty.121 
 
Criticism addressed to the policy makers rose after Vietnam in the terms of the 
use of proportional force, and dysfunctional policies. Telford Taylor among others,122 
states that, 
Some twenty-five years ago, widespread controversy arose over the meaning of 
Nuremberg vis-à-vis the Vietnam War. Secretary of State Dean Rusk invoked Nuremberg 
to justify American Military intervention, but thousands of young men contented, to the 
contrary, that under the Nuremberg principles they were legally bound not to participate 
in what they regarded as the United States’ aggressive war.123 
 
Likewise he argues that “The sad story of America’s venture in Vietnam is that 
the military means rapidly submerged the political ends,”124 and that “Somehow we 
failed ourselves to learn the lessons we undertook to teach at Nuremberg, and that failure 
is today’s American tragedy.”125 Today it can be argued that these were indeed lessons 
learned by the West, both the policy makers and the military. Proportionality, and the 
elimination of collateral damage is the current modus operandi of the United States of 
America and NATO,126 as the Final Report to the ICTY Prosecutor by the Committee 
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Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia has shown.127  
Finally, it is important to notice another aspect of the Nuremberg principles, this 
time within the new roles and missions of the military. During the Cold War era the 
armed forces were focused in fighting a global war, the Third World War. Both East and 
West endorsed the Nuremberg principles nevertheless; each interpreted the latter under a 
radically different political and socioeconomic vision.128 This changed dramatically after 
the collapse of the Soviet block in 1989. Then democracy was accepted as the 
cornerstone of international security. It is no co-incidence that after the 1991 war in the 
Persian Gulf it was reported to the United States Congress that “[d]ecisions were 
impacted by legal considerations at every level, the law of war proved invaluable in the 
decision making process.”129 When the latter started to be threatened in different places 
in the world, the armed forces started being used in low-intensity conflicts, peacekeeping, 
peacemaking, and in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) or under the 
current American terminology Stability Operations. To accomplish these new missions 
they had to be exposed to international law as the latter had been developed and codified 
by that time. New roles and missions simply required new training in the “train as you 
fight” doctrine.130 Hence, today international law is taught in major military academies 
throughout the United States of America as in their equivalent in the Western World,131 
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and rules of engagement (ROE) are designed to obey the international legal provisions.132 
Officers that are under the Professional Military Education (PME) program in the U.S. 
armed forces, together with the international officers from different nations that are 
participating in the program, are taught international law, the law of armed conflict, and 
the Charter of the United Nations.133  
 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The history of mankind shows that polities develop judicial institutions for 
mediating, resolving, and imposing settlements. However, the mere existence of the latter 
cannot create conditions and impose settlements to conflicts. Their importance lays in the 
fact that without them conditions like peace, order, security, lawfulness and justice 
cannot occur even if imposed by force. Force not only is unsatisfactory means to obtain 
such results but also often creates more harm than good. That also applies with respect to 
the international community. 
The two IMTs at Nuremberg and Tokyo were institutions that did not rely simply 
on force. They have developed new legal norms and standards of behavior, responsibility, 
and accountability that have advanced international law, state and military conduct, and 
provided legal bases and reasoning for other social, and political institutions both in the 
national and in the international level.  
They served as a turning pointing crystallizing and clarifying norms and in 
enforcing penalties for the perpetrators. The IMTs had not only influenced the post war 
trials of war criminals, but they have influenced national legislations, and international 
organizations with the United Nations being the predominant one. With the passage of 
time their principles have proved resistant to time, notwithstanding eventual 
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shortcomings during the Cold War and the post-Cold War era. They created a powerful 
precedence an aggression and obedience to their norms, and a momentum for 
international security and stability through agreements and declarations in regional and 
international level. The Korean War, the Suez Canal, and the Persian Gulf are mere 
examples of the merits of the case. 
Furthermore, their moral legacy serves as a symbol, appealing to the hearts and 
minds of the people worldwide. They have shaped the opinions of policy makers for 
many years and they have contributed in building democratic states in Germany and 
Japan, aside from their universally significance, by influencing domestic legislation and 
leading to a democratic governance. The armed forces, reeducated in the preservation of 
peace and the respect to international law, accept civilian supremacy but without 
following superior orders when committing atrocities as a defense. In the same spirit the 
civilian authorities realized that there is a limit in the use of their own armed forces; 
aggression is not acceptable any more; genocide is no longer a choice for civilization and 
no government authority should lead their military towards such actions. Within that 
reasoning they have influenced the dynamics of civil-military relations through crafting 
citizenship, providing legal codifications, that turn on defined roles and missions for the 
armed forces, and guidelines for education and training in the post Cold War era. 
In Germany civil-military relations emerged in the concept of Inner Order 
integrating the military in the society and the state by making the soldier a citizen first. 
To achieve the latter constitution and legal formulas were introduced.134 However, the 
importance of Nuremberg lies within the heart of the citizen-soldier concept. One of the 
basic elements of the Inner Order is political education of the German soldier. The 
citizen-soldier is not just a servant of the German state, but above all a democrat 
defending not just his country but also the values that Western democracy stands for; he 
is a mirror of a German democratic society. This form of “subjective constitutional 
control” was highly influenced by the Nuremberg principles as has been highlighted in 
the provisions of the Basic Law, and the Penal Code, and the Legal Status of Military 
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Personnel Act. The needs for German rearmament could not have proceeded without 
such a legal change. The Cold War needs for rearmament of the Federal Republic of 
Germany required democratic citizens in arms as much as they required a democratic 
state, not just another German armed force in another German state.  
In Japan, civil-military relations were even more influenced by the IMTs spirit. In 
fact, the Japanese went even further with the adoption of the 1946 Constitution. The latter 
declared pacifism and renounced aggression and war. Hence, relative to Japan’s 
economic growth, the JSDF have limited capabilities, and they are restricted to only self-
defense missions and peacekeeping operations always under the strict constitutional 
guidelines. The military are not considered to be military per se, since war is against the 
Constitution, but special civil servants subordinate to civilian control through JDA. More 
peculiarities rise from the fact that war is not an issue, therefore there is not any 
emergency legislation hence, Japan cannot ratify the Geneva Conventions. 
In the United States the Nuremberg principles, accepted now as part of U.S. 
national law, guided policy makers in the use of their military because of the acceptance 
of these principles from the American public. In fact, when the U.S. military were used 
against these principles there has been great public disapproval and condemnation of the 
deployment.  
The Nuremberg principles provided also for education and training in new 
missions and roles after the end of the Cold War. Proportionality and the elimination of 
civilian collateral damage is a guiding factor in the U.S. and NATO campaigns. 
Furthermore, the military education is changing. Military academies and military staff 
colleges include international law as the latter embodied the Nuremberg principles in 





V. THE UNITED NATIONS AD HOC TRIBUNALS 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was the 
first war crimes tribunal since Nuremberg and Tokyo. It was the first time also for the 
Europeans confronting allegations and evidence of genocide since the Second World 
War. Hence, the U.N. Security Council using its authority under Chapter VI of the U.N. 
Charter set up the ICTY as a subsidiary organ to restore and maintain peace in the former 
Yugoslavia. If compared with the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, which were 
multinational in nature but representing only part of the world’s community, this was 
indeed the first truly international tribunal to be established by the U.N. to enforce 
international human rights law. 
Ironically enough, the nationalism involved in the events in the former 
Yugoslavia and the subsequent atrocities have their roots in the Second World War.  
In April 1941, Nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia, creating a puppet state called the 
Independent State of Croatia. Croatian Nationalists, known as the Ustashi, under the 
direction of the Nazis initiated a violent campaign to rid Yugoslavia of all persons of 
Serbian origin and create a homogenous nation of Croatians. With the defeat of Nazi 
Germany, the Croatian Army was forced to surrender and Yugoslavia came under the 
rule of Josip Tito. Despite being a half-Croat, half-Slovenian, he considered himself 
above all a communist who envisioned that national and ethnic rivalries, like class 
distinctions, would eventually fade from everyone’s collective memory. Under his firm 
leadership, the Federated People’s Republic of Yugoslavia enjoyed a relatively long 
period of unification and peace. After his death in 1980, he was replaced by a collective 
leadership that failed to provide a unifying force needed to maintain the Republic. It was 
thus easy, in the depressed economic climate of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, for leaders 
like Slobotan Milocevic of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia to reopen the wounds 
of not only World War II, but of previous centuries.135 
During the summer of 1991 Croatia and Slovenia declared independence but 
without providing for the security of the population of Serbian nationality that lived 
within their borders. This declaration led to a civil war between the Croatian majority and 
the Serbian minority which was supported, by the Yugoslav Federal Army, at the time the 
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third largest in Europe. This led the Croatian majority to the loss of almost one-third of 
their territory and eventually to the deployment of the U.N. Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) as a peacekeeping force. Nevertheless, when Bosnia-Herzegovina on 
October 15, 1991 proclaimed its sovereignty, the Bosnian Serbs were ready to resort to 
violence to prevent the succession. Subsequently they boycotted the independence 
referendum of March 1, 1992 and organized a militia with the blessings of the Yugoslav 
Federal Army. On April 6, 1992 the Europeans recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as a 
sovereign state, and the U.S. followed the next day. The Bosnian Serbs responded 
immediately by forcing hundreds of thousands of non Serbs to flee assisted by forty-five 
thousand regular troops of the Yugoslav Federal Army and shelled the major Muslim 
population centers. The U.N. Security Council under resolution 771, which called for 
substantial information about human rights violations, and a Special Rapporteur was 
appointed to investigate the information collected. Furthermore, under Resolution 780 a 
Commission of Experts was established to examine and analyze the information 
submitted, and to provide its conclusions to the Secretary General. Hence, on May 25, 
1993, under Resolution 808, the Security Council adopted the Statute of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and under Resolution 827 the ICTY was 
unanimously approved. 
While the wars were going on in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Kosovo was in a state of unrest with the Kosovo Albanians of the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA, or UCK) fighting the Serbian police forces from 1996 on. The Serbian 
forces responded with a campaign of shelling of predominantly Kosovo Albanian towns 
and villages, widespread destruction of property and expulsion of the civilian population 
from territories in Kosovo where KLA was active.136 On March 24, 1999 the intensifying 
conflict led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to begin Operation Allied 
Force launching air strikes against the former Yugoslavia. On May 22, 1999 the ICTY 
issued a significant indictment against a sitting head of State, Slobotan Milosevic, and 
several high-ranking Serbian officials which was sent to the Federal Ministry of Justice 
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of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to all U.N. members, and to Switzerland 
accompanied with the respective arrest warrants. The indictment alleges that between 
January 1 and May 1999 forces under their control persecuted the Albanian Kosovars on 
political, racial, and religious grounds. On June 9, 1999, and after showing its 
overwhelming superiority, NATO suspended its operations and signed a Military 
Technical Agreement with the Republic of Serbia requiring the Serbian military and its 
allies to withdraw from Kosovo. An international security force, the KFOR was 
established which immediately started to demilitarize the KLA. Likewise, on June 12, 
1999 the Security Council established an international civil presence in Kosovo in the 
form of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Since 
then Kosovo has undergone obvious changes, and the Kosovar Albanians do not suffer 
from Serbian repression. However, the international community is now concerned with 
the refugees that fled to neighboring countries and the Albanian nationalism that is 
spreading in the region accompanied with revenge attacks. 
The ICTY is based in The Hague, Netherlands. It consists of three organs, namely 
the three Trial Chambers and an Appeals Chamber, the Office of the Prosecutor, and a 
Registry. It is composed of sixteen permanent independent judges and a maximum of 
nine ad litem independent judges, elected by the General Assembly. It is not subject to 
any national laws and it has concurrent jurisdiction and primacy over national courts to 
prosecute individuals for serious violations of international human rights law committed 
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. However, it co-exists in prosecuting 
these crimes vis-à-vis national courts; it lacks exclusive jurisdiction over crimes included 
in its mandate. By its set up, the ICTY aims in deterring future violations of international 
criminal law, establishing a historical record of atrocities, bringing justice in terms of fair 
trials, stop the ethnic violence and contributing to reconciliation, and serving as a model 






2. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
Rwanda is a small nation densely populated. It is a former Belgian colony, located 
in central Africa consisting before the genocide, of about seven million inhabitants.137  In 
the precolonial era, three mutually interdependent groups, namely the Hutu, Tutsi, and 
Twa coexisted and showed no predisposition to war. During colonialism, the political and 
socio-economic organization was exploited by mainly the Belgians to divide the 
Rwandans into ranked, rigid, institutionalized ethnic groups, and the Tutsi minority was 
ruling the country. Likewise, the Hutu were systematically excluded from education and 
“the catholic schools which dominated the colonial education system, practiced opened 
discrimination in favor of the Tutsi.”138 Rwanda gained its independence from Belgium 
in 1962 after the growing demands of the Hutu majority, in what came to be known as the 
“Hutu Revolution” from 1959 to 1961.139  The post-colonial governments reinforced the 
divisive policies of the past and they played on the interests and the fears of the 
masses.140  Those governments were Hutu dominated. In their effort to take control of the 
new Rwandan state they started a reverse discrimination against the Tutsi minority, 
which became progressively more virulent in the 1980s. Hundreds of thousands of Tutsis 
fled to the neighboring countries. A Tutsi guerilla force established the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF), and its army, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) started fighting 
against the oppression. On August 4, 1993 in Arusha, Tanzania, Hutu President Juvenal 
Habyarimana and Tutsi military leaders signed the Arusha Accords. These were two 
protocols, which combined with earlier agreements, comprised a peace agreement in 
order to stop the violence. For implementing the peace accord, the U.N. Security Council 
established the U.N. Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) consisting of 2,500 U.N. 
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troops. However, when President Habyarimana was murdered, 141 the Hutu militia, led by 
the Presidential Guard, began a systematic massacre of Tutsis, Hutu moderates, and 
UNAMIR soldiers.142 Hutu killing resulted in the systemic and horrific143 murder of 
hundreds of thousands of civilians. The reasons for the genocide can be found in the need 
for elites to remain in power, the fear of the peasants of losing land to the Tutsi returnees, 
concerns of physical security among the Hutu of Tutsi reprisal, the ethnic ranking, and 
the highly centralized Hutu state.144 To all these Tutsi were the obstacles. 
The genocide ended in June when the PRF took control of the major Rwandan 
centers. The results of the Rwandan genocide were the mass killing of eight hundred 
thousand Tutsis and moderate Hutus, the disintegration of the society, and almost two 
million refugees.  
Very little about the Rwandan genocide is comprehensible. A Hutu elite came to believe 
that Hutu salvation necessitated Tutsi extermination. The Hutus enacted their conspiracy 
with startling efficiency. In one hundred days, between April 6 and July 19, 1994, they 
murdered roughly eight hundred thousand individuals. …The Rwandan genocide, 
therefore, has the macabre distinction of exceeding the rate of killing attained during 
Holocaust. And unlike the Nazis, who used modern industrial technology to accomplish 
the most primitive of ends, the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide employed primarily 
low-tech and physically demanding instruments of death that required an intimacy with 
their victims. The genocide was executed with a brutality and sadism that defy 
imagination. Eyewitnesses were in denial. They believed that the high-pitched screams 
they were hearing were wind gusts, that the pack of dogs at the roadside were feeding on 
animal remains and not dismembered corpses, that the smells enveloping them emanated 
from spoiled food and not decomposing bodies. One is reminded of Primo Levi’s 
observation about the Holocaust: ‘Things whose existence is not morally comprehensible 
cannot exist.’145 
Although the neighboring states provided significant humanitarian assistance to 
the refugees, and major governmental and non-governmental organizations provided 
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supplies and medical aid, the response from the U.N. in terms of peacekeeping forces was 
minimal. The call of the former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali for a force of five 
thousand U.N. peacekeepers did not find any response. Disagreements among the 
members of the Security Council resulted in the U.N. inability to prevent the genocide. 
The U.S., influenced mainly by the domestic impact by the American deaths in Somalia 
and the subsequent failure of operation on October 3, 1993, opposed the peacekeeping 
proposals. This had tremendous costs in lives in Rwanda, since the U.S. has always been 
the major contributor to the U.N. in terms of funding and troops. But it was not just the 
US. All the permanent members of the Security Council, by being such, accept the 
responsibility to defend against threats to their national security and also to international 
peace and security. The Great Powers however, disagreed for their own reasons. “Indeed, 
there seemed to be an almost inverse relationship between their power and their 
willingness to help.”146 France temporarily deployed troops unilaterally, and for its own 
political reasons and expectations. Because the French had been supportive to the Hutu 
government, they intervened to prevent Tutsi military from retaliating against Hutus. This 
French force however, resulted in saving the lives of tenths of thousands of fleeing Hutus. 
Almost as inexplicable is the reaction of the international community. What sets the 
Rwandan genocide apart from all other genocides is that the international community 
could have intervened at relatively low cost before the effects were fully realized. A 
genocide convention enjoyed states to do something. There were twenty-five hundred 
United Nations peacekeepers on the ground, and indeed, soon after the killing began, the 
UN’s force commander, Canadian General Roméo Dallaire, pleaded for a well equipped 
battalion to stop the slaughter. Yet the UN immediately ordered its forces not to protect 
civilians. And, on April 21, it ordered that all but 270 troops be withdrawn.147 
Once again mankind was not eager to intervene, and too late when it decided to 
do so. The U.N. in an attempt to make good on its past failings in Rwanda, responded to 
the latter’s request148, and set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
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by the Security Council Resolution 955 on November 8, 1994. However late that was, it 
was of the moral, as well as legal obligations that the international community had 
towards the Rwandans in terms for justice and reconciliation. Likewise, it was the UN’s 
obligation to its members and to their respective societies as they had been appalled once 
more with the horrific crimes committed. 
The ICTR is based in Arusha, Tanzania as neutral territory and not in Rwanda, for 
reasons of justice and equity, and because Rwanda lacked any infrastructure for hosting 
the tribunal. Like ICTY it is not subject to any national laws, it co-exists in prosecuting 
these crimes vis-à-vis national courts, and it has concurrent jurisdiction and primacy over 
national courts over genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, and of its Additional Protocol II committed in the territory of Rwanda 
between January 1 and December 31, 1994. Like the ICTY, ICTR exercises jurisdiction 
over natural persons, but also lacks exclusive jurisdiction over crimes included in its 
mandate. It consists of three Trial Chambers, an Appeals Chamber, the Prosecutor and a 
Registry. 
 
B. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.N. AD HOC 
TRIBUNALS AND THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
(IMTS) AT NUREMBERG AND TOKYO 
 There are many similarities between the two ad hoc tribunals since ICTR was 
influenced in its set up by ICTY. However, there are also differences among them. As 
both represent the two active criminal International Juridical Bodies since no case has 
been presented to the International Criminal Court yet, it is necessary to have a closer 
look at them. Likewise, the comparison between the International Military Tribunals of 
Nuremberg and Tokyo will show the progress these bodies have made in a relatively 
short period of time. Their similarities and differences can be addressed by comparing 
their statutes and their pragmatic considerations under which they were established and 
functioned. 
 In summarizing the similarities of the ICTY and the ICTR it must be stated that 
they are both set up by the United Nations. Therefore, all U.N. member-states are 
obligated to cooperate with them. Likewise, they are both subsidiary organs of the U.N. 
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Security Council. They apply positive and customary international law, they are both not 
subjects to any national laws, and co-exist in prosecuting international crimes vis-à-vis 
national courts. However, they enjoy primacy over the national courts and may take over 
national investigations and proceedings at any stage if that proves to be in the interest of 
international justice. They prosecute only natural persons, not organizations, political 
parties, administrative entities, or other legal subjects. Their Prosecutor is an independent 
organ, and is the same for both tribunals. Their judges are elected by the U.N. General 
Assembly, on the basis of a short list of candidates selected by the Security Council. 
They have almost identical Rules of Procedure and Evidence. They currently have three 
Trial Chambers, and an Appeals Chamber. Ad littem judges support both ICTY and 
ICTR. Moreover, in order to ensure consistency in the application of law, they exchange 
judges and share the same President in the Appeals Chamber. Finally, the penalty 
imposed by the tribunals is limited to imprisonment; life imprisonment being the highest 
penalty imposed by them. 
 Their differences arise mainly from their establishment. The U.N. General 
Assembly also approved the ICTY, whereas the Security Council without further 
verification of the General Assembly set up of the ICTR. When the ICTY was 
prosecuting crimes for Bosnia, alleged crimes took place in Kosovo, and NATO 
intervened. Nothing like that happened in Rwanda, although small fights are regularly 
taking place. Furthermore, their jurisdiction differs. The ICTR has jurisdiction over grave 
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, 
genocide, crimes against humanity committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia 
since 1991. The ICTR has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II 
committed between January 1 and December 31, 1994 by Rwandans in Rwanda and in 
the territory of the neighboring states and for non-Rwandans for those crimes committed 
in Rwanda. Hence the jurisdiction of the ICTR is limited in internal armed conflict only. 
Also, for the ICTY, the important issue is the commitment of crimes against humanity 
within an armed conflict. For the ICTR such crimes are linked with discriminatory intent, 
i.e., if they are committed on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds. This 
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is in addition to the other requirements in the Nuremberg Charter, Tokyo Charter, and the 
ICTY Statute.  
 With the adoption of the two U.N. ad hoc tribunals, comparisons between them 
and the post-Second World War IMTs became inevitable. They are all unique in 
establishment, and they share significant differences. The Allies established the ITMs in 
occupied territories, and they were military courts. The ad hoc tribunals were created by 
the United Nations and, although extraordinary, they have nothing to do with military 
courts. The ICTY and ICTR are truly multinational, and they are based on globally 
accepted legal precedents and principles. Hence, their legitimacy is not questioned as 
“victor’s justice,” contrary to the IMTs. However, the IMTs were novel, and the 
Nuremberg principles, are part of international law. Fifty years of reflection of these 
principles by the international community has given to the ad hoc tribunals the 
opportunity to have a stable legal base. This does not imply the lack of criticism; it just 
states the fact that the IMTs contributed significantly to the development, and the 
codification of international law. Hence in the ad hoc tribunals, there are no application 
of ex post facto laws and allegations of judicial partiality. The legitimacy of the ICTY 
and the ICTR is based on both conventional and rules of customary law that are beyond 
any doubt part of international customary law, rather than the rights of belligerents to 
enforce the laws of war. Likewise, lessons that were to be learned were really learned. 
Unlike the Allies at Nuremberg and Tokyo, the members of the Security Council 
recognize that they constitute a political entity therefore; they lack competence to sit in 
judgment of alleged perpetrators, hence the establishment of the independent judicial 
bodies for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Furthermore, the ICTY and the ICTR do not allow 
trials in absentia, and they are both accountable to the defendants, who can appeal their 
judgments. Similarly to the IMTs heads of state, government officials, and persons acting 
in an official capacity cannot plea immunity however, they prosecute only natural 
persons, not organizations, political parties, groups, corporate entities or states, and they 
can impose only imprisonment. The number of the defendants to be tried from the ICTY 
and the ICTR is significantly different than the number of defendants in Nuremberg and 
Tokyo. With suspects numbering into thousands, the detainees are currently forty-three 
for the ICTY and sixty for the ICTR compared to the twenty-four for Nuremberg and 
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twenty-five for Tokyo. The required proceedings without loosing the essential fairness of 
the trial process for the ICTR will not be concluded before 2008149 and before 2016150 
for the ICTY, contrary to the relevant speedy IMTs. Even so, the ability to obtain 
evidence is not the same with the relatively easy task the Allies had in the Second World 
War. Besides the lengthy documentation and records that the victors gathered from the 
German and Japanese authorities, but also their own sources in Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
things are different and the evidence is scarce. Moreover, the ability of the Allied military 
to obtain evidence was definitely better than that of the United Nations, and their legal 
staff due to the lack of control over areas where offences have been committed. Likewise, 
the ad hoc tribunals seem to suffer from a lack of sufficient financial support unlike the 
IMTs where budget constraints and limited resources were not an issue. Definitely the 
voluntary contributions that have been established by the U.N. General Assembly 
highlight the problem. 
 
C. THE ICTY AND ICTR LEGAL STATUS AND JURISPRUDENCE 
 Each International Juridical Body interprets the law in accordance with the 
instrument that created it. Hence, the ICTY and ICTR as such, their status and rules 
consist of a synthesis of the Civil Law systems and the Common Law systems. These 
tribunals are not bound by any past legal doctrines. They apply customary international 
law as it stands when the crime is committed. It is obvious that international law has 
much evolved since the end of the Second World War therefore, the notion of the 
offences are considered at the relevant times when they were committed and not when the 
notion of those crimes was being developed.  
 Having been established under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
                                                 
 149 Ms Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Press Conference in 
Arusha on December 6, 2001. Available [online] at: 
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/speeches/delponteprsconf021201.htm, 6/17/2002. 
 150 United Nations Press Release, Fifty-fifth General Assembly, Plenary, 20 November 2000, 68th 
Meeting (AM). This creates the unacceptable situation of detainees being deprived their freedom for 
several years before their fate is decided upon. 
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International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
since January 1, 1991 or ICTY, functions in accordance with the provisions of its Statute. 
The Security Council Resolution 827 when adopted on May 25, 1993, and amended by 
the Resolutions 1166 on May 13, 1998, 1329 on November 30, 2000, and 1411 on May 
17, 2002 established the ICTY Statute.  
 Similarly, having been established by the Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens 
responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of 
neighboring States between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994 or ICTY functions 
in accordance with the provisions of its Statute. The ICTY Statute was established by 
Security Council Resolution 955 on November 8, 1994 and was amended on April 30, 
1998 with Resolution 1165, with Resolution 1329 on November 30, 2000, with 
Resolution 1411 on May 17, 2002 and finally with Resolution 1431 on August 14, 2002. 
 It is important to note that although the ICTY and the ICTR Statute have been 
established by an international organization and are binding on states under Chapter VII 
of the U.N. Charter therefore they differ from treaties; their interpretation is essentially 
the same with the latter under customary international law. When there is no applicable 
treaty provision, general principles of international law may be used. If that also fails, 
“international courts must draw upon the general concepts and legal institutions common 
to all major legal systems of the world.”151 Furthermore, they may also draw upon 
national law to fill possible omissions in their statute or customary international law.152 
 Both of the ad hoc tribunals have upheld themselves the legality of their 
establishment. In ICTY’s opinion, the Security Council was justified in the set up of the 
tribunal as a response to the threat to the peace in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, 
                                                 
 151 Fuundzija, para. 178. ICTY, T. Ch. II. Cited in Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law, 47. In 
this case itself the Trial Chamber found that most legal systems lack in uniformity in the criminalization of 
certain forced sexual acts as rape, and resorted to the general principles of international criminal law, i.e., 
the principle for respect of the human dignity. 
 152 Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic and Others, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ICTY T. Ch. II, 14 Jan. 2000, 
paras 539-40. Op. cit., 45. 
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and all UN states must observe the measures taken by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII.153 Likewise, the legality of the ICTR has been upheld by itself, when the Trial 
Chamber noted that since Rwanda itself was the state that requested the establishment of 
the ICTR, and since the obligations of the U.N. Charter bound all the member states, the 
set up of the ad hoc tribunal could not have violated the state sovereignty of Rwanda or 
neighboring states. Moreover, since the internal conflict in Rwanda was a threat to 
international peace and security the U.N. Security council was justified to act under the 
U.N. Charter, specifically under Chapter VII. Nevertheless, it reasoned that Chapter VII 
was the legitimate source of its creation and that ICTR is obligated to provide fair trials 
by its Statute and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.154 Hence, it rejected the 
contention that the ICTR’s creation violated the principle of jus de non evocando.155 
 With regards to interpretation of their statute, the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Delalic 
et al. (“Celebici”) used three different rules of interpretation, namely the literal rule, the 
golden rule, and the mischief rule. Under the first, the judge interprets the rule as is in the 
statute, whereas under the second, which supplements the literal interpretation, the judge 
is to modify the grammatical sense of the word up to a certain degree, to avoid anomaly 
and contradiction that would lead to injustice. Under the third, the judge is asked to 
examine the legislative history of the statute in terms of the mischief that it intends to 
remedy. In other words, the social and political considerations that created the tribunals 
are taken into account but under strict construction, without filling omissions in the 
statutes that are not accidental; the tribunals do not have legislative authority. 
 The decisions and judgments of the tribunals have a particular significance in 
aligning the rules applicable in both international and non-international conflicts. 
According to the tribunals there is a common core of substantive international human 
rights law that is applicable to both of them. The ICTY Appeals chamber stated that 
                                                 
 153 Prosecutor vs. Dusco Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, ICTY App. Ch., Decision on the Defense 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995. Op. cit. 24. 
 154 Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, ICTR T. Ch., Decision on Jurisdiction, 18 
June 1997. Op. cit., 25. 
 155 A principle under constitutional law in Civil Law systems that prohibits the creation of 
“extraordinary” or “special jurisdiction” courts for political offences during internal unrest without the 
guarantees of a fair trial. 
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Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions constitutes such a minimum,156 and 
that the general essence of the rules and principles governing international armed 
conflicts apply also to internal armed conflicts. The ICTY further conformed the 
existence of that common core of rules, and further clarified the distinction between non-
international armed conflict and situations of civil unrest or terrorism.157  The tribunals 
also contributed further in the elaboration and development of rules applicable in internal 
armed conflicts: 
Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or even ban rape, torture or the wanton 
destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as well as proscribe 
weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two sovereign States are engaged in war, 
and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when armed 
violence has erupted ‘only’ within the territory of a sovereign State? If international law, 
while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn to 
the protection of human beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy 
should gradually loose its weight.158 
In determining the character of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia the ICTY has 
generated significant jurisprudence. The Appeals Chambers decided, regarding the 
ICTY’s competence, that there were several distinct conflicts within the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991, and refused to accept them automatically as a single 
armed conflict since they had both internal and international aspects. Instead, it set a new 
test, the ‘overall control test’ in asserting the necessary link between an armed faction in 
a prima facie local conflict in the territory of a sovereign state and the military of another 
foreign nation, i.e. if one faction of the conflict is acting as an agent of another state 
which exerted ‘overall control’ over this faction, and left the Trial Chambers to decide 
whether the international nature was established in the cases that were brought to them.  
 The establishment of individual criminal responsibility for serious violations of 
international human rights law has been substantially advanced with the creation and the 
jurisprudence of these two bodies. Both the ICTY and the ICTR statutes provide for 
individual criminal responsibility in articles seven and four respectively. In terms of 
                                                 
 156 Prosecutor vs. Dusco Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, ICTY App. Ch., Decision on the Defense 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995, para 102.  
 157 Cases of Prosecutor v. Tadic, and Prosecutor v. Celebici respectively. 
 158 Prosecutor vs. Dusco Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, ICTY App. Ch., Decision on the Defense 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct. 1995.Para. 97. 
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jurisprudence, the ICTY asserted for the first time in history that individual criminal 
responsibility under international law exists for crimes applicable to internal conflicts. 
Furthermore, it clarified the meaning and scope the principle of command or superior 
responsibility emphasizing that the relationship between the superior and the subordinate 
exits even in informal structures as long as an effective command exists. Superiors are 
not only responsible for orders given but also for failing to prevent a crime or to deter by 
punishment the wrong doing of his subordinates. The latter apply not strictly to the armed 
forces but also to civilians in “positions of superior authority.” 
 Likewise, the rulings of both tribunals have contributed significantly towards the 
elucidation of the concept of crimes for which they claim jurisdiction. Regarding 
genocide, the gravest form of crime against humanity, was not a crime under the law of 
every country, even in certain countries that had ratified the Genocide Convention. The 
facts and the specifics of genocide were not common to the different legal systems. The 
ICTY and ICTR statutes restate the definition of the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
However, they interpreted genocide in broad terms. The victim in genocide is the group 
and not the individual. Both the tribunals de-linked the concept of protected persons with 
nationality, and looked at substantial relations rather than formal bonds. In trying to 
identify that group for terms of its protection and prosecution of the perpetrators, in 
Rutaganda ICTR considered that membership of a group is essentially a subjective 
concept, but can also be determined in an objective way. It is subjective when the 
offender perceives the victim as belonging to a group slated for destruction, or if the 
victim believes also the same. Hutu and Tutsi became distinct ethnic groups only after 
categorized as such by their colonizers. It can be objective because every Tutsi was 
carrying and identification document verifying his ethnic identity.159 Along these lines, 
the tribunals clarified how to identify the protected group taking into account the 
political, social, and cultural context of the society in question. They further made clear 
that genocide is committed not only by acts but also by omissions, and categorized sexual 
crimes that could be equivalent to genocide,160 contrary to the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
                                                 
 159 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, 6 Dec. 1999, para. 55 and 400-1. Op. cit., 71. 
 160 Forms of sexual violence used to prevent births within the group, or cause serious bodily or mental 
harm to them. 
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tribunals that omitted sexual violence against women committed in the field by the armed 
forces. 
 With regards to crimes against humanity, it must be noted that they have not been 
defined in a treaty, and their definition has developed inconsistently. The Statutes of the 
ICTY and the ICTR recognize as such a number of crimes, namely: murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on 
political, racial and religious grounds, and other inhumane acts. Whereas only states or 
individuals exercising state power during the Second World War could commit such 
crimes, this time the requirement of existence of a state or organizational policy was 
included. It is the existence of such policy that allows the perpetrator to commit such 
crimes in such a great dimension, which makes it as a crime against humanity. In 
accordance with the tribunals’ rulings, such a policy need not be conceived at the highest 
level or be clearly or formally announced. The widespread or systematic manner of the 
actions is enough to evince such a policy. Actions such as repeated and coordinated 
military offensive operations in relevant times and places, the creation of military 
institutions, connections between the military and the political leadership and its program 
for modifications of the ethnic composition, arbitrary detentions or displacements, and 
discriminatory measures may reveal such a policy. Furthermore, the ICTY has noted that 
customary international law has evolved to take into account forces that have de facto 
control in a territory.  Both the ad hoc tribunals have considered a definition of the term 
“civilian population” is justified with regards to crimes against humanity.161 Moreover, 
The ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals have repeatedly affirmed that torture is 
prohibited by a general rule of international law and that, as a norm of jus cogens, the 
prohibition of torture is absolute and non-derogable in any circumstances. The Tribunals 
have also adopted the broad definition of torture contained in the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984 which 
is regarded, in any event, as customary international law.162 
 War crimes covered by the ICTY Statute are both grave breaches of the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions, and violations of laws or customs of war. War crimes covered by 
                                                 
 161 ICTY: Prosecutor v. Tadic, and Vukovar Hospital cases. ICTR: Prosecutor v. Akayesu case. 
 162 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-seventh session, Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights: Fundamental standards of humanity, Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to 
Commission resolution 2000/9, p.7.  Available [on line] at: 
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2001/documentation/commission/e-cn4-2001-91.htm, 6/19/2002. 
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the ICTR are serious violations of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and the 1977 Additional Protocol II. In Tadic the ICTY Trial Chamber examined the 
necessary link between an offence and armed conflict. In its opinion, 
the existence of an armed conflict or occupation and the applicability of international 
humanitarian law to the territory is not sufficient to create international jurisdiction over 
each and every serious crime committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. For a 
crime to fall within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal a sufficient nexus must 
be established between the alleged offence and the armed conflict which gives rise to the 
applicability of international humanitarian law.163 
 
The ICTY has also developed the notion of protected persons in international human 
rights law. Only if the victims are protected persons then acts from the perpetrators could 
be characterized as grave breaches thus leading to war crimes. Although up to this point 
protected persons were defined with literal interpretation of the Geneva conventions, the 
Appeals Chamber emphasized the need for a flexible interpretation of nationality, stating 
that international human rights law should be applied with substantial relations and 
effective diplomatic relations. The ICTY since clarified the principle.164 
 One unique aspect of the jurisprudence of ICTY and ICTR is the effort to create a 
balance between the application of common law and civil law procedures. Two radically 
different systems are involved, namely the accusatorial system currently characteristic of 
the common law countries and the inquisitorial system characteristic of the civil law 
countries. This has significant impact on the issues of fair trial and of trial in absentia.165 
Nevertheless, under Rule 89, the Trial Chambers are not bound by national rules of 
evidence, and the Chambers of the ICTR have repeatedly noted that no system prevails. 
Instead it seams that both systems have been applied. Differences though are really 
important: In civil law systems all the prosecutor’s material is provided in advance to 
both the adverse party and to the Bench hence, the question of what matters consists of 
                                                 
 163  Ibid, p.7, and cit. 36. 
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evidence and which evidence can be admitted seldom arises in civil law criminal trials. In 
common law systems this question is crucial since the judges will find nothing but the 
indictment debates over the admissibility of evidence will continue as the trial proceeds. 
Likewise, the judicial role of the judges in these systems is different. In the civil law 
systems the judge has a more active role, whereas in the common law systems the parties 
and not the judge will control the development of the proceedings. Rulings and 
judgments are also different, e.g., in terms of precedents, formulation, styling etc. 
However, it should be noted that both civil and common-law systems differ within their 
own systems from country to country; they have no single and simple meaning. 
Conversely, but not strangely enough, the judges are left entirely free to adopt the 
interpretation that they consider more suitable and it is up to them to come with the final 
style of those legal and practical problems. 
 To set up such tribunals in a very short period of time is a very complex problem. 
However, it is obvious from the work of the tribunals so far that they have provided a 
body of sensible and universally applicable jurisprudence while at the same time trying to 
capture the social, cultural, political and historical background and to consider it under 
legal provisions in their decisions. Their jurisprudence has made an important overall 
contribution to the protection of individuals; they have contributed to the clarification of 
legal uncertainties, and have added to the progress towards international law. Through the 
reassertion of the centrality of the human dignity principle in the rules applicable in 
situations of armed conflict, and especially in internal armed conflict they further 
developed international law. Likewise, their contribution includes “the clarification of the 
conditions in which States have responsibility for the actions of non-State entities.”166 
With their rulings there are no evident substantive legal gaps in the protection of 
individuals in situations of internal violence. There is no need for new standards, and 
their jurisprudence has clarified existing uncertainties as a re-statement of existing 
principles. This among other things helps in identifying fundamental standards of 
humanity that require practical protection. 
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D. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.N. AD HOC TRIBUNALS WITHIN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS 
The experience of the two ad hoc tribunals so far has proved constructive in many 
respects despite the difficulties encountered, and possible weaknesses. Both of them have 
by now been confirmed as courts of law as a result of their substantial, innovative, and 
extraordinary activity. In their decisions they have proclaimed their autonomy, which is 
reflected vis-à-vis, their parent organ, i.e., the U.N. Security Council. The importance of 
these U.N. ad hoc Tribunals in international security and civil-military relations should 
be addressed in terms of pragmatic political and legal considerations. With their 
establishment and the reasoning behind it, is clear that the Security Council introduced a 
new paradigm in the new world order. This new paradigm does not include only political 
stability and general economic development, but democratic government, ethic harmony, 
and respect for human rights. 
It is important to notice from the beginning that both the ICTY and the ICTR are 
currently entering their phase of maturity. Nevertheless, the Security Council has created 
with them a particularly significant precedent, these being the very first time that 
international juridical bodies were given competence for violations of international 
human rights law committed within an internal conflict, in a civil war. Various reports 
drown up by the United Nations Secretary General make it clear that the Security Council 
did not intend to create new legal standards with these tribunals. Instead it tried to set up 
a system whereby the implementation of customary international law could be overseen 
by independent international judicial bodies, and should therefore be seen as 
complementary to other efforts at both national and international level. 
The establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals has been criticized 
worldwide on the grounds that they are limited, political, expensive, and they let some 
war criminals to go free. They have even been accused of being a cover for selective 
policies pursued by the World Powers providing them with an alibi for indefinitely 
deferring the institution of a permanent independent international criminal court to which 
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even the World Powers are accountable.167 This imposes a negative effect in the case of 
ICTY, contributing further to the loss of its legitimization among the Serbs after the 1999 
NATO intervention. Interestingly and surprisingly enough, leaders and army officers as 
“defenders of their country against the all mighty aggressors (as the public perceived the 
intervention) were practically ‘purified’ of the old crimes.”168  
In reality however, the experience of these tribunals proved extremely instructive. 
They have provided and still are providing confidence building and facilitate 
reconciliation in post-conflict societies. Both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia are 
doing much better now in terms of reconciliation seeing that justice has started to be 
given even to the highest possible level.169 They further serve as a tool kit for preventing 
destabilization of entire regions by large population flows. They are doing so, because by 
penetrating the shield of impunity, they provide adequate security arrangements, they 
educate the society and the elites in the norms of international law-especially the ones 
that hold political office and have the means of coercion. They further provide the legal 
background and guidance for national legal systems and institutions enforcing these 
norms.  
These tribunals are also highly politicized since the U.N. Security Council, an 
essentially political organ, instituted them. Contrary to what would have been expected, 
the conventional approach was not used, i.e., the creation of the ad hoc tribunals by terms 
of a treaty like the London Agreement of August 8, 1945. Instead the institutional method 
was followed, for reasons of expedition and political efficiency. Time for the adoption of 
a treaty was an unavailable luxury, especially in the case of Rwanda. However, this was 
an act that penetrated directly into the sovereignty of the states especially in matters of 
penal sanctions. The basing of competence to create the tribunals on Chapter VII of the 
Charter instead of Chapter VI signifies the importance of the tribunals in terms of 
                                                 
 167 They have limited reach and scope, and they can be theoretically selective, since they follow 
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international security. Under Articles 39 and 41 of Chapter VII, the conceived crimes 
constituted “a threat to international peace and security.” The tribunals meant to be 
coercive measures taken by the United Nations and not peaceful measurements of 
disputes that Chapter VI would have evoked. This reasoning and practice created many 
arguments among the members of the General Assembly, but in the end all the states 
have cooperated to a remarkable extent.  
In the case of ICTR another issue brings light to the set up of such institutions. 
The third world countries, especially the African states, wanted the creation of the ICTR 
to be done by the General Assembly with a procedure similar to the ICTY, instead of the 
Security Council.170 Nevertheless, this would have eventually put the Security Council in 
a secondary role, therefore, it was rejected for both expediency and by appeal to Article 
24 of the Charter.171 However, the chosen method for institution of the tribunals, largely 
imposed by the circumstances, proved effective in terms of rapid establishment of the 
tribunals. Noticeably, the future of the courts depends only on the Security Council since 
their jurisdiction is temporal depending on the latter to determine that they have served 
their purpose. The dissolution of the two tribunals will certainly give rise to numerous 
problems if done in haste, particularly on account of the time limits allowed for appeals 
and reviews and of the close institutional ties that exist among the tribunals per se. 
The ICTY and the ICTR brought the states in their respective regions into closer 
cooperation among them and with the international community. The safeguards offered 
by both ICTR and ICTY led the former Yugoslav states, Serbia, Montenegro, and the 
African states to support and cooperate with them. These safeguards are mainly their 
recognized independence and competence.172 Explicitly, their statutes guarantee their 
independence. Under the ICTY Statute, the nationality of the perpetrator appears of little 
importance in terms of prosecution by the tribunal. During NATO’s operation Allied 
Force in Kosovo accusations against it reached the tribunal. The Prosecutor has 
                                                 
 170 Djiena Wembou, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Its role in the African context, 
International Review of the Red Cross, No 321, (685:693), 1997.  
 171 Article 24 of the U.N. Charter invests the Security Council with primary responsibility for 
international peacekeeping and security. 
 172  Djiena Wembou, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Its role in the African context, 
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confirmed that that the ICTY has jurisdiction over crimes committed under its Statute “by 
anyone,” and has publicly repeated that investigations are carried out in all directions.173 
On May 13, 1999 a Press Release from the Office of the Prosecutor stated that on 24 
March 1999, 19 European and North American countries had  
…said with their deeds what some of them were reluctant to say with words. They have 
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of a pre-existing International 
Tribunal, whose mandate applies to the theatre of their chosen military operations, whose 
reach is unqualified by nationality, whose investigations are triggered at the sole 
discretion of the Prosecutor and who has primacy over national courts.174 
It is very important for the legitimization of the tribunals not to hold back their 
attempts to bring to justice all those believed responsible for war crimes. Especially in the 
case of the ICTY investigations should proceed towards all ethnic groups even-handedly. 
Only then stability, peace and security are much easier to establish. Justice must not only 
be done, it must also be seen to be done. 
Moreover, in terms of legitimacy, the election of their judges belongs to the U.N. 
General Assembly, on the basis of a short list of candidates selected by the Security 
Council. The latter provides necessary legitimacy and moral support to the judiciary 
bodies. In these terms their competence in trying serious violations of human rights law 
even in neighboring countries (ICTR), because the U.N. backs it up, prompted the 
cooperation between those states and the tribunals. This is of outmost importance because 
the prosecutor common to both tribunals does not possess any of the enforceable 
investigative powers available to national authorities in criminal investigations. In every 
investigation the Prosecutor relies on the co-operation and the assistance of the states. In 
1997 the African Heads of States undertook to cooperate with the ICTR, particularly in 
arresting the accused and transferring them to the tribunal. For the first time in African 
history there were efforts to disseminate and impose respect for international human 
rights law among states and local communities. The transfer of wanted criminals from 
Cameroon, Gabon, and Kenya provides proof that the political support is meaningful at 
least at that level. Likewise, after the general election in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia that ended the Milosevic regime, he was transferred to the ICTY in June 
                                                 
 173 Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, March 31, 1999, CC/PIU/391-E. 
 174 Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, May 13, 1999, CC/PIU/401-E 
92 
2001. Milocevic, who is currently on trial, is the ICTY’s high point in practical terms as 
the first ever serving head of state.175 Furthermore, in the case of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, federal legislation passed a law for the removal of any objects for the arrest 
and extradition to the ICTY of the accused by the tribunal as late as April 11, 2002, after 
the United States had frozen about forty million dollars in aid.176 Hence, the question of 
cooperation with states has not only proved to be realistic and pragmatic, but also has 
proven to be a success as long as the tribunals were supported by the World Powers.  
The link between the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and the maintenance of 
peace is observed more clearly in the provisions concerning the execution of their 
decisions. These are primarily entrusted to states, and to the Security Council only if 
states fail their obligations. But the main effort of the ad hoc tribunals is to enhance 
national reconciliation, and respect for human rights by baring impunity. This may be 
difficult to achieve in cases like Rwanda where a vast majority was involved in the 
genocide. It was nothing like the Holocaust where mass extermination took place in 
camps or crematoriums with the use of gasses or firing squads. In Rwanda primitive 
weapons were used symbolically and in close quarters with the victims requiring the 
participation of thousands. However hard this may be, Rwanda has chosen justice and 
respect for the law in reaching reconciliation.  
The ICTR has nothing to do with bodies like the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa.177 The case of South Africa is based on a different premise. 
                                                 
 175  Milosevic’s transfer to the ICTY by the Serbian authorities was affected under huge international 
pressure and almost immediately caused the fall of the then federal Yugoslav government. It is clear that 
the ICTY has neither the mandate, nor the resources, to be the primary investigative and prosecutorial 
agency for all criminal acts committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and especially in Kosovo. 
This will be most probably will be the responsibility of UNMIK assisted by KFOR. However, methods 
used by the ICTY to arrest accused individuals had been criticized in 1997 when certain Western states 
used unusual methods to bring them to justice. The use of specially trained and equipped units and NATO’s 
SFOR that led to the death of one of the accused raised the question whether the end justifies the means. 
This kind of action further encloses the danger of war criminals to mislead public opinion, the tribunal to 
loose its legitimacy and enable them to escape justice. 
 176 This US practice is considered to be inherently risky by the Europeans. Instead the European 
Union is providing aid to Yugoslavia but it does not tie it with the achievement of political goals. See the 
Fourth Report of the House of Commons, United Kingdom, Foreign Affairs. Available [online] at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmfaff/246/24605.htm, 6/22/2002. 
 177 Chris Maina Peter, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: bringing the killers to book, 
International Review of the Red Cross, No 321, (695:704), December 31, 1997. 
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It was a part of a process of national transformation and the establishments of democracy 
with free democratic elections and the establishment of a new constitution. This was 
mainly a national process with no direct involvement. In Rwanda such as solution has not 
matured yet. There is still regional instability and there are still many hard feelings 
between Hutu and Tutsi, but the ICTR can only further the reconciliation process. The 
tribunal relies much on international support. Furthermore, it seems that the international 
community by establishing the tribunal gives emphasis on prosecution of criminals and 
on combating impunity. However important this may be, satisfying it while pursuing 
national reconciliation is proving to be a very difficult task. If the world wants to 
reconstruct Rwanda, this will require a commitment and resources. Even more, it will 
require local and regional legitimacy due to the historical memories preceding 
decolonization. Likewise, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission has been proposed for 
Yugoslavia. In this case it is not just one state, or only Serbia; it is also Croatia, and 
Bosnia Herzegovina not to consider Kosovo and Montenegro as states of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The amnesty given to thirty thousand Kosovar Albanians on 
March 7, 2001 is helpful, but any real reconciliation must come to the region as a whole. 
To that end, the ICTY justice if fair and not selective has much to offer. 
These ongoing processes face the difficult task of creating new and different 
notions of security and armed forces that will diminish the possibilities of future abuse of 
the military. For that to be achieved a necessary normative framework has to be 
implemented. This normative framework, consisting predominantly of a new constitution 
and laws, must be respected by all the actors internally. However, respect for the law 
starts with the fear of the police officer. Most individuals are largely motivated by fear of 
the punishment that may occur, among other ethical or moral issues. ICTY and ICTR 
have a lot to offer in that perspective. These ad hoc tribunals have shown that 
international repression of serious violations of international human rights law is no 
longer a purely theoretical concept.178 Even so, it is clear that the significance of 
                                                 
 178 ICTY November 14, 2002 status: 79 Indictees -55 currently in proceedings before the tribunal (44 
in detention, 11 provisionally released), 24 remain at large. Available [online] at: 
 http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm, 11/14/2002. 
ICTR September 30, 2002 status: 61 detainees (22 on trial, 31 awaiting trial, 1 awaiting transfer, 1 pending 
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tribunals like these do not lie in the number of persons who appear before them, but in the 
signals sent out by their creation and jurisprudence.179 Their statues, rules of procedure 
and evidence, and their practice show that impunity is no longer acceptable in a universal 
level. Even the fear that the tribunals might preempt national prosecutions could also 
have the beneficial effect of changing national legislation, and spur prosecutions before 
the national courts. Nevertheless, the tribunals should have in mind their political settings 
and regional sensitivities. This does not imply anything more than showing understanding 
of the domestic political difficulties faced by Yugoslavia and Rwanda in acceding to the 
demands. A hostile attitude towards societies that have suffered much is neither needed 
nor required in demanding and achieving justice as the road to reconciliation, peace and 
stability. Legitimization in the “eyes of the beholder” is critical for both the tribunals. 
In Yugoslavia, and especially in Serbia new legislation started to emerge by the 
middle of 2002 under considerable international pressure and domestic disapproval. The 
Serbs, both the majority of the masses and the elites, share the view that it is preferable 
for Serb citizens to be tried by a domestic court. In their view ownership of the process is 
as important as the judicial procedure itself. Currently twenty-nine trials for crimes 
against humanity are underway in military courts, and one in a civilian court but not a 
single trial has been conducted or even handed down for the crimes in Kosovo. However, 
the minorities and the moderates have under the international pressure to transfer war 
criminals and proposals for change hopping that the trials in the ICTY will expose the 
Milocevic regime’s strategies and policies in the last twelve years. This will eventually 
strengthen them in political terms, and they will further consolidate their power. Hence, 
during November 2001 the Serbian Minister of Justice replaced one hundred and eighty 
seven judges, and issues included in the parliament’s agenda are the necessary penal code 
amendments, laws on criminal procedure among others. The judicial system today is 
unreliable, prone to political pressures and manipulation.180  Therefore, the changes to 
                                                 
Available [online] at: http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/factsheets/detainee.htm,  11/14/2002. 
 179 Chris Maina Peter, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: bringing the killers to book, 
p.2.  
 180 Serbia Still at the Crossroads, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, March 15, 2002, p. 
7. 
95 
the system are just emerging. Due to major domestic disapproval so far, they were just 
cosmetic without any legal reforms. 
In Kosovo many of the democratic institutions that have currently been built 
under UNMIK adhere to principles and norms clarified and protected under the rulings 
and the Statute of the ICTY. The success of those institutions will eventually reduce or 
reverse violence from the KLA against the Serbian minority. It will most probably 
determine if the population that fled to neighboring countries, influencing the Balkan and 
European security and stability will ever return and if KFOR will still be required to 
provide security. One of the problems that UNMIK had to face from the outset was the 
reformation of the judicial system to the one prior to the province’s loss of autonomy in 
1989.181 This happened with modifications to take account of international human rights 
legal standards, including the development of the latter by the ICTY and the ICTR. In 
order to provide impartiality, international judges and prosecutors were introduced 
applying norms as they were clarified by the ICTY, and since this is a short-term 
palliative, training has started for one hundred local judges. However, the real positive 
hope for the stability of the region in the future will be the development of a democratic 
reformed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This will require for the elites and the masses 
in Yugoslavia to accept the ICTY, and its norms as impartial. 
In the former Yugoslavia political and military elites shared not only the same 
values, but as the ICTY has shown, the responsibility for the war crimes committed. This 
was to be expected since silent politicization has always been a reality within the army’s 
ranks. It is not surprising that the ICTY did not deter the Kosovo events. Many officers 
had achieved the highest positions in the armed forces due to their conduct in the war 
with Croatia and Bosnia hence; they shared the same responsibility for war crimes all 
over the territory of the former Yugoslavia. An alliance was developed based upon 
mutual crimes, fear and mistrust. However, regarding internal missions the military 
operated even under Milocevic regime in a more restricted manner, dealing only with 
matters of vital significance for state existence.182 Careful analysis will reveal that the 
                                                 
 181 Due to Kosovo’s status as a constituent part of Yugoslavia, the U.N. Legal Department insisted 
that Yugoslav law remained valid in the territory of Kosovo hence; the Kosovo Albanian judges started 
boycotting the system. 
 182 Hence, the armed forces did not interfere with the political uprising in Serbia between 1996 and 
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military were-and still are-divided along functional and political lines, and that they 
actually presented politically a paper tiger that could not influence the political decision-
making progress. In 1996 the Chief of the General Staff admitted he had things to tell the 
media but he will not reveal anything because he is a disciplined soldier. The military 
were as traumatized as the society they served. After October 2000 a most promising 
reform started in terms of replacing officers associated with the Milosevic regime and 
possible war criminals. Forty-nine generals were retired and several commanders were 
replaced until the Chief of Staff halted the reform, although he is the same individual who 
agreed on the ICTY issue.183 This was mainly done due to the involvement of the latter to 
politics. Although throughout 2001 very little was done to restructure the army, a law on 
the civilian control of the military is being drafted. Until June 2002, there was no 
evidence of meaningful reform of the armed forces. However, on June 25, 2002 the 
Yugoslav President issued a decree ending the professional military service of the Chief 
of Staff General Nebojsa Pavkovic “for the sake of civilian control and for the sake of 
democracy.”184 The General “urged parliament to resolve the dispute” and although he 
discussed the President’s action with an unknown number of senior generals at the 
headquarters he gave an evening news conference where he stated that his intention was 
to “use all legal means to challenge the decision of the president.”185 Although there is 
currently a significant power struggle on going, the latter won unequivocal backing from 
the Europeans, and hopefully will lead to the much-needed reforms.186 
                                                 
1997 when the General Staff issued a declaration of neutrality. In the lower ranks officers expressed their 
unwillingness to obey orders to move against pro-democracy students and demonstrators in Serbia. 
 183 The Chief of Staff General Nebojsa Pavkovic, former commander of the Third Army, which was 
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Despite the fact that progress has been slow, and that the ICTY is still considered 
to be a hostile foreign organization exerting pressure on the Yugoslav authorities for the 
extradition of former members of the military, changes are indeed emerging. They 
include the reduction to military service to nine months, changes in the organization-
formation structure of the Army,187 the abolishment of the branch military academies and 
their replacement by a single military academy, the military downsizing from 105,000 to 
80,000 initially (phase one) and 65,000 finally (phase two), the transfer of the General 
Staff to the Ministry of Defense, a reduction of the military budget between 2000 and 
2001 by the Federal Parliament,188 the sale of surplus military facilities, the 
subordination of the Army Inspector to the Supreme Defense Council, and the early 
retirement of a number of generals.189 More important, after October 5 it became 
customary for the Defense Minister to be a civilian,190 the heads of the Ministry of 
Defense have on a number of occasions publicly showed their devotion to the democratic 
control of the military, along with the General Staff’s excessive use of the wording 
“civilian control of the military” in public.191 The problem however, is the democratic 
control of the military and not just the control of it. It is not just the legal provisions that 
need to change but the legitimacy of the whole model. It should be noted that the 2000 
elections in which the president was elected directly from the people and the very recent 
adoption from the Federal Parliament of the Law on FRY Security Services on 2002 are 
steps in the right direction. This latest law specifically places the Military Security 
Department, the Military Intelligence Service, the Federal Foreign Ministry Information 
and Documentation Service, and the Federal Foreign Ministry Security Service under the 
control of the Federal Parliament and the Federal Government.192  
                                                 
187 The commands of Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense were abolished, and nine corps were formed, 
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188 However, there is no evidence that the parliamentary committees are in control of the budget and 
its reduction. 
189 Gradually the staff of the high commands and departments has been replaced. 
190 However, the first two appointed to the post were a surgeon at fist and an agronomist latter. 
191 Miroslav Hadzic, Civil Military Features of the FR Yugoslavia, Research-CCMR Beograd, p.7. Dr. 
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However, the constitutional and institutional arrangements have not been 
changed. There are plans for a new constitution within 2003193 but until then, the old 
federal constitution is in effect. Even more, the existing legal framework of the defense 
system in Yugoslavia is dysfunctional and conflicting. The constitutions of Serbia and 
Yugoslavia are mutually colliding; the principle of separation of powers is still just a 
proclamation, and all the powers are in the hand of the executive apparatus.194 
Elementary human rights are neglected in the Serbian constitution, where no rights or 
liberties are completely inviolable since the exercise of every right can be restricted on 
the basis of a decision by the Serbian President. Likewise, the existence of military courts 
in Yugoslavia is considered to be an anachronism. They have jurisdiction over civilians. 
Military judges have been criticized for not being independent and not real judges 
according to international criteria.195 The Ministry of Defense is a second rank institution 
existing parallel to the General Staff administering issues not related directly to the 
management of the armed forces but instead it just secures funds for them from federal 
Assembly.196 
Things are similar if not worse within the police and their special operations units. 
They remain the same, unreformed and may potentially be a threat to the government 
itself. Although two Bosnian Serbs were arrested in November 2001 by the Serbian 
Interior Ministry’s “Red Berets” to be transferred to the ICTY, the latter stated that they 
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pressure for reforms it seems that will most probably be adopted within 2003. Its draft so far includes 
provisions stating that the military will be under civilian democratic control, and abolishing the existing 
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wanted no further arrests to be made, they were used against their will in that operation. 
They even requested the resignation of the Minister of Interior, who finally promised that 
while he is in charge no member of the police force would be transferred to The 
Hague.197 One of the main problems for the existence of this situation can be attributed to 
the inexistence of an unambiguous legal basis or better, the de facto inexistence of a legal 
basis.198 Hence, the former regime’s power structure remains at large. Although there are 
no instant solutions very recently, on July 18 2002, the Yugoslav Parliament and the 
Serbian legislature adopted the Law on the Security Intelligence Agency on federal and 
republic level. The passage of both laws, even if their quality is questionable, is an 
important landmark.199 These laws signify a break with the undemocratic practice that 
has lasted for several decades, since the security agencies have been operating in a legal 
vacuum. Likewise, the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Serbia issued on February 3, 2001 
an order to its members to strictly comply with legal provisions when performing their 
duties, prepared a report for the Serbian Parliamentary Committee, had relieved of duty 
about 2,500 of its members, and elements of decentralization have just started to be 
implemented.200 However, under the current power setting occasional setbacks are 
inevitable and it remains to be seen if these laws will prove to be meaningful or just 
cosmetic. 
Additionally, it is important to notice the public’s reaction to the ongoing reforms. 
In a research conducted by the Center for Politicological Research and Public Opinion of 
the Belgrade Institute of Social Sciences between March 3 and 10, 2001 showed that the 
public in Serbia (excluding the territories of Kosovo and Metohija) is approving by 51% 
changes in the military, and is overwhelmingly by 74.9%, approving the necessity of 
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gradually integrating into the European defense institutions; first of all to PfP.201 
Likewise, as Dr. Miroslav Hadzic remarks, 
The opinion that the inherited army should be reformed is increasingly present in the 
public, and that in this respect first the generals that Milosevic chose and appointed 
should be dismissed. This is also encouraged by the increasingly frequent public address 
of the issue of FRY membership in the PfP, with the dominating awareness that this 
includes the radical reform of the Army. At the same time it seems that the public is 
additionally familiarized with the idea and concept of democratic civil control of the 
military. It is not excluded that the same idea started circulating within the army, and that 
professional soldiers could soon discover the benefits that are to be gained from such 
control of the VJ.202 
This is another reason for the ICTY not only to be impartial but to look impartial too. It is 
imperative for the legitimization of the ICTY not to look just anti-Serbian in the former 
Yugoslavia. To that the committee established from the ICTY Prosecutor for alleged 
NATO crimes against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo air campaign was definitely 
towards the right side.203 This will help Yugoslavia in its effort to become member of the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) by the end of 2002. According to the Yugoslav officials, their 
military have the “capacities to take part in programs and exercises of PfP, such as 
particular police units, engineers, medical corps and helicopters.”204 However, arresting 
suspects from ICTY and drafting a “new army” model are prerequisites for that. It has 
been made quite clear so far to the Yugoslav decision makers that a possible request from 
                                                 
201 Milorad Timotic, M.A., The attitudes of Serbian public toward the Army and defense, Center for 
Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2002, p.2. Available [online] at: 
http://www.ccmr-bg.org/analize/istrazivanja/research3print.htm, 11/11/2002. 
202 Miroslav Hadzic, Civil Military Features of the FR Yugoslavia, p.9. 
 203 NATO servicemembers and policy makers were accused for war crimes for the NATO air 
campaign over the former Yugoslavia in 1999. Therefore, a committee was set by the ICTY Prosecutor in 
May 1999 to assess the allegations. The latter’s final report of June 2000 “exonerated all NATO personnel 
from all blame by deferring to the honest judgment of the soldiers in the field and the military strategists at 
the relevant time.” Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law, p. 163. For a critique of the 
Committee’s decision see Natalino Ronzitti, Is the non liquet of the Final Report by the Committee 
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
acceptable?, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 840, (1017: 1028), December 31, 2000. 
The Final Report is available [online] at: http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm, 6/27/2002. 
204 Yugoslavia in Partnership for Peace by the end of the year? From the media, September 26th 2002, 
Center for Civil-Military Relations Belgrade. Available [online] at: 
http://www.ccmr-bg.org/vesti/frommedia/media0014print.htm, 11/11/2002. 
101 
them for Yugoslavia to join the Euro-Atlantic structure demands certain conditions and 
actions as conditions of acceptance, particularly their cooperation with the ICTY.205 
In terms of the ICTR the following must be acknowledged. In the societal and 
structural level, the tribunal helps in raising people’s awareness of the importance and 
value of human life. It contributes to a process of normalization and in restoration of a 
peaceful society and a stable Rwanda. The restoration of civil administration and the 
reconstruction of the social fabric of the country are done through the prism of its rulings. 
This has a definite impact on the military, which will start to embrace these values either 
from habituation or from fear of coercion. The ICTR came as unpleasant to those who 
wanted by any means to stay in power. On April 2, 2002, with the opening of the Military 
Trial in Arusha the tribunal sends a clear message to that particular elite that those who 
abuse human life will be held responsible. Article 3 of the Charter of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), which provided for non-interference in the internal affairs of its 
members, does not give them shelter anymore.  
The dual system of prosecutions from both the ICTR and the national courts in 
Rwanda has its own problems. One of Rwanda’s objectives in requesting the 
establishment of an international tribunal was to gain the support necessary for the 
functioning of its own criminal justice system. That was also addressed in Resolution 
955, when the Security Council stressed that international cooperation was necessary for 
the domestic judicial system and courts inter allia because of the large number of 
suspects. This has turned out to be a relative success in the long run. Nevertheless, the 
ICTR tries the more serious cases but it can impose by its Statute only up to life 
imprisonment contrary to the death penalty, which is still an option under the Rwandan 
penal code. Hence, minor actors in the genocide are receiving severe punishment by the 
national courts, which may even give the death penalty. The latter within the Rwandan 
culture may send the wrong message, especially to the military commanders. 
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The ICTR has an important role in the Rwandan government’s efforts to build a 
new judiciary, and implement new legislation. The government in Rwanda is currently 
undertaking the material reconstruction of the judicial system and the training of its staff. 
For it is its own system that has the burden to give a legal response and create the 
normative environment for a new society, military, and government.  The detainees 
number more than one hundred thousand a figure that not even a highly developed 
country can deal with, and certainly not a country that traditionally the judiciary has been 
subordinate to the executive authority. The training now at the Nyabisindu Judicial 
Training Center is much influenced by the happenings in Arusha. Likewise, the 
government introduced a specific constitutional law206 to face the genocide and crimes 
against humanity between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994. This was done in 
order to remove the ambiguity of the direct applicability of international legal rules in the 
domestic legal system, especially in the Rwandan Penal Code. In that attempt, genocide 
and crimes against humanity have much driven from the relevant ICTR thinking and 
practice.207 In the first category of this law the persons who abused their position of 
authority, the military, and militias are included among others. Furthermore, the Bar was 
created in 1996. On November 30, 1996 the Prosecutor General of the Supreme Court 
published an initial list of 1,946 individuals in this category. On April 20, 2001 although 
opposed mainly by the Europeans, the Commission of Human Rights decided to end the 
mandate of the special representative and to end its consideration of human rights in 
Rwanda. Moreover, a technical cooperation agreement was signed between the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Rwandan Commission on Human 
Rights. Hence, the system is changing gradually.  
                                                 
 206 Organic Law of August 30, 1996 on the organization of prosecutions for offences constituting the 
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similar to the widely used practice of plea-bargaining in the United States of America. However, the 
official launch on June 18, 2002 of the new Gacaca courts system, a form of participative popular justice at 
the village level, is much criticized as unfair and flawed. An optimistic appreciation of the relations 
between the ICTR and the Rwandan national criminal courts can be found in Olivier Dubois, Rwanda’s 
national criminal courts and the International Tribunal, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 321, 
(717:731), December 31, 1997. 
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Likewise the military education and the military justice system are changing but 
very slow. With significant help by the U.S. and the U.K. opened files on 843 military 
personnel during 1999, and carried out two hundred and ninety five trials that led to 
twenty seven death penalties.208 Hundreds of soldiers and officers were enrolled in U.S. 
training programs, both in Rwanda and in the United States. That training dealt almost 
exclusively with human rights and military justice as early as 1995.209 More recently the 
Rwandan military officers started being educated in international human rights law in 
their own military academies, providing them a basic knowledge of the law and the rules 
of combat.210 Likewise, the PRF regime in Rwanda has consistently asserted its intention 
to convert its highly militarized system of government into a democratic system 
supported by a new constitution.211 The implementation of this new policy and reform 
program is hoped to lead in an administrative devolution and decentralization in the 
forthcoming nationwide elections on 2003.  
This by no means implies that everything has changed for the better in Rwanda. 
The PRF has the military and political control. Moreover, it does not tolerate criticism to 
its authority.212 There is much insecurity among the people regarding both internal and 
external armed conflicts to which the military is the only institution that can establish a 
climate of confidence and security. The fact is that Rwanda remains a country at war, and 
behaves as such. However true the latter is, and regardless of the progress that seemed to 
have been made, the conduct of the Rwandan military has recently been put under 
                                                 
 208 Rwandan Patriotic Army, Department of Auditorat Militaire, Annex B, Annual Report, 1999. Cited 
on Human Rights Watch. Available [online] at: 
http://ww.hrw.org/reports/2000/rwanda/Rwan004-09.htm, 6/21/2002. 
 209 Summary Report to Congress on U.S. Military activities in Rwanda, 1994-August 1997. Available 
[online] at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rwanda/summary.html, 6/21/2002. 
 210 On December 2000 260 company commanders and non commissioned officers were exposed in a 
humanitarian law seminar organized by the Red Cross.  
 211 “Consensual Democracy” in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District 
Elections, International Crisis Group (ICG), Africa Report No 34, October 9, 2001, p.2. 
212 Rwanda At The End of the Transition: A Necessary Political Liberalisation, ICG Report, 
11/13/2002, p.1. Available[online] at: 
 http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=817, 11/14/2002.  
As it is noted in the first page of the report “The opposition has been forced to exile, and anti-
establishment speeches relegated to secrecy. In the name of unity and national reconciliation, the various 
segments of Rwandan society are subjected to a paternalistic and authoritarian doctrine and cannot express 
themselves freely.” 
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question again. On May 28, 2002, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC-former 
Zaire) initiated proceedings against Rwanda for “massive, serious and flagrant violations 
of human rights and of international humanitarian law” resulting “from acts of armed 
aggression perpetrated by Rwanda on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo in flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, as guaranteed by the United Nations and OAU Charters.”213Even 
more, up to November 2002 there are multiple restrictions on political and civil liberties 
partly justified by the fragile situation the state of Rwanda faces since 1994. 
Nevertheless, in less than a year multi-party elections followed by a referendum for the 
adoption of the new constitution have been planned. There is certainly a momentum to 
the right direction but due to the security issues that Rwanda is facing from the 
neighboring countries, mainly the DRC; a long-term undertaking will be required.214 
The ICTR’s role in the African context is of utmost importance. It enjoys the 
support of the majority of the African states. The Harrare Summit, the Council of 
Ministers and the mechanism of the OAU for conflict prevention have repeatedly called 
for their member states to respect and enforce international law and cooperate with the 
ICTR. Interestingly enough, the African states now broadly support the tribunal perhaps 
because it is convenient or it is the lesser evil to their aims, and perhaps because there is 
some merit to supporting it. Then again, this was one of the aims of the ad hoc tribunals, 
to help the states to cooperate in terms of engaging themselves in common-binding 
structures and institutions that respect international human rights law. Since 1996 
seminars on the enforcement of international human rights law have been organized 
throughout the continent, and elites and bureaucracies are exposed to their ideas and 
protected values. African political leaders, officers, officials, and even the civil societies 
want to know more about issues such as war crimes, genocide, the Geneva Conventions, 
and the areas that can cooperate with tribunals such as the ICTR. Some African states are 
                                                 
 213 Press release of 28 May 2002, International Court of Justice. Hearings begun on June 13, 2002. 
Available [online] at: 
http://www.icj-cji.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2002/ipresscom2002-15_crw_20020568.htm, 6/21/2002. 
 214 For the situation up to 1997 see Gerhard Erasmus and Nadire Fourie, The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda: Are all issues addressed? How does it compare to South Africa’s Truth and 
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currently reviewing their legislation, looking upon their constitutions and their penal 
codes, and comparing them with the requirements of the international standards. Others, 
such as Benin, Mali, and Burkina Faso have requested help for revising important pieces 
of national legislation such as their civil-military code provisions.215
 
E. CONCLUSIONS  
The creation of ad hoc tribunals by the Security Council such as those created for 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, marks a considerable advance in the struggle against 
impunity, and violations of human rights. A new doctrine in the post Cold War era has 
been introduced, that includes political stability, economic development, democratic 
governing, ethic harmony, and respect for human rights. This respect for human rights is 
examined under the fundamental concern where international justice could help create a 
real and lasting peace and stability in places torn apart by civil wars, armed conflicts, and 
genocides. In countries such as the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda during the last decade 
even human dignity has been trampled on a large scale. By punishing those responsible 
for the horrific crimes in those states, it will deliver a powerful message to the political, 
military authorities and warlords worldwide: they will be tracked down, and one day, 
sooner or later, they will be brought to justice; it is too small a world for them to hide. 
The U.N. ad hoc tribunals’ mandate is not to develop international law; the 
standards already exist. However, like any other judicial body they clarify applicable 
rules of international law, and thus reaffirm that international human rights law exists, 
that international criminal law exists, and gradually develop them in some cases. It is 
more than certain that their jurisprudence will cause significant legal development in 
national legislatures adding to the protection of individuals, reduce any national or 
international legal gaps, clarify legal uncertainties, and bring again, after Nuremberg, the 
principle of human dignity to the center of the political and legal debate especially when 
it comes to internal conflicts. 
                                                 




However, their mandate should be considered also in narrower terms, i.e., in 
terms of pragmatic political and legal considerations in terms of their creation and in 
capturing the social, cultural, political, and historical background for Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. The aim is to be a part of the tool kit for building confidence and reconciliation 
in their post-conflict societies and prevent destabilization of their regions. Both tribunals 
showed that the cooperation of the neighboring states is a reality due to the support of the 
World Powers, mainly the West, to the tribunals.  
Likewise, the ad hoc tribunals’ contribution within the civil-military relations 
should be examined under those pragmatic and legal considerations. So far even being 
supported by the West changes started emerging only recently, and is the future that 
prove them real or just cosmetic; a hypocrisy by the elites holding office to provide 
themselves with aid, to eliminate their rivals, and to consolidated power.  
It is indeed true that the tribunals face a lot of problems by their setting. It is also 
true that the situation in the former Yugoslavia is in flux within the society, the state, and 
the military, and Rwanda-despite recent positive moves towards peace-is still fighting a 
war with insurgents and the DRC.216 Their progress has been different; institutional and 
legal reforms have already started in Yugoslavia contrary to Rwanda where any progress 
has been limited and fragile, especially within the military. The year to come will be a 
crucial one for the credibility of constitutional reforms in both countries. As long as 
international aid continues, the tribunals will fulfill their mandate. Nevertheless, both the 
ICTY and the ICTR have by now been confirmed as courts of law as a result of their 
extraordinary activity. Moreover, they are now entering their phase of maturity hence it is 
very important for them not to hold back on attempts to bring to justice those believed 
responsible for the horrific atrocities. This should be done not just by the fear of the 
police officer that they have to create, but also with the legitimization of the tribunals per 
                                                 
216 Although peace talks have started as soon as the summer of 2002 between Rwanda and DRC, 
recent incidents in Uvira made U.N.S.G. Kofi Annan to urge the leaders of both countries to stay the course 
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se within Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Efforts by the international community and the West 
should be seen as a long-term commitment; hence the recent developments towards 
peacekeeping in terms of maintaining the United States of America commitment in this 
kind of operations are encouraging.217 This bottom up method will influence masses and 
elites, and will create structures and institutions that will influence those who control 
















                                                 
217 The entry into force of the new ICC led the U.S. to stop supporting U.N. peacekeeping operations 
unless the ICC gives Americans taking part in peacekeeping immunity from prosecution. The dispute over 
immunity could have serious implications for the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia; the U.S. has said it 
could withdraw the force it has in Bosnia if demands for immunity are not met. The political debate ended 
on July 12, 2002 with a “golden-mean” solution: The U.S. peacekeepers are given immunity from the ICC 
for a year. That will allow the peacekeeping operations to continue, to ease the American fears, and the ICC 
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VI. FINAL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A. THE TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURIDICAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
1. Beyond the Ad Hoc Tribunals 
The international civil society has made significant progress after the end of the 
Second World War. The two IMTs served as symbols, appealing to the hearts and minds 
of the people worldwide. They have developed new legal norms and standards of 
behavior. Responsibility and accountability have been advanced under international law. 
The legal bases and reasoning for social and political institutions, state and military 
conduct have been improved. However, it would be unrealistic to think that the tragedies 
brought by wars and human rights abuses would disappear with these military tribunals 
and there codifications. 
It is no exaggeration to argue that their normative developments did not go very 
far due to the Cold War tensions. While international human rights law and international 
criminal law developed quickly, their international monitoring and enforcing mechanisms 
remained highly political or quasi-judicial in the best of the cases. For most of the Cold 
War era, human values and international law were virtually taboo during the Cold War, 
since they were seen as an ideological bent of the West. 218  De-colonization strengthened 
even more respect for state sovereignty during the early Cold War. The Third World 
countries decried interference in any forms in their domestic affairs. Moreover, the West 
and the Soviets treated relations of democracy as an illegitimate intrusion into domestic 
state affairs.  
In this international setting where balance due to mutual destruction provided 
stability, norms and values were secondary issues. Interference in foreign nations was 
done only with respect to “containment policies” and in similar efforts to win the Cold 
War. It was definitely a world of states in a system of anarchy, dominated by realism. 
Under that perspective, the West used its influence in creating human rights judicial 
bodies like the ECHR, and the IACHR with strong monitoring powers but limited 
                                                 
218 The human rights norms established at Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975, undermined the 
viability of one party Communist rule hence, contributing significantly to the large changes of 1989 and the 
victory of then West. For more see Daniel C. Tomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human 
Rights, and the Demise of Communism, Princeton University Press, 2001. 
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enforcing capability, either for reasons of regional unity or to provide ideological 
legitimacy against the Soviets. The ECHR system in particular was necessary, despite the 
prior existence of the U.N. system, because it meant to be effective since all its members 
shared an essentially democratic political culture. 
During the Cold War period, legal arrangements, as they have already been 
briefly addressed in the second chapter, followed the political tensions. States were 
“salient” and their consent was needed for any other state to take legal action in 
vindication of a public interest. Furthermore, it was the state that was wrong; the 
individual was not responsible for international wrongs or for conduct in breach of 
international obligations. It is the state that acts in the international plane. Since the 
Second World War, only two international conventions referred to an international 
criminal jurisdiction, namely Article 6 of the 1948 Genocide Convention, and Article 5 of 
the 1973 Apartheid Convention. The former only referred to an eventual criminal court, 
and the latter to establish an international criminal jurisdiction to prosecute apartheid, 
which obviously was not enforced for political reasons. Hence, political considerations, 
the notion of state, and the state’s consent prevented the use of international legal 
standing against international crimes such as the ones that Nuremberg and Tokyo faced.  
Along the same lines came the civil-military relations. In the Cold War climate 
the armed forces of the Soviet block were under the complete control of the communist 
political apparatus. The Western powers with the United States as their leader were more 
concerned with the strategic balance than with “pulling straggling western allies to the 
democratic flock.”219 Democracy in West Germany and Japan was promoted in order to 
consolidate the West’s side in the post world-war world following the early Cold War 
containment doctrine. The issue of getting the military under the democratic civilian 
control was performed in a similar manner; only where it was necessary or convenient for 
the sake of the common effort of the West. In this bipolar world between the East and the 
West, international factors and especially international law and international juridical 
bodies have played a role secondary to the transitions to democracy. In South America, 
international pressures were more ambiguous due to the role and the influence of the U.S. 
in the region. However, they have influenced the views of the elites domestically, and 
                                                 
 219 Felipe Agüero, Soldiers Civilians and Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, p.4. 
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“have indeed been critical in several instances in triggering or encouraging the transition 
and in supporting processes of democratic consolidation later on.”220  
When the Cold War was over, the Soviets and the Americans trying to avoid a 
security vacuum, considered the United Nations as their prime candidate to help organize 
international peace and security. The United Nations provided a ready answer for the 
World Powers to dissolve conflicts in places that had relatively little significance to them. 
In these conflicts the humanitarian consequences were such that the public opinion in the 
West, in the new emerging globalization era, could not ignore them. Issues like 
dismantling militaries, and bringing them under civilian control, promoting democracy 
and the free market, and building institutions for peace and prosperity became the 
favorite debates in both sides of the Atlantic. In that attempt the United Nations’ role in 
global politics was re-oriented: its Security Council now personified the central norms 
and values of the international community, and proved to be the major instrument for 
promoting and establishing them worldwide.  
However, these values despite their moral significance were mainly defined in 
terms that furthered security and sovereignty among the states, and the United Nations 
became the missionary for that effort. The main issue now is to create regions with shared 
values, and within them states that have domestic legitimacy and the rule of law. 
Furthermore, due to the belief that the domestic rule of law promotes the international 
rule of law, democracy was accepted as the cornerstone to international security. A state 
was seen now not only as source of protection but also as source of harm causing 
instability, and that most of the security crises occurred not between states but within 
them. “The only way to fix that problem was to promote the rule of law, a point made in 
countless speeches and documents.”221 Hence, after several decades of slow progress, the 
breakthrough came in 1993 and 1994 respectively with the establishment of the two 
United Nations ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). 
These tribunals showed that the unwillingness or inability of the national authorities to 
bring to justice the perpetrators of horrific crimes could be overcome. Justice and security 
can be achieved if the international community is willing to support such bodies 
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politically, economically and by providing the enforcement capacity necessary. Indeed, 
regardless of how their jurisprudence and rules of procedure are viewed, their value as 
precedents sending a powerful message cannot be contested. Both of the tribunals are 
now entering their phase of maturity and they do not seem to be holding back on attempts 
at bringing to justice those believed responsible for the horrific atrocities. They serve as 
part of the tool kit for building confidence and reconciliation in their post-conflict 
societies and prevent destabilization of their regions, and show that the cooperation of the 
neighboring states is a reality. Efforts by the international community and the West in 
supporting the ICTY and the ICTR should be seen as a long-term commitment. 
Moreover, with these tribunals, an interesting “spill over” effect was obtained in 
terms of an increased concern for the punishment of notorious human rights offenders 
that committed atrocities as parts of the higher echelons of their military or as head of 
states. The decision by British courts in 1998 that Senator Augusto Pinocet could be 
extradited to Spain to face trial for crimes against humanity allegedly committed while he 
was head of State of Chile was of tremendous importance in fighting the notion of 
impunity. Similar decisions were made during 2000 by a Senegalese court against the 
former Chadian President Hissene Habre on torture charges, and in 2001 with the 
convictions of four Rwandan defendants by a Belgian jury for complicity in the 1994 
genocide.222 
Recently new approaches in international justice have emerged, as products of the 
consensus between a sovereign state and the United Nations, the latter providing the 
drafting, adoption, implementation, administration and funding of the necessary 
legislation (such is the case of East Timor) or just providing materiel and international 
personnel (such is the case of Cambodia). These juridical bodies fall under the definition 
of the Transnational Juridical Institutions but are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nevertheless they will be briefly addressed. Their major characteristic is that although 
they embrace local communities, and their important by-product is expected to be 
institution building, they suffer from major problems of implementation. Their 
mechanisms are grafted onto weak national justice systems, by no means close to 
international or Western standards, most of the times not compatible with local 
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expectations, and the logistic support and commitment needed for them seem to have 
strained the capabilities of the international community.223 
The first of these bodies in Cambodia has recently failed since the United Nations 
announced on February 8, 2002 that it was ending negotiations with the government of 
Cambodia to establish the tribunal.224  It would have examined crimes committed twenty-
five years ago in Cambodia, the “Khmer Rouge tribunal” as it is called. It had been the 
object of lengthy and complicated negotiations by Cambodia and the United Nations, and 
it would have been composed of both national and international judges and prosecutors, 
organized in three Trial Chambers under the national system. Its jurisdiction would have 
been over serious violations of Cambodian and international law between 1975 and 1979, 
committed by senior leaders and others. Due to the corruption and the low standards of 
the domestic system the United Nations ended negotiations with Cambodia to set up the 
tribunal. 
The second internationalized tribunal addresses crimes in Sierra Leone. On 
August 2000, the government of Sierra Leone initiated moves by the Security Council 
establishing such a court, and the United Nations responded with a treaty based court of 
concurrent jurisdiction with national courts, and mixed composition (its judges will be 
both national and international but the Prosecutor will be appointed by the Secretary 
General) for crimes in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 1996. This court is 
financed by the United Nations under an agreement between the latter and the 
government of Sierra Leone in January 2002. 
The last internationalized body is the tribunal established by the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), for persons that have committed 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture and specific violations of the 
Indonesian Penal Code in the region in 1999. It is composed of Special Panels serving as 
part of the District Court of Dili and the judges are both from East Timor and of other 
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Jelena Pejic, Accountability for international crimes: From conjecture to reality, p. 13-33, and 
Suzannah Linton, New approaches to international justice in Cambodia and East Timor, IRRC March 
2002, Vol. 84, No 845, p. 93-119. 
 224 Statement by UN legal Counsel Hans Corell at a press briefing in New York, February 8, 2002. 
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nationalities. While it has been trying individuals since 2001 and its first ruling came on 
December 2001 it has been criticized for its link to a very weak national justice system 
and lack of funding. 
After all these tribunals-especially after the ICTY and the ICTR- due to the time 
and effort required to establish, make them functional, and to provide the necessary 
logistics, the Security Council reached a point of “tribunal fatigue.” Moreover, even if 
they have not produced a sufficient record on which to be judged, these tribunals’ 
establishment is under the Security Council’s authority. Once peace and security is 
restored, the latter loses its competence and the tribunals come to a close unless the 
Security Council itself finds that they are still necessary for maintaining peace, security, 
and stability. However, it is obvious that this should not be the practice against impunity. 
The idea of a permanent international court free from political manipulations is not new, 
but instead is overdue. This Transnational Juridical Body truly international is opted for 
the new world order, which includes the elimination of impunity.  
 
2. The International Criminal Court (ICC) Regime 
The ICC regime attempts to balance the role of national and international 
institutions. The ICC as a legal institution is highly sophisticated and no summary can 
provide an adequate understanding of the court per se and the political debate behind it, 
as a thorough and careful study of its Statute and the relevant history behind it. However, 
a broad outline for the sake of completion could bring some light to the principles and the 
current debate over it. 
Historically, the idea of the establishment of a permanent ICC goes back to the 
post Second World War period. Shortly after the U.N. was founded, the International 
Law Commission (ILC) was mandated to codify the principles that emerged from the 
IMTs, but further progress was hampered due to the Cold War. In 1989, after an initiative 
from Trinidad and Tobago over the problem of drug trafficking it was brought to the 
surface again. In the new globalization era, the set up of the ICC quickly progressed.225 
                                                 
 225 For the initial U.S. resistance towards the ICC concept, the effect of the ICJ’s decision on the 
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After the events in the former Yugoslavia, and in Rwanda the idea of prosecuting 
individuals among the military, high ranking officials and even heads of state acquired a 
broad based support among the public and many states. The U.N. General Assembly 
established in 1994 an ad hoc committee to review a draft Statute provided by the ILC, 
and to consider arrangements for the convening of an international conference on the 
plenipotentiaries. At the same time, as has been shown from the analysis in the previous 
chapter the experience with the two ad hoc tribunals was mixed. Hence, the ICC looked 
like a very promising solution for the future; both desirable and practical. Years of efforts 
of multinational working groups culminated in the convening of the Rome Conference. 
The conference was attended by one hundred and sixty states, from June 15 to July 17 
1998 that adopted the ICC Statute on the last day. 
It is important for the analysis to notice that a significant driving force behind the 
ICC’s momentum were a group of delegations known as the “like-minded” states,226 and 
non-governmental organizations, especially the “NGO Coalition for an ICC.” Their 
lobbying at the United Nations contributed to keeping the momentum for the ICC alive. 
On the other hand the greatest challenge to the ICC came from members of the Security 
Council,227 notably the U.S. and China. Against the adoption of the ICC also voted India, 
Libya, Iraq, and Yemen. Russia has signed the Treaty but not ratified it yet. The United 
States and China, each for different reasons, wanted to put the ICC under the control of 
the Security Council by making the latter the deciding body of the cases that will be 
viewed by the ICC. China is much concerned with the human rights situation 
domestically; abuses against its own population may bring China to the stand.  
China could not accept the universal jurisdiction of the ICC without State 
consent. In its view, the power of the Prosecutor should be based on State consent. 
Moreover, the ICC Statute should be adopted by consensus. 
India was concerned that the Statute gives to the UN Security Council a role in 
terms that violate international law-the Council has the power to refer a case to the ICC, 
the power to block the ICC’s proceedings, and the power to bind non-States Parties to the 
ICC Statute-all these while some of the security Council members may have no intention 
to become States Parties to the Statute. Secondly, India was also concerned that the 
Statute accepts the concept of universal or inherent jurisdiction, making no distinction 
                                                 
 226 By April 1998 the group included Australia, Austria, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, 
Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lesotho, Netherlands, 
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 227 By June 27, 2002 China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iraq, and Turkey have failed to sign up to the 
1998 Rome Treaty. The U.S., Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Russia have failed to ratify the Treaty. 
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between States Parties and non-States Parties. Finally, the ICC Statute has failed to 
incorporate India’s proposal to proscribe as a war crime the use of ‘weapons of mass 
destruction, i.e. nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.’228 
 
The American concerns arise from a fear that military personnel and state officials 
will be subjected by disgruntled states to prosecution by the court. Under the Clinton 
administration, the U.S. envoy to the Rome Conference supported a court of more limited 
powers. Eventually the U.S. signed the Treaty but due to the strong Republican control of 
the Senate no attempt to ratify it was made. The new U.S. administration has made it 
clear that has no intention to ratify the ICC. In early December 2001, the U.S. Senate first 
adopted a version of the controversial bill known as the American Servicemembers’ 
Protection Act (ASPA), and a few days after Christmas 2001 the U.S. Congress came 
very close to passing a law that would have permanently banned U.S. participation in the 
ICC.229 As Mark Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs remarked, 
We believe the ICC undermines the role of the United Nations Security Council 
in maintaining international peace and security. 
We believe in checks and balances. The Rome Statute creates a prosecutorial 
system that is an unchecked power. 
We believe that in order to be bound by a treaty, a state must be party to that 
treaty. The ICC asserts jurisdiction over citizens of states that have not ratified the treaty. 
The ICC asserts jurisdiction over citizens of states that have not ratified the treaty. This 
threatens US sovereignty. 
We believe that the ICC is built on a flawed foundation. These flaws leave it 
open for exploitation and politically motivated prosecutions.230 
 
Hence, on May 6, 2002 the U.S. informed the U.N. that their intention is not to 
become a part of the court although the previous administration signed the ICC treaty in 
2000. Moreover, on February 28, 2002 the U.S. announced that it wants to end the U.N.’s 
system of the international war crimes tribunals by the year 2007-8. In the American 
opinion this system foster a dependency on international institutions.231 
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Domestic U.S. policies, the new administration’s policy towards the ICC and the 
fear of putting U.S. personnel at risk of politicized prosecutions, especially after the 
horrific terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 reinforced the decisions not to participate 
or assist the ICC. However,  
The question is not whether the risk of unfounded prosecution of American soldiers 
should be minimized. It should be and it has. The question is whether the benefit of 
eliminating the very last iota of risk justifies totally ignoring the cost to other interests of 
opposing the ICC. No rational calculation could conclude that it does.232 
 
In some cases, American servicemembers and policy makers were accused for 
war crimes, along with the rest of their NATO allies, for the NATO air campaign over the 
former Yugoslavia in 1999. Therefore, a committee was set by the ICTY Prosecutor in 
May 1999 to assess the allegations. The latter’s final report of June 2000 “exonerated all 
NATO personnel from all blame by deferring to the honest judgment of the soldiers in 
the field and the military strategists at the relevant time.”233 
Unfortunately, the U.S. decisions towards the ICC broke ranks with its closest 
allies. It is not only that the Americans were considered to be the leaders among the west 
in prosecuting war criminals and promoting the rule of law for decades, and this seems 
not to be the case any more, but in terms of policy they isolate themselves from their 
closest ally, the E.U..234  
Regardless of how the U.S. and China view the ICC, for a large number of states 
is considered to be a landmark in international cooperation and possibly the greatest step 
towards transnational justice. Up to November 1, 2002 one hundred and thirty-nine states 
are signatories to the 1998 Rome Treaty, and eighty-one of them, including all the 
members of the European Union, are already parties to the treaty. Since the ICC needed 
only sixty signatories for entry into force, the ICC will begin functioning on July 1, 2002. 
This led the U.S. to stop supporting U.N. peacekeeping operations unless Americans 
taking part are given immunity from prosecution by the ICC. The dispute over immunity 
                                                 
 232 International Criminal Court: The Case for U.S. Support, LCHR, p. 2. Available [online] at: 
http://www.lchr.org/feature/50th/uspos.htm, 6/27/2002. 
 233 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law, p. 163. The Final Report is available 
[online] at: http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm, 6/27/2002. 
234 Although on September 30, 2002 the E.U.’s fifteen foreign ministers set forth guidelines that 
would allow individual E.U. states to negotiate with the U.S. limited immunity arrangements, Washington 
still strongly opposes the ICC. See US rejects EU criminal court guidelines, BBC, UK. Available [online] 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2291451.stm, 11/1/2002. 
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could have had serious implications for the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia; the US 
had said it could withdraw the force it has in Bosnia if demands for immunity are not 
met.235 Similar attempts for East Timor had been made on May 2002, “after several 
council members, including Washington's closest allies, rejected a U.S. proposal to 
extend criminal immunity to all former or current U.N. personnel serving in the 
mission.”236 Finally, on July 12, 2002 the U.N.S.C. agreed unanimously in providing the 
U.S. peacekeepers with a twelve-month exemption from the ICC,237 and the problem is 
therefore solved for a year. However, if an exemption renewal does not follow, the 
Stability Operations as part of the missions of the U.S. military will have to refocus in 
non-U.N. operations, which will hinder the traditional U.S.-U.N. cooperation. 
It is important to notice that a multinational treaty establishes the ICC. The court 
is designed to attract the support of its State Parties, i.e., a political support without 
sacrificing the fairness and effectiveness of the ICC as an institution, through a 
combination of features displayed in its Statute. Although there were many compromises 
for reaching the final draft, mainly to satisfy the United States, “there eventually was a 
limit to how much they would debilitate the Court in order to satisfy a nation that plainly 
was not going to join.”238 For that a closer look to the ICC’s Statute seems necessary. 
The ICC Statute comprises a Preamble and thirteen parts of total of one hundred 
and twenty eight articles. It is already part of the customary international law since the 
vast majority of the states have adhered to it. The Statute’s Preamble states that only the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community will be brought to the 
court, and emphasizing that the ICC will have complementary jurisdiction to the national 
courts.  
                                                 
 235 UN urged to oppose US immunity, BBC NEWS, June 27, 2002. Available [online] at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_2069000/2069059.stm, 6/27/2002. 
 236 Colum Lynch, U.S. Peacekeepers May Leave East Timor-Immunity Sought By World Crimes 
Court, Special to the Washington Post, May 18, 2002, p. A20. Available [online] at: 
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237 U.N. agrees to U.S. peacekeeper exemption, CNN.com./U.S. Available [online] at:  
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/07/12/us.international.court/ 7/20/2002. 
 238 International Criminal Court: The Case for U.S. Support, LCHR, p. 12.  
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Part 1 is entitled “Establishment of the Court” affirms the independence of the 
ICC as a permanent institution, with the seat at The Hague, Netherlands. The court will 
have international legal personality and such legal capacity necessary to fulfill its 
purposes. It may exercise its powers on the territory of any state Party to the Rome 
Convention and on the territory of any other state by special agreement. 
Part 2 is under the title “Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable law.” This is a 
highly politically influenced part, and is a result of a compromise in which the scheme 
established will assure effectiveness while respecting the sovereignty of the states.  It 
mainly states that the ICC shall have jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and the crime of aggression once the latter is defined. Therefore, its subject-
matter jurisdiction is very narrow. Likewise, its jurisdiction ratione temporis exists only 
for conduct occurring after the Statute’s entry to force. The ICC will have jurisdiction 
only if either the state of nationality of the accused or the state on the territory of which 
the crime took place, is party to the Statute. If they are not parties then the ICC will 
exercise jurisdiction only if either of the states consents so or, if the UN Security Council 
sends the case to the ICC. Hence, by requiring state consensus, the ICC upholds the basic 
idea of differentiation between the individual who engages in criminal acts from the 
collectivity, which the individual claims to represent. In addition to these limits, the 
principle of complementarity displays the respect to the national systems. The primary 
responsibility for investigating and prosecuting crimes are in the hands of the domestic 
systems. The ICC will act in cases where the latter are unwilling or unable to do so 
themselves. Therefore, if U.S. servicemen were accused the ICC’s jurisdiction would be 
triggered only if the United States of America were unwilling or unable to prosecute. 
However, even preliminary U.S. investigations of wrongdoing would satisfy this 
requirement; even if no charges were finally brought. Furthermore, the US has a 
rigorously enforced military system hence; it is extremely unlikely that the ICC would 
ever have the chance to bring charges against U.S. military personnel. Even in the case of 
the My Lai massacre it does not seem likely that the ICC would have jurisdiction since 
the U.S. prosecuted the individual, under U.S. national law,239 responsible for the 
                                                 
 239 According to Dr. J. Holmes Armstead Jr. “The My Lai incident, besides being the horrible crime 
that it was, was a reflection on this country and our fighting forces. It was a reflection on the way we view 
ourselves in the international community and a vivid demonstration of how wrong we can be. It afforded an 
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massacre.240 The ICC is not a replacement of the national justice systems; in fact the 
ICC’s contribution to the weaker national legal systems is likely to be one of the most 
important long-term accomplishments. 
Part 3 is under the title “General Principles of Criminal Law.” It incorporates the 
basic principles of legality nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Moreover, the ICC shall 
have jurisdiction only over natural persons and from those only the ones over the age of 
eighteen. Official positions neither bar its jurisdiction nor they constitute grounds for 
reduction of sentence. Additionally, this part provides for the responsibility of 
commanders and other superiors in addition to the rest criminal responsibility provisions, 
and states that the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction shall not be subject to any statute 
of limitations.  
Part 4 addresses the compositions and administration of the ICC. The court will 
include the Presidency, namely the President and two Vice Presidents; the Appeals 
Division, a Trial Division, and a Pre-Trial Division; the Office of the Prosecutor; and the 
Registry. A total of eighteen judges will serve the court,241 and most importantly the 
Office of the Prosecutor, who is elected by an absolute majority of the Assembly of 
States Parties for two years, shall act as a separate organ, independently. 
                                                 
opportunity however, to deal with issues of international war crimes as regarding our own citizens and 
while justice was meted out to one irrefutably culpable, a trial by a different forum with more latitude 
would have provided a more comprehensive resolution of the legal issues involved. We treated an 
uncommon criminal as if he had committed a common crime and receive a not unexpected result-a guilty 
verdict. But that is not enough; this man was found guilty of the wrong charge and probably in the wrong 
court.” J. Holmes Armstead Jr., The United States vs. William Calley: An opportunity missed! Southern 
University Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 1984, p.217. 
 240 William Calley was tried by a court martial for his role in the My Lai massacre in Vietnam during 
the Vietnam War, was convinced and sentenced to life imprisonment and hard labor. Nevertheless, the US 
President Richard Nixon ordered that he be confined to quarters pending appeal, and the Commander of the 
Third Army reduced Calley’s sentence to twenty years. IN 1974 the US Secretary of Defense reduced his 
sentence to ten years, and in 1975 he was released on parole until the US Court of Appeal for the Fifth 
Circuit reversed the decision of the district court; Calley remained free on parole, and released after serving 
a total of six months of his sentence. In My Lai twenty-two infants, children, women, and old men were 
killed in cold blood. Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law, p. 41. Furthermore, it is 
important to notice that the crimes in the ICC treaty are crimes of universal jurisdiction hence, any nation in 
the world has the authority to exercise jurisdiction over such criminals without the consent of the 
individual’s nationality. In that case the ICC provisions are definitely, again, in favor of a hypothetical U.S. 
servicemember. 
 241 For how the judges are nominated and elected at the ICC see Neil Falzon et. all, Nomination and 
Election of Judges to International Courts, The European Law Student’s Association, April 2002. 
Available [online] at: 
http://www.iccnow.org/ELSAprepcom9annex.pdf, 6/27/2002. 
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Part 5 involves the procedures for investigation and prosecution. It should be 
noted that the Prosecutor could carry out investigations within the territory of a State 
Party without needed the cooperation of that state if the Pre-Trial Chamber determines 
that that state is unable to execute a request for cooperation. The Prosecutor is 
independent however “detailed provisions are included in the Statute to ensure proper 
checks and balances with respects to his power.”242 He must defer to states, the 
investigation is initialized not from him but from the Pre-Trial Chamber, both the suspect 
and the states concerned have the right ton challenge his decisions, the admissibility of 
the case and the jurisdiction of the ICC can be also challenged under the Statute. The 
Prosecutor’s appointment is done by secret ballot by the State Parties and the Assembly 
has the power to remove him.  
Part 6 addresses the trial, and the rights of the accused, where Part 7 enumerates 
the penalties imposed, and Part 8 provides on Appeal and Revision. Part 6 states that 
there will be no trials in absentia. It is very important that, according to this part, the ICC 
is empowered to award reparations to victims. This reparation can be restitution, 
compensation, and rehabilitation. In terms of punishment the ICC may impose only 
imprisonment, and forfeiture of proceeds, property, and assets derived from the crime. In 
general the Statute contains the most comprehensive list of due process protections, 
which has so far been promulgated, and sets extensive checks and balances to prevent 
prosecutorial abuses. 
Part 9 regards International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance and Part 10 
Enforcement. Non-Sate Parties may be invited also to provide assistance. ICC has 
priority over competing requests between itself and other states. When a State Party fails 
to cooperate with the ICC, the latter may refer the matter to the Assembly of the States 
Parties or to the U.N. Security Council if the latter referred the matter to the ICC. 
Moreover, the ICC may not proceed with a request for surrender, which would require 
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law or 
international agreements. Such obligations and agreements as diplomatic immunity of an 
individual or property of a third State are agreements according to which the consent of 
the third state is required. This was again an issue of political compromise since states are 
                                                 
 242 Some Questions and Answers, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations, 
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reluctant to surrender their citizens to international judicial bodies. The relevant national 
law or constitution in many cases prohibits extradition. The United States of America 
mainly upheld the debate over the issue, and the solutions adopted represent some of the 
U.S. concerns. The latter is concerned that U.S. citizens could be brought to the ICC 
without any U.S. consensus. At present, the United States of America has Status-of-
forces agreements (SOFA) with the host state in which U.S. forces are stationed that 
protect U.S. personnel from local arrests for actions in course of their duties; the concerns 
remains for states that no SOFA exists. However, “the United States has promoted and 
become a party to several treaties that create new international crimes over which 
national courts have jurisdiction (for instance, money laundering and drug trafficking), 
even if the accused is a citizen of a country that is not a party to the treaty, and even if the 
crimes were not committed in the country that proposes to try them.”243 
Parts 11, 12 and 13 regard the Assembly of Party States, Financing, and final 
Clauses respectively. Each State Party will have one representative to the Assembly and 
they will represent the voting body of the ICC, deciding on relevant non judicial issues, 
e.g. administration, budget approvals, number of judges etc. The ICC is to be financed by 
contributions from the State Parties based on the U.N. scale; by the U.N., subject to the 
approval of the U.N. General Assembly; and on voluntary contributions. In the Final 
Clauses part is provided that the ICC will settle disputes regarding judicial functions; the 
rest are responsibilities of the Assembly or can be regulated by negotiations. The Statute 
can be amended but only after seven years from its entry to force, i.e., in 2009.  
The ICC started operating in July 1, 2002. It will be harder for the court to 
function without the logistic capacity, military know-how, finding and providing 
evidence, and the political support of the U.S.. Nevertheless, due to its importance, the 
Americans are likely at some point in the future to become a Party State. The ICC in the 
short term is not going to do very much. The case of U.S. personnel to be brought to the 
court exists in theory but it is not likely to happen; the arguments have more to do with 
                                                 
p.5-6. Available [online] at: http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/iccq&a.htm, 6/27/2002. 
 243 Marc Grossman Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Cited from Antony Dworkin, The 
United States and the International Criminal Court: A briefing, Crimes of War Project, May 15, 2002, p.8. 
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domestic U.S. politics than reality. Likewise, the U.S. criminal, and military justice 
system would have in any case primacy over the ICC. There are many NATO and 
European allies that share the same concerns, but they are overwhelmingly supporting the 
ICC. Besides the issues of credibility, it is important to adhere to the principle that 
international law is not just for the others; international law is for everyone, is universal. 
In the state-policy arena, sooner or latter cases like Rwanda or Yugoslavia will 
unfortunately happen again, and the U.S. will have no influence over the way things will 
be happening; an unwelcome perspective for the only superpower left after the end of the 
Cold War.  
From a purely pragmatic standpoint, the United States can do more to advance national 
interests (and the interests of U.S. servicemembers) by signing the Treaty than it could by 
continuing to-oppose the ICC. To no small degree, the Court’s efficacy and impact will 
hinge on the appointment of capable, fair, and apolitical officials. The United States has 
everything to gain from helping to choose those individuals. The United States will be in 
a better position to ensure an appropriate U.N Security Council role regarding the 
definition of aggression if ever the Assembly of States Parties were to entertain 
discussions on that contentious issue. Ignoring the court accomplishes little. It seems, on 
balance, prudent to sign the treaty.244 
 
The current political debate seems to favor a “golden-mean” solution: The U.S. 
peacekeepers have already been given immunity from the ICC for a year, then most 
probably this immunity will be extended on a year-by-year basis, and the E.U. has 
allowed the European states to negotiate limited immunity deals with the U.S.. This 
situation will permit the peacekeeping operations to continue, to ease the American fears 
and help them in moving towards the actual provisions of the 1998 Rome Treaty, and the 




B. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis examined the practice and theory of the four ad hoc criminal tribunals, 
namely the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia at 
                                                 
 244 William L. Nash, The ICC and the Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces, American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences. Available [online] at: http://www.amacad.org/publications/icc9.htm, 6/29/2002. 
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The Hague, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at Arusha. This was 
done through the scope of civil-military relations and their dynamics.  
It proved to be a topic generally neglected by both political scientists and 
international lawyers. The political scientists have not so far focused in international 
courts as external systemic factors and the international lawyers were more involved with 
the jurisprudence of the courts than the social and political outcomes.  
The basic research done proved to be constructive despite the difficulties 
encountered. These tribunals have shown that international repression of serious 
violations of international crimes is no longer a theoretical concept, and that is what is 
expected from them: to send the signal that impunity is no longer tolerable. In doing so, 
they significantly challenged the relations between the military, the state, and the society 
not just in the state that had or have jurisdiction but worldwide.  
The International Military Tribunals produced principles that were codified as 
international law and influenced societies by serving as symbols; states and state behavior 
through their constitution, legislation, and appealing to the public; armed forces through 
education, changing traditions, training in new missions, and forging a cult of obedience 
in international law. Although Germany and Japan had been for many years under 
occupation, credit has to be given to the IMTs for the establishment of democratic civil-
military relations in them. The German Basic Law created democratic citizen-soldiers 
that are mirror images of their societies since “democracy can be defended only by 
democrats.” The German soldier this time is not a simple state organ but a political being 
that by law is required to defend its Constitution hence to accept and preserve political 
control and respect for human rights. Horrific crimes like genocide and aggressive wars 
are explicitly prohibited. In Japan the 1946 “pacifist” Constitution effectively not only 
limits the capabilities, the roles and the missions of the military; it bans war itself. In both 
countries monitoring bodies were established under the Constitution to assure both that 
the conduct of the armed forces is along with the lines of the Constitution and that the 
state is not misguiding the armed forces in missions for holding on to power. These 
Constitutions were embraced by the respective societies which after suffered during the 
Second World War the remained under occupation for many years, hence bringing again 
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issues regarding the military into balance and not mere condemn. Even more the West 
and mainly the society in the United States of America embraced the tribunals; 
Nuremberg serves to them as symbol of justice and not just might. Missions of their own 
military were either condemned or applauded under the perspective of justice given more 
than fifty years ago, e.g. the wars in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf respectively. 
The Cold War significantly slowed down their normative developments at the 
international level. Certainly it was not, and it is not anticipated that the rulings of the 
International Military Tribunals would or will put an end to aggressive wars or war 
crimes. It is doubtful whether an explicit definition of aggression satisfying the principle 
of legality could ever be agreed upon. However, their significance in shaping public 
opinion and policy-makers world wide, in declaring an international ban on waging such 
acts was, and still is, of outmost importance. Their jurisprudence was used from the 
national legislations against war criminals and human rights abusers. Furthermore, the 
influence of their principles on the United Nations is obvious besides the U.N. per se, to 
the plethora of international treaties signed, e.g., the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide 
Convention, the Apartheid Convention, etc. Likewise regional structures were created 
like the ECHR and the IACHR to monitor the respect to human rights. When these 
Conventions were ratified from the national legislature then they restricted and guided the 
military even more. 
Furthermore, even though the IMTs had taken place more than fifty years ago 
they still influence policies and affect the armed forces. The way the latter are trained, 
educated, design their missions, and deployed is another indicator of their influence. New 
missions in terms of stability operations require knowledge of terms like “aggression,” 
“proportional force,” “war crimes,” “genocide,’” and “crimes against humanity” as the 
recent experience has shown. This terminology was first established in those criminal 
tribunals after the Second World War. Because the military are trained they way they are 
going to fight they are growingly exposed to all these terms and norms behind the latter. 
Likewise, a new doctrine in the post Cold War era has been introduced, that 
includes political stability, economic development, democratic governing, ethic harmony, 
and respect for human rights. In countries such as the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
that during the last decade even human dignity has been trampled on a large scale. By 
126 
punishing those responsible for the horrific crimes in those states a powerful message to 
the political, military authorities and warlords is delivered worldwide: one day sooner or 
later they will be brought to justice. This is exactly what the ICTY and the ICTR are 
trying to do. 
Their mandate is not to develop international law; those standards already exist. 
Their broader mandate is to reaffirm that international human rights law exists, that 
international criminal law exists, and gradually develop them in some cases, thus 
continue the momentum of the IMTs. Their jurisprudence has caused significant legal 
developments even diffusion effects in national legislations and in the United Nations as 
the cases of Pinocet and the internationalized tribunals are showing. However, their 
mandate should be considered also in a narrower terms, i.e. in being a part of the tool kit 
for building confidence and reconciliation in their post-conflict societies and prevent 
destabilization of their regions. Both tribunals showed as long as they are supported in 
their efforts they are successful. Likewise, the ad hoc tribunals’ contribution within the 
civil-military relations should be examined under that prism. So far even being supported 
by the West changes started emerging only recently, and is the future that prove them real 
or just cosmetic; a hypocrisy by the elites holding office to provide themselves with aid, 
to eliminate their rivals, and to consolidated power.  
The situation in the former Yugoslavia is in a flux within the society, the state, 
and the military, and Rwanda is fighting a war with insurgents and the DRC. Their 
progress has been different. In both countries new constitutions are going to be 
implemented during 2003. The PRF regime in Rwanda has consistently asserted its 
intention to convert the current highly militarized system into a democratic one with a 
new constitution. Further reforms included the justice system, and the passing of new 
legislation. The military responsible for the genocide are currently under trial at the 
ICTR. Efforts have been made to educate the armed forces with respect towards human 
rights, and reform the military justice system however; sufficient empirical results are not 
yet available. Nevertheless, the security threat for Rwanda is both internal from 
insurgents and external from DRC. Hence, even though there is a momentum towards a 
desirable end state it is too early to predict a conclusion. 
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In Yugoslavia, political and military elites shared not only the same values, but as 
the ICTY has shown they also shared the responsibility for the war crimes committed. 
This was to be expected since silent politicization has always been a reality within the 
army’s ranks. However changes can be seen in modernizing the legal system, passing 
new civil-military legislation, and in cooperating with the ICTY. The recent events with 
the Commander in Chief show that the civilian authorities seem to be in control. 
Likewise the fact that the Yugoslav General did not choose to overrun the government 
but instead pursued his claims through the court system is a good indicator. 
Furthermore, the tribunals having been exposed to criticism of partiality and 
“slow-justice” a fact that may cost the legitimization of the tribunals per se within the 
public in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The committee established from the ICTY Prosecutor 
for alleged crimes committed by NATO against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo air 
campaign, was definitely towards the right side. However, the need for fulfilling their 
mandate in a reasonable time frame remains. Efforts by the international community and 
the West should be seen as a long-term commitment and support the tribunals with 
administrative and logistic support in order for the tribunals to fulfill their mandate as 
soon as possible without endangering the demand for fair trials. 
The time and effort required to establish, make them functional, and to provide 
the necessary logistics for the above tribunals brought the Security Council to a point of 
“tribunal fatigue” that led to the establishment of the ICC. The debate over the latter, and 
the United States refusal to ratify it, has resulted in two major outcomes. The first is that 
efforts for prosecuting war criminals and promoting international justice lost their major 
contributor both in personnel and logistics the United States of America, and second that 
the possible U.S. military withdrawal from peacekeeping operations like the ones in East 
Timor and Bosnia, would effectively affect roles and missions of the U.S. military, by 
limiting their participation in U.N. peacekeeping.  
The abovementioned research highlighted that international justice can be used as 
a useful policy instrument to promote democratic civil-military relations. It effects 
Constitutions, attitudes, education, training, roles and missions of the armed forces and 
poses limitations to the state and the military through the established legal order in terms 
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of monitoring or balancing mechanisms like the military or the criminal justice system. 
Hence the major argument that if justice is served through institutionally mature, 
resourceful, widely representative, financially viable, and autonomous Transnational 
Juridical Institutions, then states and individuals will commit themselves further to the 
rule of law, even the most powerful states, seems to be justified. 
Even if the United States never ratifies the ICC, the argument will not loose its 
value; the executive authority of states will still have even more reason to changed its 
modus operandi into one that will adequately express the will of the people, the use of the 
military will be restricted to lawful actions, and the armed forces will be deterred from 
usurping the state apparatus, as long as the rest of the international community is 
supportive. This is an important result if one considers that the cost of international 
justice is small, relative to other areas of international cooperation.245 Hence, the burden 
for keeping international justice alive as a peculiar public good falls now within the rest 
of the West, especially within the E.U.. Their ability to confront the needs for keeping 
alive this fight against impunity and instability will be tested soon, for one thing is 







                                                 
 245 Approximately $250 million were spent each year up to 1996. See the conclusions in Cesare P. R. 
Romano, The Cost of International Justice.  
129 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Abenheim Donald, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West 
German Armed Forces, Princeton, 1988. 
2. Agüero Felipe, Soldiers Civilians and Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1995. 
3. Armstead J. Holmes Jr, The International Criminal Court: History, Development and 
Status, Santa Clara Law Review, Vol. 38, No 3,1998. 
4. Armstead J. Holmes Jr., The United States vs. William Calley: An opportunity missed! 
Southern University Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1984. 
5. Babovic Budimir, On police reform in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
Serbia, Working Paper Series-No 10, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, 2002. 
6. Barnett Michael, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, Cornell 
University Press, 2002. 
7. Bassiouni M. Cherif, Vet Nanda et al, A treatise in International Criminal Law, Vol. 
1, Thomas, 1973. 
8. Bassiouni M. Cherif, Nanda Vet et al, A treatise in International Criminal Law, Vol. 
2, Thomas, 1973. 
9. Bassiouni M. Cherif, ICC Ratification and National Implementing Legislation, 
International Association of Penal Law (AIDP), 13 Quarter, 1999. 
10. Bassiouni M. Cherif, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A documentary 
history, Transnational Publishers, 1998. 
11. Boelaert-Suominen Sonja, The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and the Kosovo conflict, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 837, 
2000. 
130 
12. Brownlie Ian, Principles of Public International Law, fifth edition, Oxford University 
Press, 1998. 
13. Campbell Kenneth J., Genocide and the Global Village, Palgrave, 2001. 
14. CCMR Belgrade, Security Concerns citizens, not the State, Compendium of Yugoslav 
laws on the Security Sector: Human rights and Democratic Oversight Aspects, 2002. 
Available [online] at: http://www.ccmr-bg.org/vesti/frmccmr0002.htm, 11/12/2002. 
15. De Hoogh André, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: A Theoretical 
inquiry into the Implementation and Enforcement of the International Responsibility 
of States, Kluer Law International, 1996. 
16. Dower John W., Embrasing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, Norton, 
1999. 
17. Ellenbecker Joseph A., From Nuremberg to The Hague: A Contrasting Study of War 
Crimes Tribunals, Maters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1998. 
18. Erasmus Gerhard and Fourie Nadire, The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda: Are all issues addressed? How does it compare to South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission?, International Review of the Red Cross, No 321, 1997. 
19. Falzon Neil et. all, Nomination and Election of Judges to International Courts, The 
European Law Student’s Association, April 2002.  
Available [online] at:http://www.iccnow.org/ELSAprepcom9annex.pdf, 6/27/2002. 
20. Feaver Peter D., Civil-Military Relations, Annual Reviews Political Science, 1999. 
21. Fisher Roger (ed), Improving Compliance With International Law, The Procedural 
Aspects of International Law (PAIL) Institute, Washington DC, 2002. 
22. Gourevich Philip, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will be Killed with our 
Families, Fattar Straus, 1996. 
23. Haas Richard N., Intervention: The use of American Military Force in the post-Cold 
War World, Revised edition, Brookings Institution Press, 1999. 
131 
24. Hadzic Miroslav, Civil Military Features of the FR Yugoslavia, Research-CCMR 
Beograd.  
Available [online] at: http://www.ccmr-bg.org/analize/istrazivanja/research4pint.htm, 
11/12/2002. 
25. Heinrich William (ed), United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: A guide to 
Japanese politics, United Nations University Press, 1999. 
26. Huntington Samuel P., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 14th printing, 
2000. 
27. Information on the ICTR cases researched until 11/11/2002. Available [online] at 
http://www.ictr.org. 
28. Information on the ICTY cases researched until 11/11/2002. Available [online] at 
http://www.un.org/icty. 
29. International Crisis Group (ICG), “Consensual Democracy” in Post-Genocide 
Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections, Africa Report No 34, 
October 9, 2001. 
30. International Crisis Group (ICG), Rwanda At The End of the Transition: A Necessary 
Political Liberalization, 11/13/2002. Available online] at: 
 http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=817, 11/14/2002. 
31. Koukourdinos Dimitrios, Constitutional law and the external limits of the legal 
framing of DCAF: The case of Croatia and the FR of Yugoslavia. Paper prepared for 
a Seminar “Legal framing of democratic control of armed forces and the security 
sector: norms and reality/ies” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland, 4-5 May 2001. 
32. Kittischaisaree Kriangsak, International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 
2001. 
132 
33. Lepard Brian D., Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: A Fresh Approach Based on 
Fundamental Ethical Principles in International Law and World Religions, 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002. 
34. Linz Juan and Stepan Alfred, Problems of Democratic transition and Consolidation, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
35. Linton Suzannah, New approaches to international justice in Cambodia and East 
Timor, IRRC, Vol. 84, No 845, 2002. 
36. Milosavljevic Bogoljub, New Legislation on Republic of Serbia’s State Security 
Service, Word of Experts, CCMR Belgrade.  
Available [online] at: http//www.ccmr-bg.org/analize/rec/word2.htm, 11/10/2002. 
37. Neuffer Elizabeth, The Key to my neighbor’s house: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and 
Rwanda, Picador USA, 2001. 
38. Newman Frank & Weissbrodt David, International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and 
Process, 2nd Edition, Anderson Publishing Co, 1996. 
39. Pejic Jelena, Accountability for international crimes: From conjecture to reality, 
IRRC, Vol. 84, No 845, 2002. 
40. Peter Chris Maina, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: bringing the 
killers to book, International Review of the Red Cross, No 321, 1997. 
41. Robertson, Horace B. Jr., Contemporary International law: Relevant to today’s 
world?, Naval War College Review, Vol. 45, Summer 1992. 
42. Röling B. V. A. et all, The Tokyo Judgment: The International Tribunal for the Far 
East, (I.M.T.F.E.) 29 April 1946-12 November 1948, APA-University Press 
Amsterdam BV, 1977, Vol. I. 
43. Röling B. V. A et all, The Tokyo Judgment: The International Tribunal for the Far 
East, (I.M.T.F.E.) 29 April 1946-12 November 1948, APA-University Press 
Amsterdam BV, 1977, Vol. II. 
133 
44. Röling B. V. A et all, The Tokyo Judgment: The International Tribunal for the Far 
East, (I.M.T.F.E.) 29 April 1946-12 November 1948, APA-University Press 
Amsterdam BV, 1977, Vol. III. 
45. Romano Cesare P. R., The Cost of International Justice, Columbia International 
Affairs Online Working Papers.  
Available [online] at: http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/roc01/index.html, 1/20/2002 
46. Rutaremara Jil D., Genocide in Rwanda: Towards a Theoretical Approach, Masters 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2000. 
47. Scharf Michael P., The politics behind the U.S. opposition to the International 
Criminal Court, New England International and Comparative Law Annual. 
Available [online] at: http://www.nesl.edu/annual/vol5/scharf.htm, 6/29/2002. 
48. Schulze Chistian, A Comparative Study of the German and British Defense 
Legislations, Institute for Foreign and Comparative Law, UNISA, 1994. 
49. Slagstad Rune (ed), Constitutionalism and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 
1988. 
50. Stepan Alfred, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, Princeton 
University Press, 1988. 
51. Taylor Telford, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, Quadrangle Books, 
1970. 
52. Taylor Telford, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: a personal memoir, Little, 
Brown and Company, 1992. 
53. Timotic Milorad, M.A., The attitudes of Serbian public toward the Army and defense, 
Center for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2002.  
Available [online] at:  
http://www.ccmr-bg.org/analize/istrazivanja/research3print.htm, 11/11/2002. 
54. Tomas Daniel C., The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the 
Demise of Communism, Princeton University Press, 2001. 
134 
55. United States Institute of Peace, Serbia Still at the Crossroads, Special Report, 2002. 
56. United Nations, Achievements of the ICTR.  
Available [online] at: www.ictr.org, 1/14/2002. 




58. United Nations, International Law. 
 Available [online] at: www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/specil.htm, 1/13/2002. 
59. United Nations, United Nations Documentation: Research Guide. 
Available [online] at: www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/specil.htm, 1/13/2002. 
60. United Nations, ICTY, ICTY at a glance. 
Available [online] at: www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm, 1/14/2002. 
61. Wembou Djiena, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Its role in the 






INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Professor James Holmes Armstead, Code NWAJ 
 Naval War College 
 Monterey, California 
 
4. Professor Thomas Bruneau 
            Department of National Security Affairs, Code NSBN 
 Monterey, California  
 
5. Chairman, National Security Affairs Department 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
6. Chairman, International Security and Civil-Military Relations 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
7. Engineering & Technology Curricular Office (Code 34) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
  
8. Hellenic Navy General Staff 
 Personnel and Training (B) Branch 
Holargos, Greece 
 
9. LT Stavros Polydorou 
 Holargos, Greece  
 
 
